On the Electoral System
Dwight King
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University
A. Three new electoral systems.
“Indonesia faces a series of three elections that are some of the most complex and challenging to have been faced by any democracy, let alone an emerging democracy such as Indonesia’s” (IFES, December 2003). In the five years since the 1999 elections, Indonesia has introduced three new election systems for the 2004 elections: an open-list proportional representation system for the national (DPR) and regional (DPRDs) legislatures; a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system for the new Regional Representative Council (DPD); and a two round majoritarian system for the Presidency. Each is more complex for at least one significant stakeholder–voters, parties, candidates and election administrators–than the single election system used for the 1999 elections.
Pre-election surveys have indicated that a huge, last minute effort is needed to educate the Indonesian public not only about new election processes, but about the new and revised institutions being created. As a result, we should expect higher rates of administrative problems at the lower levels as well as a higher proportion of invalid votes cast than in 1999. .
On top of the challenges of the changed framework, and the immensity of election tasks, are the problems of implementing elections in Aceh, under martial law, that are perceived to be conducive to a free vote and held in an atmosphere in which all contestants may participate fairly and without threat.
B. Thoughts on the “disappearing” abangan voters.
In an analysis of the 1955 and 1999 election results, I argued that the “basic cleavage in the Indonesian electorate between areas supporting nationalist and religiously inclusive parties (abangan) and areas supporting Islamic parties (santri) has not disappeared.”[1] In her review of my book, Paige Tan found this “striking because several studies in recent years have shown that the abangan themselves are dwindling.” She cites Bill Liddle’s and Saiful Mujani’s (hereafter LM) study of the 1999 election in which they found that about 80% of Indonesian Muslims would now be described as santri. Moreover, an even smaller share of the total fits the traditional characteristics of the abangan (about 3%). How can these seemingly contradictory findings about the socio-cultural characteristics of the electorate be reconciled?
One way, brought to my attention by Anies Baswedan, involves recognition that abangan refers to quite different behaviors in the two studies. I am concerned with voting which is likely to reflect commitment to a political ideology, whereas LM use abangan to refer to the daily practice of religion (observance of the Five Pillars). Since we lack information about religious practice collected from a representative sample (survey data) at at earlier point in time, we have nothing against which to compare LM’s findings. (One of LM’s objectives in 1999 was to establish a baseline for future measurement and comparison.)
The problems of equivalence and comparability aside, we need to know how the 80% level of “santrification” can be explained. Certainly one factor has been the increasingly active role of the state in Islamic affairs. Suharto built more than 900 masjid around the country. Nowadays, virtually every government building/complex includes a masjid/musholla where pengajian is available almost every day. There is impressionistic evidence that an increasingly large number of high ranking military officials are delivering Friday sermons in their barracks. Whereas in the past, the government bureaucracy was a haven for non-practicing Muslims, it has become a center of Islamic observances.
Gripped by frustration and a sense of powerlessness, growing numbers of Indonesia have become more pious/devout in their religious practice. It would not surprise me if a proportion larger than in the last election chose political Islam, i.e. parties that carry Muslim aspirations and agenda, such as formal inclusion of the Syariah into the constitution as well as efforts to promote policies that are particularly supportive toward the progress and empowerment of devout/pious Muslims, e.g. National Education System Law. Hence, I think we should expect stronger support than in 1999 for Islamist (PBB, PPP, and PKS), Islam-inclusive (PKB, PAN) and “Islam-friendly”[2] (GOLKAR) parties in the legislative election on April 5th. Voter behavior in the presidential election July 5th, however, seems even harder to predict and could well be a very different matter, e.g. a secular-nationalist ticket could prevail.