MISSION STATEMENT

The Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History was founded in 2010 with the goal of highlighting the scholarship of undergraduate history students. In doing so, the journal aims to develop and encourage academic achievement, to forge an intellectual dialogue between peers, familiarize students with the publishing process, and encourage student-faculty collaboration.

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Cover Photo:
Photograph of the former women’s gymnasium on College Green. The original building was constructed in 1909 and served as the gymnasium for both genders. In 1923 the men’s gymnasium was built and the original building served only women. In 1966, the university demolished the women’s gymnasium to make room for the new Vernon R. Alden Library on College Green.

*Cover photo and caption courtesy of Vernon R. Alden Library
Dear Reader,

I am pleased to present to you the third volume of the Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History. When OU students established the OUUJH in 2010, the purpose was to create a forum that showcased the hard work and dedication of undergraduates of history. In the first two issues, we saw various topics from young scholars across the United States and internationally whose interest and talents in researching and writing history are significant. That impressive scholarship continues with this year’s journal. The editorial board remains confident in the high quality of our publication due to the talents of our contributors. I am excited that our initial idea has been expanded this year as well. In volumes one and two, OUUJH highlighted longer works in the form of manuscripts. With the 2013 issue, through the incorporation of book reviews we created yet another space for undergraduate scholars to showcase their capabilities.

The third edition of the Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History explores the theme of imperialism and diverging interpretations of the power of politics. Readers will discover the impact of tiger hunting under imperial Japanese policies in Korea, delve into the politics of European imperial powers during the Fashoda conflict, explore the failures of the American Socialist party in the early twentieth century, and analyze the debate over the use of violence in abolitionist movement.

In closing, the credit and success of this publication is the product of the hard work, dedication, and collaborative efforts of the OUUJH student editorial board, advising professors, and most importantly, the authors of these articles. As one of the founding members, it has been truly a wonderful experience working with these professionals. We are grateful for the time and energy given by our graduate students Adam Givens and Matthew Jacobs as well as our faculty board, Dr. Brian Schoen, Dr. Miriam Shadis, and Dr. Ingo Trauschweizer. Their advice and guidance has helped the efforts of the student board as well as the authors in creating this final product. The commitment of the authors not only in researching but editing is to be commended. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to be a part of the Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History and look forward to reading future versions. I offer my sincerest congratulations to the editorial board, but most importantly to the authors for creating such a unique and absorbing journal.

I hope you enjoy!
Sara Fisher
Editor-in-chief

Athens, Ohio
15 April 2013
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From Fashoda to Entente: Lord Lansdowne and Anglo-French Rapprochement

James Bohland

British expansion from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century created a global empire unlike any ever seen before. By 1900 the British Empire was at the height of its power. Its merchant ships plied oceans the Royal Navy ruled, facilitating world trade. However, the British policy of isolation from Continental affairs, which allowed for much of the previous centuries expansion, became untenable in the last years of the nineteenth century. Storm clouds brewed on the horizon. German unification in 1871 created an economic and military powerhouse in the center of Europe. In 1894 two of Britain’s oldest enemies, France and Russia, allied with one another, creating a strong balance to British power. The Continental powers resolved the squabbles that kept them divided and unable to challenge British hegemony abroad.1 Meanwhile, in the Far East, Japan transformed rapidly from a feudal land run by Samurai to the dominant power in the region. This, coupled with the crumbling of the Manchu Dynasty in China, threatened to upset Britain’s favorable balance of trade in Asia. By 1900 even the United States was an industrial and imperial power.2 These new powers, taking advantage of a tentative European peace, sought to expand throughout the globe much as Britain had earlier.

British leaders faced the expansion of these new empires throughout the world after 1880, and became increasingly fearful that their Empire faced a security dilemma.3 The British policy of ‘Splendid Isolation’ from Continental affairs, which previously allowed for expansion, now became its greatest enemy. Britons who balked at the cost of defending the Empire alone argued that the only way to preserve it was to end isolation and secure a defensive partner.4 Chief

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4 Darwin, After Tamerlane, 324.
amongst them was Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, the Fifth Marquess of Lansdowne, who became Foreign Minister in 1900. Lord Lansdowne broke with the tradition of the past while at the Foreign Office and throughout his tenure there attempted to link British policy more tightly with the Continent. His work culminated in the signing of the Entente Cordial between Britain and France in 1904. This agreement served as the basis for an eventual Anglo-French alliance that would hold strong through two World Wars.

There exists much scholarship on the birth of the Entente Cordiale. In his excellent work, *Entente Cordiale: the Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904*, P.J.V. Rolo meticulously details the discussion and bargaining that took place before the signing of the Entente Cordiale. He argues that the agreement was only one of many reasons for the formation of the eventual Anglo-French alliance and that its significance is overrated. Historian George Monger in, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907*, argues that the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 and naval expansion by the other Great Powers initiated the change in British foreign policy seen at the beginning of the twentieth century. J.A.S. Grenville, in his work, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century*, provides great insight not only into Salisbury’s policy, but also how Lansdowne’s policy at the beginning of the twentieth century broke from the ‘Splendid Isolation’ of the past. Christopher Andrew’s biographical study, *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898 – 1905*, provides a detailed account of French objectives in building the Entente. The numerous and well-organized documents of the British Foreign Office, specifically, *British Documents on the Origins of the War: 1898-1914*, and the massive *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, also provide clues as to the source of the Entente Cordiale. When woven together, these narratives prove that the main reason British policy shifted away from isolation and towards rapprochement was due to the policies of Lord Lansdowne. Like all diplomats, Lansdowne developed policies based on threats perceived and real; and it was these policies, originally intended to end British isolation, that led to the Entente Cordiale of 1904.

**The Fashoda Incident**

The successful negotiation of the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France in 1904 is all the more remarkable considering that the two empires nearly went to war with one another only six years prior in 1898. Understanding both the incident that almost led to war, known as the Fashoda crisis, and its resolution is important in understanding the eventual rapprochement between Britain and France. It also nicely illustrates how Lansdowne’s formulation of foreign policy marks a distinct transition from the British foreign policy of the prior centuries. At the time of the Fashoda crisis, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, the Third Marquess of Salisbury serving as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and believing only in a future full of “apathetic tolerance” between the British and French worked only to preserve the status quo in the region.
Lansdowne would, after Salisbury’s retirement from government in 1902, fundamentally rework British policy in the region and improve the relationship between Britain and France.  

The origins of the Fashoda incident lie in one of the major issues of the nineteenth century, the ‘Eastern Question,’ or how the Great Powers of Europe should interact with the declining Ottoman Empire. In the early 1880s a crisis arose in Egypt, a semi-autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire, revolving around the security of the Suez Canal, a vital communication and trade link to British India. The overthrow of the corrupt Egyptian government in 1882 led the British to unilaterally occupy Alexandria in August of that year in order to restore security to the city and protect the Suez Canal. Further south along the Nile, in the Egyptian protectorate of Sudan, an open rebellion was underway. Mohammed Ahmed, a Muslim cleric who styled himself as the ‘Mahdi,’ or redeemer of the Muslim faith in the last years before the end of days, led the revolt against Egypt. Caring for neither Egyptian nor British rule, the Mahdi’s army sacked the city of Khartoum in 1885, killing the famous British general, Charles Gordon, and many other westerners in the process. The British Army under Lord Kitchener marched south to subdue the uprising. Meanwhile the French, seeking to restore some influence in Egypt, dispatched Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand and a troop of Senegalese soldiers to claim the strategically important Upper Nile. Kitchener, steaming south on the Nile, and Marchand, trekking east, met at the town of Fashoda, Sudan in September 1898.

At ten-thirty on the morning of September 20, 1898, Captain Marchand, facing annihilation by a coalition of fifteen hundred Egyptian and British troops aboard five heavily armed river steamers, arrived on the deck of Kitchener’s ship. With war a distinct possibility and tensions running high, the talk between Kitchener and Marchand had an unlikely aura of cordiality to it. Kitchener told Marchand that he had orders to regain Fashoda from the British Government. Marchand replied since the land was in open rebellion any government could claim it, and that until he received orders from Paris to retreat he would stay in position. Both men agreed that decisions about what to do next rested with official in their respective capitals. Realizing his precarious position however, Marchand did not protest the deployment of British soldiers in the town to keep watch over his men, nor did he object to the raising of the British and Egyptian flags over the town. With their business concluded, Kitchener and Marchand toasted the Queen of England and the President of the French Republic over a glass of whiskey, which Marchand later recalled was one of the greatest sacrifices that he made for the French Republic. Kitchener made a similar sacrifice over French champagne later that afternoon while

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7 Macfie, The Eastern Question, 47-50.
touring the French base.\textsuperscript{12} Once the formalities ended, the real work of what to do about Fashoda began in earnest in London and Paris.

In London, Prime Minister Salisbury led the negotiations. Buffer states, realpolitik and spheres of influence motivated Lord Salisbury’s views on foreign policy. Not one to entangle the British Empire in various foreign commitments, Salisbury found it prudent to enter into alliances only in times of war and felt it unwise to forge long or short term alliances in peace due to how quickly the aims of allies can fall out of alignment.\textsuperscript{13} He always backed his threats with military might, which in the case of Fashoda overpowered French dreams of empire on the Upper Nile. The British held all the cards -- they outnumbered Marchand’s troops and controlled the Nile, limiting the supplies available to the French. Salisbury refused to enter into negotiations until Marchand’s force evacuated Fashoda. The threat of Royal Navy mobilization forced the French to relent and on November 2, 1898, Marchand received orders to abandon Fashoda. On March 21, 1899, the British and French signed an agreement defining the borders between British Egypt and Sudan and French territories. This solved the problem for the time being, however, the French continued to seek ways to undermine British control of Egypt.\textsuperscript{14}

Relations between the two remained strained throughout the next several years. The continued attack by the French press against British conduct in South Africa during the Boer War, 1899-1902, did not help reduce tension. The British press’s response to French Major Alfred Dreyfus’ second sham conviction in 1900 of treason by an anti-Semitic French court did not reduce tension either. These two incidents compounded the effect of the Fashoda crisis. Not until Lansdowne secured his position in the Foreign Office did the dream of Anglo-French rapprochement surface.

The Anglo-German Alliance

The ascension of Lord Lansdowne as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs brought with it a change in view as to how the British Empire should conduct its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Lord Salisbury, previously foreign minister, wanted to keep Britain out of long term alliances during peace, Lansdowne realized an ally could help secure Britain’s empire. Lansdowne, who served as Viceroy of India from 1888 to 1894, and then as War Minister from 1895 to 1900, during the beginning of the Boer War, understood the precarious position of India in the Empire and the limits of British military power.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, Lansdowne tailored his diplomacy to end British isolation and improve the Empire’s security by obtaining the help of another power. Indeed, in a memorandum dated November 11, 1901, Lansdowne made clear his views on

\textsuperscript{12} Bates, \textit{The Fashoda Incident}, 130-134.
\textsuperscript{13} Grenville, \textit{Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy}, 16-23.
\textsuperscript{14} Grenville, \textit{Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy}, 224-234.
\textsuperscript{15} Grenville, \textit{Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy}, 321.
isolation stating: “because we have survived in the past in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect of that isolation in the future.”17 Lansdowne understood that Britain did not have the power or the money to successfully defend its large empire alone. Lansdowne’s first attempts to pull Britain out of isolation and into an alliance resulted from the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China and the death of Queen Victoria. In both instances, Lansdowne sought to tie England to the German Empire in a firm alliance.

In 1899 the Boxers, a group of Chinese dissidents, rebelled against the Ch’ing government, citing its corruptions by Europeans as their rallying cry for change.18 The Boxer defeat in 1901 at the hands of a coalition of European powers left China weak, demoralized and unable to enforce its sovereignty. At the Ambassadorial Conference of the Powers in Peking, convened by the victorious Europeans to decide China’s future, news broke of a Russian plot to conclude a secret treaty with the Chinese in an attempt to seize the province of Manchuria from them.19 The Japanese, fearing Russian power and with ambitions of their own in Manchuria, immediately petitioned Britain and Germany to stop the talks. The Japanese cited an agreement they had signed with Britain and Germany in October of 1900, expressing the desire for China to remain an ‘open door,’ as cause for intervening in Manchuria.20 Britain and Germany, however, both unwilling to go to war with Russia over Manchuria protested lightly.

Then, in March 1901, the Chinese asked for British mediation over their negotiations with Russia. Sensing Chinese reservations about a treaty with Russia, Lansdowne reversed previous lukewarm support of Japanese protests and attempted to conclude a secret defensive alliance with the Germans in order to counteract Russian ambitions in the region.21 The treaty was never finalized. Prime Minister Salisbury and others in the Cabinet felt it too overreaching, while the Germans thought it would force them into supporting British interests in the Far East and wished to retain their neutrality in the region.22 While Lansdowne’s proposed alliance failed to materialize, it represented the start of a tectonic shift away from the foreign policy of isolation that dominated British actions of the previous century and towards a new more assertive and alliance-driven policy.

While events unfolded in Manchuria, Queen Victoria, the longest serving monarch in British history, became deathly ill. The Queen’s grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, canceled celebrations for the 200th anniversary of the Kingdom of Prussia and rushed to his grandmother’s bedside. The Queen died on January 22, 1901; however, more importantly the British press seized on the image of the grieving Kaiser. The press viewed the Kaiser’s anguish as a political statement representing German solidarity with Britain and Anglo-German relations.

19 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 328-329.
20 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 331.
21 Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 115-116.
22 Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 340-343.
reached an all-time high.²³ Lansdowne, encouraged both by the high feelings of the time and Baron Hermann von Eckardstein, First Secretary at the German Embassy in London, engaged in talks about forming a concrete alliance with the German Empire.²⁴

In a conversation with Lansdowne on March 18, 1901, Eckardstein hinted at the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance. On the same day, Lansdowne wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin, describing Eckardstein’s offer as a “purely defensive alliance between the two Powers, directed solely against France and Russia,” in which “if either Germany or England had to defend itself against both France and Russia, Germany would have to help England, or England Germany.”²⁵ Lansdowne hoped to secure this alliance but feared what his Cabinet colleagues, especially Prime Minister Salisbury, would make of this proposal. Lansdowne stalled for time throughout the spring in order to elicit more details from the Germans.

On May 23, the German Ambassador, Count Paul Wildenburg von Hatzfeldt, provided additional details on the proposed alliance. The Ambassador suggested that the British join a defensive agreement like the one described by Eckardstein with the Germans, Austro-Hungarians and Italians in the Triple Alliance. The proposed alliance would serve the dual purpose of strengthening the bond between Germany and the other two members and bring England out of isolation by securing for it three allies on the Continent.²⁶ Lansdowne had several more conversations with Eckardstein, including one in which Eckardstein promised to send a memorandum of German terms to Lansdowne. However, before receiving a reply from Eckardstein, Lansdowne tasked the Foreign Office to write up a draft proposal for an Anglo-German alliance under the terms discussed between him and Hatzfeldt on May 23, which he then presented to the Cabinet.²⁷ In a memorandum dated May 29, 1901, Prime Minister Salisbury responded to the proposed alliance negatively, stating that Britain has “no historical reason,” to believe in the danger of isolation having never “felt that danger,” and therefore should not enter into an alliance.²⁸ When Lansdowne pressed Hatzfeldt for the memorandum promised by Eckardstein so as to make better sense of the situation, Hatzfeldt refused after realizing Eckardstein had overstepped orders from Berlin.²⁹ Discussions of British entry into the Triple Alliance halted for the time being and relations between the two nations cooled.

If the death of Queen Victoria spurred the dream of an Anglo-German entente, the death of Empress Fredrick of Germany, sister of the new English King, Edward VII, helped to ruin that dream. When Edward traveled to Germany to bury his favorite sister, the Kaiser invited him to lunch and then proceeded to berate the weary king on the evils of his nation’s foreign policy.³⁰

²⁴ Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 115.
²⁵ The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Lascelles, British Documents vol. 2, no. 77.
²⁶ Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 347-348.
²⁷ Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 353.
²⁸ Memorandum by the Marquess of Salisbury, British Documents vol. 2, no. 86.
²⁹ Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 117.
³⁰ Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 357.
The Kaiser’s treatment of Edward soured relations. They did not improve when Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, publicly snubbed Germany for criticizing British policy in the Boer War.\textsuperscript{31} Hoping to salvage negotiations in December 1901, Lansdowne proposed terms for a limited agreement to the new German Ambassador, Count Paul Metternich; the ambassador did not even bother to transmit the request to Berlin.\textsuperscript{32}

While Lansdowne was unable to secure an alliance with the Germans, this failure allowed the Entente Cordiale to come about. An Anglo-German alliance would have made Anglo-French rapprochement impossible. The failure of the talks left Britain without an ally in an increasingly militarized and polarized Europe. Germany became increasingly hostile, building a blue water fleet to compete with the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{33} Russia began building the Orenburg-Tashkent railway to allow for the quick transport of its army to the Afghan border, in preparation for an invasion of India.\textsuperscript{34} Realizing this, Lansdowne began to look to France as a possible ally, believing an improvement in Anglo-French relations would lead to better Anglo-Russian relations. However, in order to conduct successful negotiations with the French, Lansdowne needed to overcome a recent history of mutual hostility between the two.

**Working toward Entente**

In the months immediately preceding the Fashoda incident, Théophile Delcassé became the Foreign Minister in France and assumed his role at the Quai d’Orsay. As Foreign Minister, Delcassé hoped to create a “greater France built round the shores of the Mediterranean.”\textsuperscript{35} Key to this empire was Morocco and Egypt. Marchand’s mission was supposed to help in the building of this empire by forcing the British to the bargaining table of Europe to decide Egypt’s fate. However, the lack of German support for a general European council on Egypt forced the French to back down. This reversal embarrassed the French and damaged their diplomacy however; Delcassé still clung to the hope that the British could be forced out of Egypt.\textsuperscript{36}

While the embarrassment of Fashoda failed to change Delcassé’s policy towards Egypt, it had changed some influential minds in France. Eugene Etienne and his interest group, the Comité de l’Afrique Française, began to promote the idea that France should recognize a British-controlled Egypt if the British would in turn recognize a French-administered Morocco.\textsuperscript{37} Etienne and his allies worked quietly behind the scenes for several years until they were finally able to convert Delcassé to their cause in 1903. At the same time Etienne was finally able to convert Delcassé to his cause; the British, weary from the Boer War, and increasingly nervous of

\textsuperscript{31} Rolo, *Entente Cordial*, 118-119.
\textsuperscript{32} Rolo, *Entente Cordial*, 120.
\textsuperscript{33} Robert & Isabelle Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy*, 437.
\textsuperscript{34} Monger, *The End of Isolation*, 4.
\textsuperscript{35} Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé*, 87.
\textsuperscript{36} Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé*, 110.
German intentions, looked to France for help in countering growing German power.\(^{38}\) Morocco held the key to the looming discussions.

Both the British and French Empires held interest in Morocco. While independent Morocco was small and only engaged in modest trade with the British and French, it became a lynchpin in the Entente negotiations of 1903-1904.\(^{39}\) The French, wishing to add Morocco to their surrounding African colonies, hoped to take possession of the territory after the death of the Sultan in 1894. The British wished to keep Morocco an independent nation, due to the strategic importance of the Moroccan coast, which lay just opposite of the British base at Gibraltar.\(^{40}\) However, stability in Morocco, deteriorating since the Sultans death, worsened in the winter of 1902-1903, forcing action. Delcassé and Lansdowne, fearing the collapse of the regime in Morocco and German intervention, opened informal talks about preserving the status quo in the region.\(^ {41}\)

While the possibility of Anglo-French rapprochement was taking hold among the diplomatic corps of both nations, an improvement in the public opinion of both countries towards each other was also taking shape. One important reason for this was the visit by King Edward VII to France in May 1903. The king, who realized England’s precarious position in the world, especially after the animosity thrust upon it due to the Boer War, knew Anglo-French rapprochement would be good for Britain.\(^ {42}\) The King received shouts of “Vive les Boers! Vive Marchant! Vive Fashoda!” upon his arrival in Paris; however, his humble attitude and suave style during his stay won over the French people.\(^ {43}\) The massive crowds that formed to see the King off shouted their praises: “Vive Edouard! Notre Bon Edouard!”\(^ {44}\) The success of the King’s trip to France produced a blossoming of English and French cordiality through which the possibilities of rapprochement became more realistic.\(^ {45}\)

King Edward repaid French hospitality by inviting the French President to visit England in July 1903. The duties of helping to plan the events of the visit fell to the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon. A powerful ambassador, Cambon survived the successive rise and fall of several French governments without being recalled and sometimes burnt orders with which he did not agree. More than anyone, he helped foment and push along negotiations for rapprochement, suggesting an Entente between the two countries a full year before the Moroccan Crisis.\(^ {46}\) When Cambon learned Delcassé would be accompanying the President on his visit, he

\(^{38}\) Andrew, Théophile Delcassé, 203.
\(^{39}\) Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 126.
\(^{40}\) Monger, The End of Isolation, 2-3.
\(^{41}\) Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 146-147.
\(^{43}\) Neilson, “Edward VII and The Entente,” 185.
\(^{44}\) Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 166.
\(^{45}\) Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 168.
set up a meeting between Delcassé and Lansdowne in hopes of advancing an agreement between the two empires.47

On the morning of July 7, 1903 Théophile Delcassé met with Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office to discuss the possibility of an Entente between Britain and France. In a letter to Sir E. Monson, the British Ambassador in Paris, dated the same day, Lansdowne described their talk. The conversation began with a discussion over fishing rights in Newfoundland, but turned quickly to Morocco, where the French “had no desire to get rid of the Sultan,” but “could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic disorder in Morocco.”48 Lansdowne reiterated British wishes to keep the seaboard neutral and to allow for British commerce to continue unmolested. Their talk switched to a discussion over Siam, the New Hebrides, the Sokoto, Egypt (which both agreed should be part of a larger settlement with Morocco) and then finally to the treatment of British firms in the French Congo.49 Lansdowne made note of the “utmost sincerity,” with which Delcassé spoke on all his points.50 A rough outline of an entente started to take shape.

Negotiations continued throughout the summer and by the fall Lansdowne and the Cabinet produced a memorandum of British demands for any Anglo-French agreement.51 The British demanded much and gave little. While the British were willing to allow the French to liquidate Morocco, instead of just preserving the status quo, they were unwilling to allow the militarization of the Moroccan coast. Also, Lansdowne wanted the French to recognize British occupation of Egypt which although “originally intended to be temporary, [had], under the force of circumstances, acquired a character of permanency.”52 The French in return wanted more concessions from the British in Morocco and the colony of Gambia if they were to allow the British to have Egypt.53 The haggling continued back and forth into the New Year.

By late March the agreements were nearly finalized. Lansdowne and Cambon resolved the last discrepancies and signed the final text of the Entente Cordiale on April 8, 1904. The declaration alleviated British fears of a militarized Moroccan coast: “the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco.”54 It also formalized the British occupation of Egypt: “The Government of the French Republic … declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in the country.”55 The Entente Cordiale also settled differences between the British and French in Newfoundland, the Iles de Los, the Niger River basin and Sokoto, Siam, Madagascar and last but not least the New Hebrides.56 Almost immediately the Germans pressured the agreements made over Morocco in an effort to undermine the Entente and wreck the newfound British and French friendship.

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47 Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 173.
48 The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson, British Documents vol. 2, no. 357.
49 Lansdowne to Monson, British Documents vol. 2, no. 357.
50 Lansdowne to Monson, British Documents vol. 2, no. 357.
51 Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 205.
52 The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon, British Documents vol. 2, no. 369.
54 British Documents vol. 2, no. 417.
55 British Documents vol. 2, no. 417.
56 British Documents vol. 2, no. 417.
On March 31, 1905, the Kaiser sailed into Tangiers to promise his support to the Sultan of Morocco that his nation should remain independent and not be beholden to any agreements made without international consent. The Kaiser called for an international conference to decide the fate of Morocco. The British, fearing the Germans meant to seize a Moroccan port, thereby endangering the security of Gibraltar, joined the French in opposing an international conference. Furthermore, in a letter to Cambon dated May 25, 1905, Lansdowne stated his hope that the British and French Governments would “keep one another fully informed of everything which came to our knowledge,” and “discuss any contingencies by which we might in the course of events find ourselves confronted … during the somewhat anxious period through which we are at present passing.” While Lansdowne’s letter was not an equivocal statement wishing to form an alliance, it seemed so to Delcassé who understood it as the beginnings of a joint Anglo-French policy pursuing similar goals. Delcassé hardened his resistance towards Germany. The French Cabinet, however, fearing war with Germany, decided against such a strong line, and Delcassé resigned in protest.

While the resignation of Delcassé was a huge blow to the burgeoning friendship, England still needed to prop up French resistance to Germany’s calls for an international conference. Lansdowne insisted that if the French “maintained their refusal, so, most certainly, should we.” By the end of June the French Government stiffened its resistance to German demands. The Germans finally relented and came to an agreement with the French over Morocco in July 1905. The Entente survived its first challenge. While originally intended as a mere exchange of colonial territories, the Entente Cordiale started to take on the air of an alliance. In fact, now more than ever the British and French viewed the Entente as vital to their security.

In December 1905, after the defeat of the Conservative Government at the polls, Lansdowne resigned as head of the Foreign Office. His successor, Lord Grey, along with a cast of Foreign Office officials who were increasingly Germanophobic, improved ties with the French, understanding Lansdowne’s policies to be a new ‘cornerstone’ of British foreign policy. The increasing view in the Foreign Office after 1905 that Germany was the main problem for British security led in January 1906 to the first conversations between the British and French militaries on building a mutual strategy. British and French relations continued to grow and became more interrelated until the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the beginning of the First World War in August 1914 finally consummated them.

57 Monger, The End of Isolation, 186.
59 The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie, British Documents vol. 3, no 95.
60 Monger, The End of Isolation, 198-199.
61 The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie, British Documents vol. 3, no. 124.
62 Monger, The End of Isolation, 203.
63 Monger, The End of Isolation, 205.
64 Rolo, Entente Cordiale, 276.
65 Andrew, Théophile Delcassé, 303.
66 Monger, The End of Isolation, 247.
Conclusion

Lord Lansdowne’s tenure at the Foreign Office was a time of great change in the British Empire. British isolation at the end of the nineteenth century created challenges that threatened the security of its empire. Lansdowne, through his time in India and as War Minister, realized the empire could not continue on its current isolationist path and survive as it had. He initiated policies intended to end Britain’s isolation and secure the Empire. Facing numerous crises and incidents that threatened to engulf the Empire, Lansdowne successfully tailored British policy to meet these challenges and improve the security of the British Empire. His signature achievement, the Entente Cordiale of 1904, laid the foundation for an eventual Anglo-French alliance that would come into effect as German armies swept through Belgium in 1914. While Lansdowne could not have predicted the Empire’s entanglement in a major European war on the Continent, by the time he left office in 1905 his policies secured for Britain a new position in the world.

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In 1913, only three years after the centuries-old Korean dynasty of Chosŏn surrendered its sovereignty to the ambitions of a growing Japanese Empire, unpleasant reminders of the new colonial regime were abundant. For villagers in the county of Yŏng’am on the southern edge of the Korean Peninsula, however, a far more nefarious threat lurked in the dark shadows of the neighboring forests and mountains. Tigers, animals which for centuries had struck fear into the hearts of Korean peasants, were reportedly appearing in the county’s villages on a nightly basis, snatching away unsuspecting livestock while the villagers retaliated only with loud screams. As tigers made off daily with their livestock, villagers feared the possibility of becoming the hungry tigers' next meal.

“With tigers being this common, how are people supposed to live?” asked the Maeil sinbo (Daily News), the official Korean-language mouthpiece of the Japanese colonial administration. The answer to this emotional query, the article suggested, was simple. Salvation lay in the benevolent arms of the new colonial regime and the efforts of the Japanese-led police force to hunt and kill the foul beasts who threatened the livelihood of poor Korean peasants. Reports of tiger attacks in colonial media portrayed the tiger as a terror and scourge of rural Korean villagers. Newspaper reports of tiger attacks were frequent even before Japanese colonization, but under Japanese rule, previously routine accounts of tiger predations in rural Korea assumed a new ideological dimension. Japanese colonizers publicized efforts to hunt and exterminate tigers as evidence of concern for the welfare of their colonial subjects. As Japanese administrators sought to justify Korean colonialism both within the empire and without, they used official news organs to turn tiger hunting into a symbol of imperial benevolence.

Contemporary historians remember the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a period of "high imperialism." Western powers including Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States colonized vast portions of Africa, Asia and other parts of the non-Western world.

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1 Yŏng’am ŭi hohwan pisang,” Maeil sinbo, July 16, 1913.
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for purposes of national enrichment. Japan emulated the example of its Western counterparts by first colonizing Taiwan in 1895 and then Korea in 1910. While Japan's greed may have been the implicit motivator of outward expansion, this naked self-interest was often cloaked in more altruistic language. Borrowing inspiration from Western imperial rhetoric, administrators of the Japanese empire claimed an obligation to improve the material welfare of colonial subjects in Korea and elsewhere. In a 1910 address immediately following the Japanese annexation of Korea, Resident-General Terauchi Masatake reassured newly-colonized Koreans of the ultimately "benevolent" nature of Japanese governance. Imperial benevolence would take many forms over the course of Japanese colonial rule: among those were the hunting and extermination of tigers.

The nearly complete eradication of tigers from the majority of the Korean Peninsula by the end of Japanese rule in 1945 prompted regretful soul-searching among generations of naturalists and historians. Many blame Japanese policy for the tiger’s demise, but the impetus for colonial tiger extermination originated both from Korea's previous history of tiger-human violence as well as from imperial ambition. Japanese colonial officials who targeted tigers followed the precedent of earlier Korean rulers who had enacted similar policies even as the officials touted their successes as groundbreaking. Reports of tiger attacks and tiger extermination in colonial media reveal as much about Koreans’ complex historical relationship with the tiger as they do about the ideological aims of the Japanese colonial regime.

Korea's Historical Relationship with the Tiger

As an object of both fear and awe, the tiger has long occupied a conflicted place in the pantheon of East Asia's predators. In pre-modern Korea the tiger was traditionally an object of folk worship, a powerful being that interceded between the natural and spiritual worlds. The supposed spiritual qualities of the fearsome tiger, however, could not save it from human hunters; from the earliest point of recorded history, tiger skins were exotic and valuable trade goods.

2 Having only narrowly escaped colonization itself in the mid-nineteenth century, Japan sought political parity with the great Western powers as well as greater economic wealth by expanding its burgeoning empire overseas.
products. Furthermore, tigers threatened humans and livestock, a fact that weighed heavily on the pre-modern Korean consciousness.

Simple biological imperatives guaranteed violent encounters between humans and tigers from the beginning of Korea's recorded history. An exact estimate of how many tigers historically occupied the Korean Peninsula is difficult to approximate, but estimates can be made based on modern biological data. In forested areas of the Russian Far East where tigers still live in somewhat significant numbers, Siberian tigers have an average distribution of 0.3 to 0.7 adult males per 100 square kilometers. Based on these figures, a primeval, mostly wooded Korean peninsula could have had anywhere from several hundred to over a thousand tigers living within its boundaries. As an apex predator whose diet consists of whatever quarry is most available, tigers instinctually prey on livestock or humans themselves when more typical prey such as deer or wild boar cannot be as easily procured. To protect against tiger attacks, rural villagers set traps and local officials recruited professional hunters when tiger sightings occurred.

In response to the widespread fear of tiger attacks, the early modern kingdom of Chosŏn made efforts to reward those who killed tigers and brought the heads to local provincial authorities. A 1470 royal edict, responding to claims that tigers were attacking rural villagers in large numbers, commanded provincial officials to give financial “rewards” to tiger-hunters. A similar system of tiger bounties was implemented later during Japanese colonial rule. For centuries preceding the Japanese colonization of Korea, the elimination of tigers that threatened human populations was seen as a duty of local government and military authorities. The Independent, a newspaper published by Korean nationalists over a decade before Japanese colonization, reported in 1897 that military officers in the southeastern province of North Kyŏngsang were being requested to kill tigers “infesting” nearby villages. The idea of the tiger as an eradicable pest continued into the early twentieth century as Japanese colonial administrators organized tiger hunts in a manner similar to earlier Korean officials.

Tigers and Tiger Extermination in Japanese Colonial Media

When the Japanese colonial administration took power in Chosŏn, they inherited a long tradition of government-led efforts to target tigers as animals dangerous to human interests.

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9 Neff, Korea through Western Eyes, 261. In a collection of oral interviews compiled by researcher Hildi Kang, one Korean born in the rural village of Waesŏk in 1905 remembered that “our village was in such a remote mountain area that tigers roamed freely, and behind our houses we had a tiger trap.” See Hildi Kang, Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 25.
While strangers to tiger threats (tigers are not native to the Japanese islands), Japanese colonial administrators came to Korea already familiar with the mechanics and ideology of carnivore extermination. Only years before, Japanese modernizers successfully eradicated all remnants of the once widespread wolf population from Japan. As environmental historian Brett Walker recounts in *The Lost Wolves of Japan*, wolves in nineteenth-century Japan were seen as impediments to agricultural progress and modernization. Harnessing tools available from industrialization, including high-powered rifles and steel traps, the Japanese succeeded in completely eliminating native wolf populations by 1905.12

Carnivore extermination in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan was promoted as a method of modernization and a way for man to assert control over previously unconquerable natural forces. As Japanese modernizer Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote, the triumph of man over nature signified the emergence of a truly advanced “civilization.”13 The desire to conquer nature in the name of "civilization" may have motivated the pursuit of tigers and other carnivores in colonial Korea, but other factors were more prominent in official public discourse. As Japan’s modernizing impulse led to the creation of empire, predator extermination assumed a new ideological dimension in the Japanese imperial realm. Eradication of wild animals such as tigers was one more tool to harness in the near-constant campaign to justify "enlightened" imperial rule to both the colonized Koreans and the outside world. By assuming the role of protector against the tiger's threat, the Japanese colonial regime could publicly cooperate with colonized Koreans in the pursuit of a common enemy. As the headline of one *Maeil sinbo* article proclaimed, “let us catch dangerous animals!”14 Wolves, wild boars, leopards, bears and tigers all were included in this call, but of those predators the tiger occupied the most prominent place in the colonial imagination.

Two years after the conclusion of the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty in 1905, Japanese colonizers forcefully absorbed police and military duties formerly executed by native officials, including the hunting of tigers. Newspapers published by the Japanese administration during the early years of colonial rule attempted to impress upon their readers the danger of natural threats such as tigers and the need for rural Koreans to cooperate with their new colonial overlords for their own safety.

An article published in 1908 by *The Seoul Press* (an English-language colonial mouthpiece aimed at both foreign expatriates in Korea and observers abroad) criticized foolish Koreans who chose not to entrust the disposal of dangerous tigers to local Japanese authorities.15 The article related what was described as a "second-hand" story from a certain “gentleman” who had recently returned to Seoul from a journey to southern Korea. According to this “gentleman,” rapacious tigers were “haunting” Korean villagers in the rural Ho-in district. The local Korean

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13 Ibid., 161-162.
magistrate was notified of a tiger’s appearance, but instead of safely “entrusting its disposal to the local Japanese garrison,” this corrupt Korean administrator decided to capture the tiger to obtain its valuable skin for himself. Only after endangering the lives of several villagers in a fool-hardy attempt to trap the tiger did the magistrate finally enlist Japanese help to kill the “beast.”

As this story illustrates, tiger-hunting was a useful way for the Japanese colonial regime to emphasize the benevolence of their colonizing mission in Korea. This article, published two years before Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, told a convenient second-hand story of corrupt Korean officials endangering the lives of Korean peasants by not trusting the outstretched hands of Japanese authorities. The article only briefly mentioned the fact that Koreans were perhaps unable to effectively rid themselves of tigers because Japanese authorities had confiscated their firearms. Instead, *The Seoul Press* emphasized the incompetence of local leaders by contrasting it with the efficiency of Japanese military officials in protecting Koreans from the “dreaded” tigers haunting their villages.

After formal annexation of Korea in 1910, Japanese colonial officials outlawed the publication of independent Korean newspapers. As a result, the only Korean-language public media available during the first decade of colonial rule was the *Maeil sinbo* (Daily News), a newspaper created by the colonial administration from the remains of a once stridently anti-Japanese newspaper, the *TaeHan maeil sinbo*. As colonial officials began engaging in a systematic policy of “Harmful Animal Extermination” (*gaijū kojo* in Japanese and *haesugujae* in Korean), tiger-related articles increased in frequency. In the short span of thirty-three days between July and August of 1912, articles on tiger attacks or sightings were printed in the *Maeil sinbo* on four separate occasions. The first of these articles, printed on July 19, related the following under the headline, “Ferocious Tiger Mauls Farmer’s Wife:”

Last month on the twenty-ninth, the twenty-three-year-old wife of Kim Úng-hak of P’ungsan Village, Unsan District, North P’yŏngan Province, was gathering edible plants in a place not far from her home when she was attacked by a tiger. News of this instantly reached the local police force, which is currently reported to be searching diligently for the whereabouts of the tiger.

The above article concludes not with a description of the tiger's victim but rather its Japanese hunters, illustrating that such accounts were printed for more than their sensational value. Instead, the intent of this article and many others like it was to emphasize the physical benefits of imperial rule in the form of safety from animal attack. It was unlikely that these articles were

17 A complete ban on firearms was instituted in 1907 for fear of native insurrection against Japanese rule; restrictions were only slightly lifted for recreational firearm use several years later.
19 Both readings for “Harmful Animal Extermination” originate from the following Chinese characters: 獸獸區除.
sheer fabrication, but they did conveniently justify local Korean collaboration with colonial police forces.

More than simply relating accounts of terrifying tiger attacks and police response, the *Maeil sinbo* printed other pieces encouraging Koreans to cooperate with the administration’s predator extermination policy. In one August 1913 article, the *Maeil sinbo* informed its readers that Japanese police officials in North Kyŏngsang Province had recently recruited over a thousand villagers to comb nearby mountains in search of tigers. Japanese authorities also conferred with Korean village leaders about establishing a reward for anyone who could successfully trap and kill a tiger. Rather than simply proceeding in their effort to single-handedly kill dangerous tigers, the article noted that Japanese police officers were consulting local Korean leaders on the best ways to encourage tiger-hunting efforts.\(^{21}\) The stated objective of this initiative was to protect locals from the dangerous “threat” posed by hostile predators. By emphasizing the role of local collaboration in this Japanese police-led initiative, the colonial administration expressed their ideal for the implementation of "Harmful Animal Extermination" policy.

The episode described in the above article was not the only example of collaborative efforts to hunt tigers in colonial Korea. Another article printed in the October 28, 1913 issue of the *Maeil sinbo* similarly reported that local villagers in the northern district of P’yŏngyang were actively cooperating with officials to hunt down tigers who were eating their dogs and pigs. Interestingly, the language used to describe the ravages of tigers here, as in the Yŏng’am article, was *hoehwan*, or “tiger emergency.”\(^{22}\) The use of this traditional term for tiger attack demonstrated the continuity between tiger-hunting efforts led by Chosŏn officials and those conducted by Japanese imperial leaders.\(^{23}\)

One key difference between Chosŏn-era tiger hunts and Japanese-led “Harmful Animal Extermination,” however, was the systematic approach to wildlife extermination that the colonizers borrowed from earlier experiences in Japan. The results of Chosŏn-era responses to tiger threats were only occasionally recorded in official dynastic annals with knowledge of these numbers limited to official chroniclers. In contrast, Japanese administrators not only kept detailed records of tiger deaths, but also publicized these statistics in colonial media organs to impress upon the readers the efficiency of their extermination efforts. In 1918, the *Maeil sinbo* reported on the six-year results of the colonial administration’s “Harmful Animal Extermination” policy. Among the carnivore deaths listed, nineteen tigers were reported killed by official hunting efforts during this period.\(^{24}\)

Statistics about tiger extermination were deployed in a variety of propaganda sources designed to influence public opinion in favor of Japanese colonialism, including the self-


\(^{22}\) “Namp’o Taegŏhosu,” *Maeil sinbo*, October 28, 1913.

\(^{23}\) For a detailed Korean-language exploration of Chosŏn-era tiger hunting policy and rhetoric, see Kim Tong-jin, *Chosŏn chŏn’gi p’oho chŏngcha’ek yŏn’gu : nongji kaegan ū kuwa chŏm esŏ* (Research on early Chosŏn dynasty tiger-hunting policy from the perspective of agricultural cultivation), (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2009).

aggrandizing *Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea)*. This English-language publication was produced annually by the colonial administration in an attempt to impress upon outsiders the virtue of Japanese rule over Korea. While its contents were usually limited to explanations of modernizing reforms such as road and hospital construction, tigers made their appearance in the 1915-1916 issue. A section entitled “Wild Animals” explained to readers that the colonial government was encouraging “every possible means” to exterminate animals in Korea considered “dangerous to man and cattle,” including tigers. The article concluded with a statistical record of animal extermination efforts in Korea from 1915-1916: 11 tiger deaths, along with 41 leopards, 261 bears, 122 wolves and 1,162 wild boars.²⁵

Media designed for residents of the imperial metropole also emphasized the Japanese role in protecting rural Koreans from tiger attacks. In a 1918 issue of the magazine *Nihon Shōnen* (Japanese Youth), a colonial official told Japanese youth that while Korean tigers were among "the best in the world" in terms of the quality of their fur, they presented a significant threat to Korean villagers and livestock. After listing the casualties on humans and livestock inflicted by tigers and other predators in Korea, the official issued the following call to his young readers: "As you can see from these numbers, the damage inflicted by predators in Korea is tremendous. When you my young friends get big, bring a rifle too, and bag some of these predators." By bringing a hunter's resolute determination to the new imperial colony, young Japanese could contribute to the welfare of their nation's growing empire.²⁶

The decision of Japanese colonial rulers to highlight animal extermination as evidence of their “progress” was indicative of a larger animosity towards carnivores not just in Korea and Japan, but also in much of the Western world. In the early twentieth century, rural U.S. officials were systematically killing large predators in a way that mirrored Japanese efforts in Korea.²⁷ British imperialists in Africa encouraged the hunting of animals like jackals and wild dogs that they deemed as threatening to local agricultural interests.²⁸ As Western empires and nation-states sought to modernize agricultural production within their borders, the extermination of dangerous predators was seen as a natural extension of this effort. Discussion of the disastrous ecological consequences of those initiatives was limited, for the most part, to a small circle of naturalists and wildlife enthusiasts who had little real influence on environmental policy.²⁹

Tiger extermination continued to be promoted in official Japanese colonial documents as a logical response to predator aggression. By 1920, however, the nature of public discourse in colonial Korea changed dramatically. As a response to the growing agitations of Korean nationalists, the colonial government authorized private newspapers such as the *Dong-a ilbo*...
(East Asia Daily) for publication. While still subject to Japanese censorship, these newspapers were allowed some room to question various aspects of colonial policy. Even in these more independent news sources, however, the Japanese policy of targeting tigers as “dangerous animals” escaped editorial scrutiny. The image of tigers in newspapers such as the *Dong-a ilbo* differed little from the picture of the man-eating beast promoted in official Japanese documents. In a testament to the depth of Korean fears towards tigers, as well as the desire of newspaper publishers to sell compelling and profitable tales of tiger attacks, mention of wild tigers in the *Dong-a ilbo* was limited to references to their ferocity. In one example printed in September 1921, the *Dong-a ilbo* reported on the travails of Yi Sŭng-ryong, who was suddenly mauled by a tiger while traveling through a “deep mountain road” with his sister-in-law.30 After being alerted to the attack, the local Japanese-led police force recruited forty local villagers to hunt down and “subdue” the tiger before it could inflict further damage. This article and many others like it demonstrated that for both Koreans and their colonial overlords, the principal public image of the tiger continued to be that of a man-eating "beast," even as the number of actual wild tigers in Korea decreased dramatically.

The Tiger as National Symbol and Spectacle

Admittedly, some Korean nationalists saw the tiger as a worthy symbol of national strength in the face of Japanese imperial aggression. In 1908, three years after the Japanese declaration of a Korean "protectorate," Korean nationalist Ch'oe Nam-sŏn inserted a simple drawing into his youth magazine *Sonyŏn* that caught the imagination of his countrymen both then and for decades to follow. The artwork was that of an awkwardly crouched tiger, arms and body spread in the shape of the Korean Peninsula.31 The ferocious and independent tiger suddenly found new cultural meaning as an embodiment of Korean ethnic pride. No suggestion was given, however, that actual tigers needed to be preserved along with the national unity they represented. Nationalist appropriation of the tiger as a symbol of Korean ethnic identity may have started to change the way tigers figured in the modern Korean cultural imagination, but for decades during and even after Japanese colonial rule, it did little to change actual physical interactions between tigers and rural Koreans. It also failed to challenge the prevailing imperial rhetoric, supported by centuries of Korean precedent, that tigers were "harmful animals" in need of extermination.

The challenges that did arise to Japanese wildlife policy were few and unheeded. As tigers became increasingly rare in Korea and worldwide concerns about the plight of these charismatic predators increased, a few observers responded to these trends by challenging official tiger extermination policy, albeit with little practical effect. In a 1929 letter to the editor of *The Seoul Press*, American missionary and amateur naturalist Horace Underwood complained that reports of “man-eating” tigers were being greatly exaggerated, and Japanese police needed

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30 “Ch’inchŏngil e maenghoga,” *Dong-a ilbo*, September 12, 1921.
31 Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, “Ponggili chirikongbu,” *Sonyŏn*, January 1908, 67.
to limit their efforts to only those animals that were genuinely dangerous. In 1936, Seoul-based Japanese educator Ueda Tsuichi warned that the tiger was headed towards extinction, but such expressions of sympathy went unheeded. The tiger continued to be seen more as a dangerous threat than an integral part of the Korean landscape worth preserving for future generations.

One development in colonial-era Korea, however, seemed to indicate a limited interest by the colonial regime in promoting tiger conservation, at least at first glance. While the Japanese regime in Korea was heavily invested in pursuing the extermination of wild tigers from rural Korea, tigers were also a source of fascination that the colonial regime occasionally attempted to preserve for purposes of exhibition. When Japanese authorities in the colonial capital of Seoul erected a new “zoological garden” in 1909, they immediately went to great efforts to ensure that the native tigers would be a highlight of this novel urban attraction. A news brief in the March 30, 1910 edition of The Seoul Press mentioned the 300 yen purchase of a live tiger by colonial authorities for display at the Seoul zoo, a not insignificant sum at the time. As thousands of visitors poured daily into the colonial-era zoo, they came into contact with the fearsome predator, albeit in a caged, controlled environment.

Ostensibly, the colonial-era zoo provided an interesting example of tiger preservation in a time when Japanese-controlled public discourse overwhelmingly depicted the tiger as a man-eating beast worthy of summary extermination. In reality, however, exhibition of caged tigers arguably accomplished many of the same objectives that motivated the colonial regime to pursue the wild tiger. As historian Ian Miller argues, the early twentieth-century zoo was a useful instrument for modern nation-states to emphasize their control over the wild and formerly uncontrollable parts of the natural landscape. Whether they killed “dangerous” tigers in Korean mountains or housed them in zoo cages, Japanese colonial authorities emphasized their control over the colonial landscape while “protecting” their subjects against the predations of animal threats.

As efforts to exterminate tigers in Korea resulted in their increasing scarcity, a 1925 article in the Maeil sinbo noted somewhat ironically that many were “regretting” the fact that zoo authorities could not find any more native tigers to populate their exhibitions. Such an article seems to hint that tiger conservation was starting to enter imperial discourse, but in reality the ecological consequences of tiger extermination were mostly ignored by the colonizers and the colonized alike as the image of tigers as “man-eaters” continued to dominate the public discourse. Imperial legislation was eventually put in place to protect animals "unique" to Korea, but tigers...
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and other predators were excluded from such limited conservation attempts. The few animals deemed worthy of protection by the colonial government were birds such as the stork or the white-necked crane, animals that posed no ostensible threat to humans or their livestock. Official documents and articles in the Maeil sinbo continued to record the extermination of tigers until the end of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Non-official newspapers like the Dong-a ilbo also noted tiger extermination along with the "anxiety" villagers felt over the presence of tigers. By the late 1920s-early 1930s, few recognized that the beasts that hunted their livestock were the last of a dying breed in Korea.

Remembering and Forgetting Korea's Tigers

Not until the emergence of independent nation-states in Korea following the Second World War did the now-extirpated tiger suddenly become a creature worth reclaiming as a national symbol of cultural identity. By adopting the tiger as the mascot of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korean officials helped reinvent the image of a creature that had been widely reviled only less than a century before. Nationalist appropriation of the tiger had begun early in the century with Ch'oe Nam-sun's image of the Korean Peninsula as a crouching tiger. It was not until the tiger assumed Olympic significance, however, that the tiger's place as a national symbol of Korea became firmly entrenched in the popular consciousness.

Significantly, it was during this period that the first inquiries into colonial-era wildlife policies were conducted. In a series of Japanese-language newspaper articles that were quickly republished in Korean, tiger enthusiast and researcher Endo Kimio depicted colonial efforts to kill tigers as insidious attempts to destroy the "heart and soul" of pre-modern Korea. While a few Korean historians have since challenged that conclusion, the description resonated with many at the time and continues to find popularity today, because it reemphasizes popular conceptions of Japanese colonial rule as a dark period of imperial imposition.

Evidence from the colonial period and before, however, discredits Endo's anachronistic projection of contemporary wildlife values into the early twentieth-century sphere. For most in colonial-era Korea, the tiger was not simply a majestic animal as Endo supposes but also a threat that needed to be killed whenever it endangered humans or livestock. As reflected in Japanese-led public discourse, official tiger hunters in colonial Korea portrayed themselves not as destroyers but saviors. By using the fears of tigers which were already long established in the

38 One pictorial volume about Korea published for a Western audience by the Colonial Government in 1935 mentions efforts to preserve animals "peculiar to Chosen" (Chosen being the Japanese colonial name for Korea) and also plants that are "fast disappearing." Government-General of Chosen, Thriving Chosen: A Survey of Twenty-Five Years' Administration (Seoul: Taisho Shashin Kogeisho, 1935), 26-27.


40 Endo Kimio, Hanguk Horang’in wae sarachyŏttun’ga?, back cover.

41 “In’gan kwa horang’i p’yŏngghwa Chosŏn sidae e kkaechyŏttda (Man's peace with the tiger shattered during the Chosŏn dynasty)”
Korean consciousness, Japanese imperialists garnered support for an effort they believed demonstrated their imperial benevolence. In fact, of the many imperial policies pursued by the Japanese regime in colonial Korea, the policy of tiger extermination was one of the least controversial. Only a small few mourned the passing of a creature that had formerly roamed the mountains and forests of Korea freely. Not until traces of tigers completely disappeared from the Korean Peninsula did the “beast” become a creature worth restoring to its place at the top of Korea’s wildlife pantheon.

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“Cold Steel and the Flashing Blade”: The Decline of Garrisonian Pacifism and the Rise of Antislavery Violence, 1830-1850

James Schmitt

On September 13, 1858 Oberlin College student William Lincoln was studying in his Tappan Hall dormitory when a knock at the door startled him. Outside his room Lincoln discovered a young student wielding a rifle. The student explained to Lincoln that slave catchers had just captured and taken fugitive slave John Price to the nearby town of Wellington, Ohio. Lincoln closed the door and returned to his bed. Torn between his pacifist beliefs and the use of violence in order to rescue a slave, Lincoln began to pray. Seeking his religious principles for guidance, his decision soon became clear: “rescue him or die in the attempt.” Within moments, Lincoln grabbed the rifle from the student and discovered the whole town of Oberlin armed and prepared to help Price. Alongside fellow townspeople, Lincoln and his comrades stole a wagon from a local Democrat and ventured to Wellington. Upon his arrival, Lincoln found a tense and leaderless crowd consisting of almost two hundred individuals gathered outside the Wadsworth Hotel where the slave catchers had Price captive. After peaceful negotiations with the slave catchers failed, Lincoln took command. With rifle in hand, Lincoln knew that physical force alone was the only method that would free Price. Accompanied by a group of five men, Lincoln stormed the hotel and threatened to shoot the slave catchers unless they freed the fugitive slave. Lincoln’s militant strategy proved successful and Price, whom Lincoln never met prior to this event, escaped the shackles of slavery once again.¹

William Lincoln’s decision to take up arms against slavery was not an isolated occurrence. By the 1850s militancy within the abolitionist movement hit a significant peak, culminating in John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry in 1859. After the passing of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, many Northerners found themselves in a difficult position: either defy the law enacted by the United States Federal Government or obey the slave legislation and consequently abandon their beliefs in the rights of man.² The tension created by this law greatly increased

² The United States Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act on September 18, 1850. The law required that all “good” citizens, both in free and slave states, assist in the return of fugitive slaves, regardless of their stance on slavery.
hostility towards the institution of slavery and the concept of state sovereignty, which forced many abolitionists including William Lincoln to act physically in order to prevent slave catchers from retrieving Southern planter’s stolen “property.”

While the Fugitive Slave Law provides a significant reminder of the tensions and violence of the 1850s, historians dispute when and why militancy became a common strategy for abolitionists. Scholars from the 1930s and 1940s regarded antislavery militancy as a sign of mental instability and argued that abolitionists were impulsive religious fanatics who “undermined any possibility of sectional compromise that could permit slavery to end peacefully.” The revisionist works of the 1960s and 1970s rejected these previous interpretations of fanaticism and began to construct a time frame to identify the emergence of violent strategies within the abolitionist movement. Historian Robert H. Abzug argued that the abolitionists focused primarily on appealing to the moral conscience of slaveholders by protesting the sinful nature of the institution and, furthermore, that this pacifistic strategy diffused the notion of violence until the 1850s. Abzug drew this conclusion by examining, what he believed to be, a deeply embedded fear among abolitionists that slave uprisings would culminate into a nationwide race war between Euro-Americans and individuals of African descent.

Recent scholars have reworked the previous interpretations of militant abolitionism to incorporate sources that past historians have disregarded. The 1964 revisionist work of John Demos, for example, concluded that pacifism was the primary strategy of abolitionists until the 1850s. However, much of Demos’ work focused primarily on the speeches and writings of William Lloyd Garrison, who was the strongest advocate of pacifism within the antislavery movement. Demos’ research ultimately overlooked the influences of abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass, a popular voice within the antislavery movement who advocated the use of violent strategies, and focused on individuals who practiced pacifism. Scholarship from the 1990s has recognized that Douglass was a significant influence within the antislavery movement, and, after ending his partnership with Garrison in the 1840s, contributed to the popularization of militancy through his writings and speeches. By identifying influences outside the Garrisonian spectrum, more recent scholars have concluded that starting in the late 1830s, “violence (both real and threatened) was the principal tactic employed by slaves and their abolitionist allies to undermine slavery.”

Abolitionists used violence as a strategy before the 1850s. The pacifistic antislavery tactics that William Lloyd Garrison employed created a great deal of animosity among abolitionist circles starting in the late 1830s. Many abolitionists criticized Garrison’s use of nonviolent tactics, arguing that they were slow and did not yield sufficient results. Other

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3 John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold, ed., introduction to Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict of Antebellum America (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1999), 12.
6 McKivigan and Harrold, ed., introduction to Antislavery Violence, 13.
politically driven abolitionists disagreed with Garrison’s radical concept not to participate in elections and eventually broke all connections with him throughout the 1840s. As Garrison’s influence significantly diminished throughout the 1830s and 1840s, militant leaders gained enormous support for their violent strategies. Through tactics such as promoting and aiding slave uprisings or physically taking up arms themselves, these new militant voices offered aggressive new alternatives to the Garrisonan tactic of moral reform. By examining the ineffectiveness of Garrison’s tactic of moral reform, the influence of slave revolts and anti-abolitionist mobs, and the rising popularity of militant abolitionists, this essay demonstrates that pacifism was a declining strategy starting in the late 1830s. Furthermore, this decline made the use of direct physical violence and strategies that had inherently violent outcomes such as the promotion of slave uprisings and self-defense tactics acceptable practices for the abolitionists before 1850.

The 1830s marked a significant breakdown of the traditional participants within the abolitionist movement. The earliest antislavery group, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS) founded in 1775, believed that only particular types of citizens had the capability to make progress for the cause of slave liberation. The PAS, whose political strategy required painstaking legal and legislative action, called upon elite white men to strengthen support for petitions, lawyers to manipulate legal codes, and wealthy benefactors to offer financial support for the group’s efforts. By 1827, fifty-two years after the founding of the PAS, an estimated one hundred and thirty antislavery societies existed within the United States, but these “elite” groups excluded the majority of the country’s potential abolitionists. By the early 1830s William Lloyd Garrison, who founded the New England Anti-Slavery Society in 1831, began to promote a new strategy that involved the mass mobilization of American citizens. Through writings and travelling lectures, Garrison effectively ending the archaic practice of exclusive abolitionism as women, non-elite men, and individuals of African descent rallied for the abolitionist cause, resulting in the establishment of over three hundred antislavery societies comprised of more than one hundred thousand members by October 1835.

Although Garrison had secured unity through the inclusion of a diverse range of new abolitionists, support broke down throughout the 1830s as the effectiveness of his tactics sparked debate among abolitionists. Throughout his career, Garrison held steadfast to his belief that moral suasion, the process of protesting the sinful nature of slavery through lectures and writings, was the only strategy that would effectively end slavery. However, this technique was slow. Appealing to the moral conscience of slaveholders and southern sympathizers required time and resources that did not always produce desired results. Prior to his break from pacifism in 1858, William Lincoln encountered this problem first hand while lecturing in Breathitt County. During his speech, Lincoln attempted to convert three pro-slavery Kentuckians to the doctrine of

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antislavery. After the lecture, Lincoln’s disapproving listeners secretly followed him back to the home where he was staying, and opened fire upon the young abolitionist, nearly killing him.  

Instances similar to Lincoln’s contributed to the development of major frustrations among abolitionists and many antislavery supporters began to demand greater action. In 1839, African-American abolitionist Peter Paul Simons delivered a speech before the African Clarkson Association that criticized Garrison’s practice of moral suasion. Having examined the progress of the antislavery movement over the past half-century, Simons declared, “Our people were slaves then and are the same today.” Simons believed slow progress was primarily the result of the ineffectiveness of moral reform and that this strategy restricted abolitionists from taking bolder steps, declaring that progress required physical and political “ACTION! Action! ACTION!”

With the successful emancipation of the British Caribbean still on their minds, Simons and numerous other abolitionists desired the same visible progress for the American antislavery movement. Through the promotion of mass mobilization, Garrison invited individuals to rally for the cause of emancipation with the promise of observable results. Over time, however, Garrison’s moral reform strategy proved ineffective in meeting the demand for rapid progression and many abolitionists began to examine the viability of militancy.

Citizens of Putnam, Ohio placed serious doubts upon the doctrine of pacifism and during an antislavery meeting in 1838 almost half the inhabitants within the community argued violence would produce greater results. Kentucky resident Cassius Clay outright refused to take part in the “sickly cant” and “mawkish sensibility” of moral suasion, arguing, “Moral power must always be backed with cold steel and the flashing blade.” These examples exhibit a substantial breakdown regarding moral reform as a viable strategy and further demonstrate how many abolitionists began to consider physical force as a practical measure to achieve progress for the antislavery cause.

The question of nonviolence as an effective strategy further came under fire throughout the 1830s, the great “mob years” of the abolitionist movement. In every part of the country, abolitionists found themselves subjected to violent opposition from large groups of pro-slavery mobs. These mobs put substantial pressure on antislavery groups to break from their traditional beliefs in pacifism and forced many abolitionists to use weapons in self-defense. The murder of Elijah P. Lovejoy, an editor for the antislavery publication the Alton Observer, represents the most significant of these confrontations. In November, 1837 at Alton, Illinois, a mob attacked Lovejoy outside the warehouse where he published his antislavery newspaper. During the altercation, the horde of anti-abolitionists forced Lovejoy to defend himself with a rifle, but the

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11 Brandt, Town that Started the Civil War, 11-12.
16 The Liberator, July 18, 1845.
aggressive mob ultimately overwhelmed the abolitionist and brutally murdered him as he attempted to flee the scene.\(^\text{17}\)

Lovejoy’s death ignited a wildfire of debate amongst abolitionists regarding the concept of violence as a means of self-defense against pro-slavery attacks. The Garrisonian groups, who declared that abolitionists should never “return evil for evil, nor give blow for blow, nor resort to murderous weapons for protection or defence [sic],” argued Lovejoy’s death had been a result of his use of violence.\(^\text{18}\) They asserted that Lovejoy would have survived the altercation if he did not take up arms against the crowd. The American Anti-Slavery Society, cofounded by Garrison and Arthur Tappan in 1833, broke from the Garrisonian interpretation of the events and argued that Lovejoy’s use of violence had been “justified by the laws of the land, and of all other civilized countries.”\(^\text{19}\) Regardless of one’s stance on the issue of self-defense, mob violence put enormous pressure on abolitionists to defect from pacifism and accept violence in times of desperation.

While Lovejoy’s death sparked heated disagreements concerning self-defense, mob violence further translated into a larger meaning for abolitionists regarding pacifism as a whole. In 1843, following an antislavery lecture in Pendleton, Illinois, an anti-abolitionist mob severely assaulted Frederick Douglass, knocking him unconscious. This event marked a significant turning point in Douglass’s view on violence; during a debate with Garrison in 1854 he admitted that the Pendleton incident “cured” him of his beliefs in pacifism.\(^\text{20}\) A similar incident involving mob violence in New Hampshire drove former Garrison-supporter Henry Highland Garnet to preach militancy as a necessity.\(^\text{21}\) For Douglass and Garnet, mob attacks significantly altered their views on the effectiveness of pacifism, and pushed them to declare that militancy was the only instrument capable of counteracting the issue of mob violence and slavery as a whole.

The effectiveness of Garrison’s moral reform and anti-self-defense ideologies underwent further debate as the viability of slave violence took a radical turn in 1839. Throughout his career, Garrison adamantly argued that slave uprisings held little chance for success because slaves were too few in number and lacked the necessary provisions including arms and ammunition to wage war against the South.\(^\text{22}\) In 1835, Garrison further declared, “by the patient endurance in their wrongs…the slaves will hasten the day of their peaceful deliverance from the yoke of bondage…whereas by violent and bloody measures they will prolong their servitude, and expose themselves to destruction.”\(^\text{23}\) The success of slave uprisings on the Spanish slave vessel Amistad in 1839 and the later Creole mutiny in 1842 quickly contradicted Garrison’s arguments by

\(^{17}\) Demos, “Problem of Violent ‘Means’,” 507-8.


\(^{19}\) The Liberator, Dec. 1, 1837.


\(^{22}\) Demos, “Problems of Violent Means,” 503.

\(^{23}\) The Liberator, Oct. 10, 1835.
demonstrating that slaves could secure their own liberation through physical force alone. Abolitionist Gerrit Smith found inspiration through the success of these slave revolts, and following the *Amistad* mutiny, he boldly asserted, “I cannot but look on these remarkable and exciting occurrences in a very cheering light. God has ordered them to hasten the overthrow of slavery.”

The antislavery movement echoed Smith’s belief that slave revolts would hasten the overthrow of slavery throughout the course of the 1830s and 1840s, as many abolitionists pushed aside their pacifistic ideologies and began to examine slave violence as an effective strategy. Jabez D. Hammond, a former member of the United States Congress, wrote a letter to Smith in 1839, in which he stated his plans to increase the success of slave rebellions by establishing military schools in Mexico and Canada. Hammond stated these schools would serve to train slaves to use rifles and would produce the “most successful Southern missionaries.”

Hammond was not alone in his promotion of slave armies. By 1849 the Liberty Party had resolved that sending guns and compasses to southern slaves proved more beneficial than the distribution of Bibles.

The continued development of aggressive strategies throughout the 1830s and 1840s further underscores the impatience that culminated as a result of Garrison’s doctrine of moral reform. Following the success of the *Amistad* and *Creole*, many abolitionists came to view slave violence as a swift and effective strategy for slave liberation. An impatient Jabez D. Hammond even argued that if abolitionists marched an organized army of “10,000 men with an able commander” through Southern states that every slave would achieve liberation within six months. By placing a timeframe on his strategy, Hammond provides evidence that many abolitionists began to develop militant strategies that they believed would produce immediate and visible results, similar to the *Amistad* and *Creole* uprisings.

While the antislavery movement became more receptive to slave violence following the *Amistad* and *Creole* mutinies, abolitionists found justification for the promotion of slave revolts by associating the oppressive nature of slavery to America’s own struggle against the British during the American Revolution. In 1838 James G. Birney, a former slaveholder turned abolitionist, declared, “those who approve of the conduct of our fathers in the American Revolution, must agree that the slaves have at least as good a natural right to vindicate their rights by physical force.” Popular African-American abolitionist, Henry Highland Garnet, also used Revolutionary language in his speeches and called on slaves to “let your motto be RESISTANCE! RESISTANCE! RESISTANCE!” arguing that, “No oppressed people have ever secured their liberty without resistance.”

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24 *Emancipator*, Sept. 19, 1839.
26 Herbert Aptheker, “Militant Abolitionism,” 463.
27 Jabez D. Hammond, to Gerrit Smith, February 28, 1852, in Philanthropist and Reformer, 304.
Garrison sought to explain the occurrence of slave revolts arguing that, like the American Colonies bloodstained separation from the British crown, rebellion and enslavement were inseparable.\(^{30}\) Regardless of an individual’s stance on pacifism, slave uprisings symbolized a struggle against oppression, which was both relatable to American citizens and justified by the Declaration of Independence.

By the end of the 1830s, William Lloyd Garrison became well aware that the antislavery movement had taken a radical turn towards violence. Following the advice of abolitionist Lewis Tappan, Garrison’s abolitionist newspaper *The Liberator* began to publish a regular column titled “Peace,” which discussed the principles of pacifism established by the doctrine of nonresistance, and published Biblical passages that promoted the use of nonviolence. The section of the newspaper further discussed “‘problem situations’ from everyday life, to which peace principles might or might not be applicable.” In particular, the early principles discussed in this column criticized the actions of Lovejoy, who died defending himself against an anti-abolitionist mob. Condemning the slain abolitionist, the article declared Lovejoy was not a true Christian. “The man who can grid himself to go forth and bruise, wound, and mangle his fellow-creatures,” the article argues, “is no Christian.”\(^{31}\) The addition of this column to *The Liberator* was an obvious response to the growing tensions created by anti-abolitionist mob attacks, the enormous debate over the slow progress of moral reform, and calls for slave violence.\(^{32}\)

While the circumstances of the 1830s created enormous debate over the viability of pacifism, another significant problem greatly contributed to the rise of militancy: Garrison’s belief in disunionism. Garrison strongly believed that the United States Constitution was a proslavery document. The Constitution, he declared, “both legalized and protected slavery,” and ultimately violated “human rights and Christian principles.”\(^{33}\) Garrison subsequently claimed that any union held together by this constitution should not be considered binding, and strongly argued for the secession of Northern states.\(^{34}\) Taking his belief in “No Union with slaveholders” to a more radical level, Garrison supporters began to boycott all institutions of political influence including holding political office and refusing to take part in elections. One Garrisonian abolitionist in particular is an extreme example of this radical boycott. In 1842, Henry Wright published an article in *The Liberator* declaring he would not vote even if his one ballot could end the institution of slavery for good.\(^{35}\)

Garrisonian extremists like Wright weakened Garrison’s influence within the antislavery movement for two reasons. First, many abolitionists began to question Garrison’s true motives. Throughout the 1840s Garrison’s speeches became primarily about the disunion of the United States and less about the issue of slavery. Many abolitionists including wealthy businessman


\(^{31}\) *The Liberator*, February 23, 1838.

\(^{32}\) Demos, “Problem of Violent ‘Means’,” 509.


\(^{34}\) Nye, *Humanitarian Reformers*, 142.

\(^{35}\) Perry, *Radical Abolitionism*, 89.
Arthur Tappan grew skeptical of Garrison’s actual intentions and argued that Garrison concerned himself with the destruction of the Union more than his original message of slave liberation. Second, the United States was a new country that had recently secured its independence from the British, and many abolitionists did not want to associate the controversial idea of disunionism with the already unpopular view of antislavery. Political antislavery groups including the Liberty Party refused to associate themselves with Garrison and the doctrine of disunionism. As Garrison began to ridicule abolitionists for not following the disunion doctrine, close associates and devoted followers including Frederick Douglass broke all connections with him.

The skepticism regarding Garrison’s true motives combined with his ever-declining popularity throughout the 1840s explains why Ohio’s House Representative Joshua Reed Giddings gained enormous support for his militant views. Throughout his twenty-year stint in the United States House of Representatives, Giddings proved that his primary concern was the destruction of slavery. After the Creole mutiny in 1842, Giddings put his political office on the line by defying the House “gag rule,” and issued a list of resolutions that declared slaves had a justified right to secure their freedom through violent insurrections and that Northerners had a duty to assist these revolts. Consequently censured for his actions, Giddings resigned his seat in the House but his constituents in northeast Ohio promptly re-elected him after he promised to offer his radical resolutions once again. Giddings returned to the House and was more adamant than ever to end slavery, even proclaiming in 1846 his desire to provoke the British to invade the United States in an effort to hasten slave liberation. Giddings’ willingness to make radical sacrifices proved to his followers that he would take substantial risks in order to make the issue of slavery heard, and that he wanted to destroy the institution permanently.

While Giddings filled the political void left by Garrison’s resolution to be non-political, Garrison’s decline also allowed John Brown to alter the views of many former Garrisonian abolitionists. Frederick Douglass, who withdrew his support of Garrison following his assertion that the Constitution was pro-slavery, began meeting with Brown in the 1840s. Combined with the previous Pendleton mob attack, Brown “loomed in Douglass’s conscious,” and greatly pushed the former Garrisonian towards the idea of militancy. In his 1881 autobiography, Douglass recalled Brown’s powerful presence upon their first encounter, and stated, “from this night spent with John Brown, my utterances became more and more tinged by the color of this man’s strong impressions.” Brown continued to gain enormous support from Gerrit Smith, who,

36 Nye, Humanitarian Reformers, 164.
37 Ibid., 144.
40 Ibid., 186.
42 Ibid., 138.
along with five other abolitionists financially supported Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid in 1859.\footnote{Known as the Secret Committee of Six, this group included the influential Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Samuel Gridley Howe, Theodore Parker, Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, Gerrit Smith, and George Luther Stearns, who all believed slavery would never die a peaceful death.} Although Brown’s most militant actions occurred in the 1850s, his ability to gain support from former pacifistic abolitionists demonstrates that support for Garrison’s use of nonviolent strategies declined throughout the 1830s and 1840s.

The combination of the ineffectiveness of moral suasion and Garrison’s declining influence further drove many abolitionists to criticize Garrison by praising Brown’s use of militancy. Following Harpers Ferry, \textit{The Radical Spiritualist} stated Brown accomplished what Garrison could not; abolitionist Stephen S. Foster argued “I think John Brown has shown himself a \textit{man}, in comparison with the Non-Resistants”. Even Garrison’s former friend and supporter Frederick Douglass outright denounced moral reform declaring that Brown “was a man who did more than just give speeches.”\footnote{Radical Spiritualist, Jan., 1860; \textit{Practical Christian}, Nov. 26, 1859 (First quotation); James H. Cook, “Fighting With Breath, Not Blows: Frederick Douglass and Antislavery Violence” in \textit{Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America}, ed. John R. Mckivigan and Stanley Harrold (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1999) 143 (Second quotation).} By comparing John Brown’s actions to those of Garrison, these examples prove that by the time of Harpers Ferry many abolitionists had completely lost faith in nonviolent strategies and the seeds of militancy were well established within the antislavery movement.

The impulse that drove William Lincoln to accept violence to free John Price in 1858 was the same that inspired many abolitionists to re-examine the viability of militancy over the previous thirty years. William Lloyd Garrison’s inability to diffuse mob violence greatly pushed abolitionists to support militant action, while slave revolts on the \textit{Amistad} and \textit{Creole} proved that violent insurrections could successfully free slaves. Militant abolitionists further gained support as Garrison’s popularity significantly declined following his declaration to be non-political, culminating into the rise of Joshua Giddings, Frederick Douglass, and John Brown. Lincoln himself came to terms with his use of violence following Price’s rescue, and even became an adamant supporter of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, arguing that militant action was a necessity for the liberation of the slaves.\footnote{Brandt, \textit{Town that Started the Civil War}, 255.}

Ultimately, the Civil War completely dismantled nonviolent antislavery strategies. While the violence leading up to the war did not sway Garrison’s faith in pacifism, he became highly supportive of the war effort and welcomed President Abraham Lincoln’s 1862 Emancipation Proclamation declaring “We are very near Jubilee.”\footnote{Newman, \textit{The Transformation of American Abolitionism}, 176.} Unlike Garrison’s unwavering stance on pacifism, William Lincoln, in addition to abolitionists Frederick Douglass, Gerrit Smith, and Joshua Giddings all believed that war would once and for all destroy the institution of slavery, even if violence must be employed to do so.\footnote{Brandt, \textit{Town that Started the Civil War}, 255.}
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Voting for a socialist candidate in the United States, unlike in other democratic countries, has remained an impractical and often futile gesture since the early twentieth century. For example, in the 2008 presidential election, Socialist Party candidate Brian Moore received 6,582 votes, which amounted to 0.00005 percent of the United States national vote.\(^1\) In other areas of the world, such as Europe, socialist candidates and parties fare much better. In the 2007 French national elections and the 2009 German national elections, socialist parties received 24.7 percent and 11.9 percent of their country’s vote, respectively.\(^2\) Although neither of these socialist parties won a majority in their country’s elections, they still proved to be viable choices for voters. As historians of American socialism Martin Lipset and Gary Marks further illustrate, a socialist party influences every democratic country in the world, with the exception of the United States.\(^3\) Given this anomaly, the question arises about why or what events could have prevented the existence of a strong socialist party in the United States today.

Scholars have attempted since the early twentieth century to explain why socialism never caught on in the United States. Political scientist Louis Hartz argued in his book, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, that American notions of class consciousness are largely behind the failure


of socialism in the United States. Hartz stated that the socialist push for a classless and equal society in the United States was negated by the fact that Americans already believed they lived in such a society, and did not need socialism to promote equality based on class.\(^4\) By contrast, Christopher Lasch, an American historian, stated that socialism did not develop in the United States because of its political system. Lasch argued that the Electoral College and American mainstream political parties have been effective in undermining third party movements such as socialism. According to Lasch, mainstream parties often adopt radical third party ideas as their own, thus diminishing the appeal third parties have to American voters.\(^5\)

While arguments such as Hartz’s and Lasch’s point to longstanding ideological trends and political traditions as reasons for the absence of a strong socialist party, other historians attempt to pinpoint shorter periods of time and certain policies, such as the Great Depression and the New Deal, as explanations for the absence of a strong socialist party in the United States. James Weinstein, a historian of U.S. socialism, argued that the policies of the New Deal had little effect on the Socialist Party. Weinstein believed, instead, that the internal problems of the American socialist movement disrupted the party’s growth.\(^6\) In opposition to Weinstein’s argument, Eric Foner, in his historiographical article, “Why is There No Socialism in America?” paraphrased Mike Davis’s opinions on how the New Deal detrimentally affected socialists: the flexibility of New Deal Democrats and the concessions they made to unions, marginalized the Socialist Party’s impact and therefore contributed to its collapse.\(^7\)

Another theory about why an American socialist party did not become influential during the Great Depression was brought forth by Elizabeth Cohen. Cohen argued that radical left parties that advocated for change through the democratic process, such as the Socialist Party, made Americans feel like the existing government could help them if it just adapted more radical ideals, which made voters less inclined to vote for radical parties during the Depression.\(^8\)

Although the Socialist Party’s internal problems hindered its potential influence and Americans may not have been as inclined to vote for a more radical left party, as Weinstein and Cohen respectively mention, these problems do not fully explain why the party failed to gain power when given its best opportunity, the Great Depression. Instead, as suggested by Davis and Foner, the lack of a viable socialist party today stems more from New Deal policies, which aligned New Deal Democrats with organized labor, thus depriving a socialist party or movement from its own alliance with organized labor.

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This essay examines the Socialist Party’s attempts to ally with organized labor leading up to and during the Great Depression, and how these attempts were eventually destroyed by the New Deal. The New Deal’s effects on the Socialist Party and the crucial role that organized labor played in these effects can be understood only in the context of the conditions of socialism and labor in the early twentieth century. A brief examination of socialism, labor, and their expected relationship in the United States provides a background for how the New Deal can be seen to negatively affect socialism in the United States. This effect will be explained by looking at the Socialist Party’s attempts to attract labor in the early twentieth century, the New Deal’s policies and programs that successfully pulled labor’s support away from the Socialist Party, and the reactions to the New Deal by socialist and labor leaders. These three factors will demonstrate why the New Deal caused the essential demise of the Socialist Party by the 1936 presidential election.

The Socialist Party that existed during the Great Depression was largely the creation of Eugene V. Debs, who was the leader of the party from 1901 until the early 1920s. Debs, the former president of the American Railway Union and leader of numerous labor strikes, had his perspective of socialism shaped by his experience with organized labor. He believed that organized labor should be highly influential in a socialist movement, stating that the “[working class] must unite in one and the same industrial union and one in the same [socialist] political party.” In the mid-1920s, however, Debs’ worker-based Socialist Party came under the leadership of Princeton graduate and former minister Norman Thomas. While Thomas, like Debs, also tried to attract organized labor to the party, the Socialist Party under Thomas appealed to a more ideologist and pacifist base of Americans, especially to the poor and those opposed to the First World War. Both Thomas and Debs, however, had trouble aligning labor behind the Socialist Party and promoting a uniform idea of socialism in the United States.

While the Socialist Party in the early twentieth century had difficulty appealing as an ideologically consistent party, it certainly was more coherent than the segment of the population it was trying to attract, organized labor. During the 1920s and the early years of the Depression, American unions and labor organizations were fairly weak. In 1932 only three million Americans were union members. This number is remarkably low considering that 49 million Americans were wage or salary workers in 1932. The weakness of organized labor was mainly due to divisions in the labor movement and the failure of either of the Republican Party or the

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13 Zieger, American Workers, 3.
Democratic Party to support unions consistently.¹⁴ America’s strongest union at this time, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), allowed membership only to a select group of skilled laborers. In addition to dividing workers based on their skill, the AFL also excluded most minorities and women.¹⁵ Workers who saw the AFL as hostile to their profession or gender found no relief from the federal government. The government’s opposition to organized labor was often shown by its reluctance to interfere with employers who frequently repressed the formation of unions.¹⁶ Without the support of a strong and unified labor movement, the Socialist Party in the United States was at a disadvantage compared to other countries, where organized labor made up much of the support base for socialist parties.

The relationship between American organized labor and socialism was rather atypical when compared to the relationship between European labor and socialism. In Europe, workers and unions consisted of a significant portion of labor and socialist parties since the nineteenth century.¹⁷ Thus, European socialists who advocated for a stronger socialist movement in the United States saw the main flaw of socialism in the United States as being its isolation from labor.¹⁸ Socialists saw labor’s support as vital because workers were expected to be the main contributor to socialist parties’ support base. Even though organized labor and the Socialist Party were not aligned as they were in Europe, the Socialist Party still had opportunities, especially during the Great Depression, to adopt segments of U.S. organized labor.

The Socialist Party in Early Twentieth Century America

The socialist movement in the United States underwent numerous transformations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the movement attracted many different classes of Americans, such as tenant farmers, industrial workers, and ideologists. Although these changes often hurt the Socialist Party, they also occasionally offered an opportunity for the party to unite with organized labor. Two of the most influential changes that affected the party’s stability and ability to ally with labor were the 1899 split of the Socialist Labor Party and the near collapse of the Socialist Party in the early 1920s. Despite both these events, the party still experienced resurgence during the early years of the Great Depression, proving that socialist ideas remained politically enticing in the United States.

¹⁷ Marks and Lipset, It Didn’t Happen Here, 26.
The first major challenge to the American socialist movement was the 1899 division of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP). This division resulted from the SLP’s inflexible negotiation tactics with organized labor, specifically the SLP’s insistence on creating separate competitive unions that were hostile towards the AFL. As a result of the SLP’s rigidity, members of the party broke away, and jeopardized the most prominent U.S. socialist party and the movement in general. Nevertheless, members of the SLP who left in 1899 merged with Debs’ Socialist Democratic Party in 1901 to form the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party, unlike its predecessor, the SLP, was more open to negotiating and forming alliances with organized labor.

The Socialist Party, under Debs’ leadership, experienced its greatest political influence when the party began to attract western farmers, former populists, and various workers. Debs’ approach to leadership advocated for the large-scale spread of socialist ideas to make future socialist candidates viable options for elections. While Debs wanted the Socialist Party to win elections, his top priority was the creation of an organized working class that could give his party a staunch electoral base. Debs tried many ways to attract unions and organized labor to the Socialist Party. For instance, he tried aligning, albeit unsuccessfully, with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) believing that such an alliance would unite the IWW’s unions behind the Socialist Party.

Although Debs found it difficult to unite American workers behind the Socialist Party, his failures did not prevent him from seeking other ways to ally with organized labor. In 1908 Debs tried reuniting the Socialist Party with the SLP in an effort to combine the support of organized labor both parties already received. This effort was evidenced by his correspondence with SLP leader Frank Bohn. In a letter to Bohn, Debs explained that he would do everything he could to get his party to accept a merger with the SLP, and noted the importance of combining these two parties before the 1908 election. While the two parties did not merge but rather formed a cooperative alliance, Debs still benefited from the attempt by capturing 6 percent of the presidential vote in 1912, the party’s highest percentage ever. Although Debs’ efforts attracted some union support in the early 1900s and 1910s, his attempts ultimately were not enough, as the party lost membership and support following World War I.

The war years and the early 1920s were not kind to the Socialist Party. The party’s open opposition to the war received hostile reactions from many public officials and politicians. In 1920 Debs was imprisoned for making an anti-war speech. In addition to the Socialist Party’s

22 Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs, 246-247.
25 Rosenstone and Behr, Third Parties, 89.
26 Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism, 119.
domestic problems, the party also was hurt by events abroad, most significantly by the Russian Revolution. After this revolution, a branch of the Socialist Party broke away in 1919 and aligned with the communists in the Soviet Union.\(^{27}\) With the Socialist Party’s many setbacks during and immediately after the war, the imprisoned Debs only managed to win 3.4 percent of the popular vote for president in 1920.\(^{28}\)

As the Socialist Party continued to weaken in the early 1920s, the party chose not to run its own candidate but instead supported Progressive Party candidate Bob LaFollette for president in 1924. This decision was Debs’ last attempt to save the party. Debs thought that by uniting the Socialist Party with the Progressive Party, which was dominated by union leaders, he could finally attach the Socialist Party to organized labor. Although LaFollette was defeated and Debs’ plan failed, this event had a significant impact on the next leader of the Socialist Party, Norman Thomas.\(^{29}\) Aided by the resiliency of a socialist movement in the United States and his own attributes as a leader, Thomas learned from this experience and led a revival of the Socialist Party in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

The election of 1924 taught Thomas that the Socialist Party needed to remain on its own to attract organized labor. This proved difficult for him as he brought a new face to the party. Thomas was different from Debs, in that as a graduate of Princeton he appealed to intellectual socialists, rather than the farmers and factory workers that Debs attracted.\(^{30}\) Thomas’s background, however, did not completely impede his attempts to align with organized labor. The Great Depression, which left millions of workers disgruntled and unemployed, aided his attempted alliance with labor. A newspaper article appearing in 1932 about Thomas’ presidential campaign revealed that he tried to appeal to these distraught workers by adapting the campaign slogan “Repeal Unemployment.” The same article, published in Kansas in 1932, mentions that Thomas helped feed 400,000 workers on strike during the Depression and aided in the formation of over sixty unions.\(^{31}\) During the 1932 presidential campaign Thomas also became the main proponent of unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, and child labor laws.\(^{32}\) As a result of Thomas’s friendly attitude towards organized labor and the massive numbers of unemployed and overloaded workers, the Socialist Party grew significantly during the early years of the Depression.

At first, the Great Depression proved to be an excellent opportunity for the Socialist Party to grow and ally with organized labor. In 1932 and 1933 the Socialist Party achieved its most political influence since the pre-WWI years as membership in the party doubled from 1928. Two hundred local branches of the party formed, and in 1932 Thomas received almost 900,000 votes for president. This was more than double the amount he received in 1928.\(^{33}\) Additionally, people

\(^{27}\) Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs, 333.

\(^{28}\) Rosenstone and Behr, Third Parties, 90-91.

\(^{29}\) Fitrakis, The Ideal of Democratic Socialism, 145-147.

\(^{30}\) Fitrakis, The Ideal of Democratic Socialism, 147.


\(^{32}\) Duram, Norman Thomas, 24.

\(^{33}\) Lipset and Marks, It Didn’t Happen Here, 205.
who rejected socialism in the past became more receptive to the Socialist Party’s critique of capitalism after the Depression brought lower standards of living to millions of Americans. Although the Socialist Party experienced a revival under the leadership of Norman Thomas in the early 1930s, this revival was short lived as the party essentially was destroyed by 1936. The catalyst of the party’s destruction was the New Deal, which through its labor-friendly policies and programs dismantled the Socialist Party’s opportunity to align with labor.

The New Deal’s Alliance with Organized Labor

When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president in 1932 he did not seem like a leader who would help render the Socialist Party irrelevant in just four years. Prior to his 1932 election, Roosevelt had never been a big supporter or friend of labor. In 1932 he failed to attract the votes of many labor leaders, such as John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers (UMW), who supported Herbert Hoover for president instead. Since Roosevelt was skeptical of the power of organized labor, the friendly labor policies he signed off on should not be considered an attack against the Socialist Party, nor should they be seen as an attempt to bind the Democratic Party to labor. Rather, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies came to the aid of American workers out of necessity, since millions of Americans were unemployed and frustrated with the American government and political system during the Great Depression.

With thirteen million Americans unemployed at the time of Roosevelt’s inauguration, the administration was quick to enact policies favorable to unemployed workers. As early as June 1933, roughly one hundred days after Roosevelt’s inauguration, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and its Section 7(a) was implemented by the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Although the NRA had generally been pro-business, its passage of the labor friendly Section 7(a) contributed to the immediate growth of unions and provided legal protection to workers. Roosevelt personally opposed the inclusion of labor friendly policies in Section 7(a), but was forced to sign off on them because failing to do so could have been political suicide given unions and workers support for Section 7(a). The NIRA’s Section 7(a) was highly regarded by organized labor because it gave workers the right to bargain collectively with their employers, and also prevented employers from ignoring and breaking up unions. Thus, by establishing new rights for workers, New Deal Democrats began to bind themselves with the interests and influence of organized labor.

New Deal politicians furthered labor’s support for Section 7(a) by calling in labor leaders to help draft it. The most prominent labor leader who helped draft Section 7(a) was William

34 Duran, Norman Thomas, 24.
36 Vittoz, New Deal Labor Policy, 73.
38 Zieger, American Workers, 29.
Green, the President of the AFL. Green called for amendments to the bill and suggested new wording to prevent employers from interfering in collective bargaining. Congress listened to Green as his changes to Section 7(a) were turned into law.\textsuperscript{39} Won over by the NRA and the New Deal’s flexibility to work with labor, Green later exclaimed, when speaking about the NIRA and the NRA that, “We cannot allow this great economic experiment to fail…Labor must see to it that it shall not fail.”\textsuperscript{40} Green’s insistence on maintaining the NIRA proved futile however. Not only were the NIRA’s labor friendly policies unenforceable, but the whole act was ruled unconstitutional in 1935. As a result from the NIRA’s failure, upwards of 1.5 million workers went on strike in 1934.\textsuperscript{41} However, the labor-friendly precedent set up by the NIRA and its Section 7(a) resulted in an expectation from organized labor that New Deal policies would continue to be on their side.

Once workers began to form a base of support for the Democratic Party, Roosevelt was pressured to reform by demands from organized labor and became more willing to pursue policy favorable to labor.\textsuperscript{42} As a result of this pressure and a wave of strikes in 1934, Congress passed the Wagner Act and its National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The Wagner Act and the NLRB were largely the ideas of Democratic Senator Robert Wagner, who believed the act would both resolve the NRA’s inability to enforce Section 7(a) and eliminate the surge of union strikes in 1934. Wagner’s NLRB was a profound success for organized labor. Not only did it enforce and investigate labor practices, but it largely eliminated violent and sometimes lethal labor negotiations by forcing employers and workers to settle their differences through the judicial system.\textsuperscript{43} With these accomplishments, the Wagner Act further helped cement the alliance between New Deal Democrats and American organized labor.

The New Deal’s impact on organized labor, especially through the NIRA’s Section 7(a) and the Wagner Act, was significant. Between 1932 and 1939 union membership tripled from three million to nine million, a direct reaction to the labor-friendly policies of the New Deal which allowed the creations of more unions and promoted collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{44} Union leaders also cheered the New Deal and nearly unanimously supported Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection. Although organized labor came to support the New Deal, Norman Thomas and the Socialist Party responded to it with heavy criticism. Thomas’s criticism, and the American workers’ support of the New Deal, exemplified why the Socialist Party and an influential socialist movement in the United States was mostly dismantled by 1936.

Reactions to New Deal and the Election of 1936

\textsuperscript{39} Vittoz, \textit{New Deal Labor Policy}, 92.
\textsuperscript{41} Zieger, \textit{American Workers}, 33.
\textsuperscript{42} Vittoz, \textit{New Deal Labor Policy}, 144-145.
\textsuperscript{44} Lipset and Marks, \textit{It Didn’t Happen Here}, 203.
The reactions from labor leaders to the New Deal demonstrate that during Roosevelt’s time in office the Democratic Party and organized labor built a significant bond. By 1936 the framework of this bond was laid out by union leaders who supported Roosevelt’s election campaign. In a series of speeches in 1935, William Green of the AFL and John L. Lewis of the UMW stated their support for the New Deal and Roosevelt’s reelection. Green backed the New Deal by claiming that it had “laid the basis for a better social and economic order.”\textsuperscript{45} Lewis, on the other hand, used his speech to support Roosevelt personally stating that, “Organized labor should come to support President Roosevelt with its votes and money available, for they [labor] should be grateful and reelect Roosevelt.”\textsuperscript{46} Since Green and Lewis were arguably the most powerful labor leaders in America at this time, their support for Roosevelt and the New Deal largely reflected how the movement as a whole perceived Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Roosevelt’s 1936 campaign was not the only time when labor leaders noted their support for his policies and the New Deal. These leaders also backed the New Deal before the 1936 election and well after it. In 1934, John Munhollund, the vice president of the Central Trades and Labor Council of New York, displayed optimism when reacting to the setbacks of the NIRA, arguing the NIRA’s flaws could be and would be fixed, allowing it to function for the benefit of labor as New Deal Democrats intended it to do.\textsuperscript{47} John L. Lewis continued his support for the New Deal and Roosevelt after the president’s reelection. In a 1938 statement about the importance of the midterm elections Lewis affirmed that, “President Roosevelt’s pioneering program of social legislation must not be allowed to lapse or become ineffective through the legislative branch.”\textsuperscript{48} The consistent support of the New Deal from organized labor revealed the solidification of the political alliance between the Democratic Party and workers. While this alliance was seen as beneficial by organized labor and Democrats, the Socialist Party had a very different reaction to the New Deal and the new Democratic-Labor alliance.

As expected, Thomas offered a heavily critical response to the New Deal. In a 1936 radio address he tore apart the policies of the New Deal as well as its alliance with labor. In the address Thomas first criticized the New Deal by exclaiming that its policies were by no means socialist.\textsuperscript{49} With this statement Thomas tried to create separation between socialism and New Deal policies. He worried that voters who typically voted for socialists would place their support behind New Deal Democrats instead of the Socialist Party. In the second half of his address, Thomas specifically attacked New Deal Labor policies and labor’s support of the New Deal. He primarily criticized the NRA, claiming that while it initially appeared friendly to labor, the NRA was

\textsuperscript{46} “New Deal Laws on Right Path,” 2.
ultimately a scheme to show workers temporary encouragement. Thomas, at this point in his address, also tried to appeal to workers directly. He stated that the Socialist Party, not the Democrats, proposed a Workers Rights’ Amendment, and that the Socialist Party had been the true sponsor of workers and farmers throughout the century. The fact that Thomas gave this address in 1936 before the presidential election is no coincidence. His attempts to separate the New Deal from socialism and make a bid for why workers should support the Socialist Party, make evident that by 1936 he saw the party struggling after three years of New Deal labor-friendly policies. Therefore, it seems as though this address was a last attempt to persuade workers and organized labor, as well as Thomas’ own intellectual supporters, that he was the candidate they should elect in 1936.

The 1936 presidential election signaled two things: the death of the American Socialist Party, and the emergence of a lasting political alliance between the Democratic Party and organized labor. The programs that the New Deal set up in order to help labor, such as the NIRA and NLRB, helped Roosevelt receive a preponderance of support from union leaders and unskilled workers. Meanwhile, as a result of these same policies, Thomas and the Socialist Party received a disappointing 187,000 votes, down from the 900,000 he received in 1932. While the Socialist Party continued to exist after 1936, and even ran Thomas as a candidate until 1948, it ceased to be an influential party in American politics after the 1936 election. The 1936 election showed that organized labor had finally aligned with a political party in the United States, and to the displeasure of many socialists, that party was not the Socialist Party.

Conclusion

The Socialist Party during the Great Depression had an excellent opportunity to recruit the millions of unemployed American workers to socialism’s ideologies. While the party had numerous setbacks in the early twentieth century, its resurgence during the first few years of the Depression proved that the party was still a viable choice for distressed American voters. Further, the labor-friendly policies of Norman Thomas and the positive relationship with workers the Socialist Party established under Eugene V. Debs proved that the party was capable of attracting the support of organized labor during an era in which many workers were frustrated by the setbacks of a free market system. Nevertheless, the New Deal impaired this capability by creating its own alliance with organized labor.

The New Deal built a lasting alliance between the Democratic Party and organized labor in just four years, a feat the Socialist Party could not accomplish after decades of attempts. Because workers were mainly attracted to the Democratic Party after the 1930s, the Socialist Party, unlike its equivalents in Europe, was unable to rely on widespread support of labor. Without its most

50 “Text of Speech by Norman Thomas,” 6.
51 Leuchtenburg, The FDR Years, 132.
substantial support base, the Socialist Party and socialist movements in the United States had their influence swiftly marginalized. Therefore, the reason socialism is not prominent in the United States today results from the New Deal’s friendly labor policies, and their effectiveness at aligning organized labor to a party not widely associated with socialist ideologies.

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“Cultural imperialism” has taken its place among the buzzwords of contemporary international relations, and the United States, the conventional wisdom holds, is in recent times its most notable practitioner. This is certainly not an unsubstantiated claim. As one respected historian has argued, the “American empire” is partly defined by “a distinctive form of ‘conversion’… carried out by… exporters of American consumer goods and entertainment.”¹ And any traveler making a trip abroad will quickly see the signs of this U.S. influence: Coca-Cola and the English language are as globally ubiquitous as the latest Hollywood film or pop culture icon.

But this is not the whole story. In *Modernist America*, the latest from Richard Pells, author of previous works on the intersection of culture and diplomacy, we are shown the picture’s crucial other side. The author offers a much-needed dose of revisionism to the story: it has never been the case that U.S. culture served as a one-way springboard for the extension of Yankee hegemony. Far from it, throughout the twentieth century European artistic movements had a profound effect on those across the Atlantic. The story of subsequent “Americanization” can thus largely be viewed as the saga of America’s absorption and manipulation of Europe’s cultural output. Ultimately, Pells demonstrates, American modernism was not a purely indigenous development, but one profoundly shaped by Old World influences.

*Modernist America* treads important ground by placing American reception of outside cultural forces at the center of investigation. While most works that explore transatlantic cultural relations tend to neglect this other side, Pells tackles it head-on; this is not a story of imperialism, but of an ongoing, syncretic process decades in the making. *Modernist America* is also noteworthy for its sheer scope. By giving attention to several eras and divergent intellectual movements, from the avant-garde bastion of interwar Paris to New York City during and after the Second World War, Pells underscores one of the book’s key themes: the openness and “melting pot” atmosphere that the United States offered. In many respects, cities such as New York served as laboratories in which diverse cultural currents converged. It was this blending and nurturing of different inputs that in time enthroned the United States as the world’s leading cultural power. For students and scholars of international relations, such insights into the dynamics of artistic and intellectual exchange will prove rewarding. This is certainly a work of history – but one with obvious contemporary resonance.

Yet *Modernist America* is not without shortcomings. Pells’ use of the term “modernism,” for example, can at times lack consistency. Does it correspond to the movement that first swept Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Or does it fit into a much broader category of art that is “modernist” simply by virtue of its newness? Moreover, a few of Pells’ judgments about the ultimate influence of European art on American culture could be questioned. How much of a debt does American cinema, arguably the cornerstone of U.S. cultural influence,

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owe to European-style modernism? The presence of such loose ends, as well as the author’s failure to articulate a clear definition of his titular phenomenon, can make for frustration.

Such critiques aside, Professor Pells tells a story remarkable in both scope and significance. For anyone interested in gaining a more balanced view of American cultural history, *Modernist America* makes for an enlightening read. It gives crucial agency to the world with which America has interacted and continues to interact, showing that the United States by no means has a monopoly on cultural transmission. It skillfully analyzes historical sociocultural developments in both Europe and America and synthesizes them into a cogent, convincing, and novel argument for symbiosis. Perhaps most importantly, it paves the way for further investigations into the largely unplumbed depths of U.S. reception of foreign forces, an agenda that serves cultural history well and warrants further research.

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Esther Cohen’s *Modulated Scream* provides a sweeping survey of the ways late medieval people interpreted, understood, and used pain. Cohen, a history professor at Hebrew University, explores bodily suffering in both religious and secular contexts, paying special attention to torture and its implications. In order to do so, she draws from a wide variety of writings, including juridical, medical, and theological sources. While the broad range of material can at times be distracting, the book is noteworthy as one of the first thorough surveys of medieval understandings of pain.

Cohen divides her work into two sections: “Manipulating Pain” and “Knowledge from Pain.” The first section, “Manipulating Pain,” discusses the different ways in which late medieval people dealt with pain in the contexts of theology, law, and medicine. Cohen argues that Church authorities discussed pain as a positive and useful force which could be used to achieve a better existence in the next life. Likewise, drawing upon the writings of jurists such as Albertus Gandinus and Paulus Grillandus, Cohen argues that the pain of torture was seen as a positive means to prompt the guilty to confess their guilt in public, bringing the “secret, tortured confession into the light of the public gaze in the courtroom” (85). In her section on medicine, Cohen points out the overwhelming focus of medical literature on curing the underlying condition causing pain, even by using painful practices such as phlebotomy in order to effect a treatment.

The second section, “Knowledge from Pain,” summarizes the various contexts in which late medieval thinkers applied their knowledge of pain. First, Cohen sets out to provide a comprehensive look at the vocabulary used to describe pain. Next, she outlines the ways in which perceptions of pain influenced theology. Cohen schematizes her discussion in terms of the medieval theology of history, from impassible prelapsarian man to the pain of purgatory and hell after death. This discussion contains an especially vast range of primary sources that illuminate the connection between the late medieval “culture of pain” and contemporary depictions of the Passion, encapsulating scholastic debates about the nature of Christ’s soul, devotional literature, and affective mystical responses including *The Book of Margery Kempe*. The last chapter of the section deals with the seemingly contradictory views of impassibility found in late medieval culture, discussing the distinction between impassivity, the ability to resist pain, and impassibility, or freedom from pain.

Throughout the work, the interaction between the legal discourse of torture and the growing importance of suffering in theology is emphasized nicely. In this way, Cohen’s book provides a counterpart to other works such as Mitchell Merback’s *The Thief, The Cross, and The Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (University of Chicago, 1998), which discusses the implications of the interaction of late medieval law and theology in visual artistic representations of the Passion.
Cohen also connects her work with well-known literary theories of pain, especially those stemming from Elaine Scarry’s *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford, 1985). Unlike Scarry, who sees little use in pain, Cohen uses primary sources to demonstrate how many late medieval people thought of pain as a useful experience. For example, Cohen explains how even practices such as execution that seemed to involve decidedly non-beneficial pain were intended to lessen the victim’s suffering in the afterlife. At the same time, Cohen’s chapter on late medieval vocabularies of pain seems to support Scarry’s theory of pain as a language-defying force. As Cohen notes, both physicians and jurists “were acutely aware of the individual character of pain tolerance and of the relative uselessness of words in assessing pain in different people” (167).

At some points, the strength of the book is also its greatest weakness. At times, the broad range of topics is overwhelming, and it is sometimes easy for the reader to get lost in the vast amount of information and sources presented, losing the thread of Cohen’s argument. Thankfully, Cohen summarizes the gist of each chapter in a more straightforward fashion in a conclusion section, and is often able to pull together the loose ends in a satisfactory manner. Overall, Cohen’s *Modulated Scream* is an excellent medium for entering into an understanding of late medieval pain. While broad in scope, Cohen makes good use of her extensive sampling of primary sources to offer incisive arguments about the perception of pain and the interaction between secular and religious thought.

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