MISSION STATEMENT

The Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History was founded in 2010 with the goal of highlighting the scholarship of undergraduate history students. In doing so, the journal aims to develop and encourage academic achievement, to forge an intellectual dialogue between peers, familiarize students with the publishing process, and encourage student-faculty collaboration.

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All communications should be directed to ouujoh@gmail.com or to:
Undergraduate Journal of History
Department of History
Ohio University
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Cover Photo:
College students attempting to reinact the feat of kicking a football over Cutler Hall performed by John Brough in 1830. The original story claims that John Brough, who founded the Cincinnati Enquirer and served as Governor of Ohio during the Civil War, kicked a ball over the building while playing an early form of football in his student days. Manasseh Cutler hall is named in honor of Manasseh Cutler, cofounder of Ohio University.

*Cover photo and caption courtesy of Vernon R. Alden Library
Dear Reader,

It is with great pride and excitement that we bring you the second edition of the *Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History*. We recognize that the publication of the second edition would not have been possible without the support and dedication of the members of the history department, to whom we are incredibly grateful. The purpose of the *Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History* is to create a forum in which undergraduate research can be highlighted and this year we are happy to be able to showcase these articles. The study of history involves a type of time travel and re-examination of various events throughout time. It calls for the researcher to use a mental time machine, of sorts, to write about and connect events in history and draw conclusions. In the work *The Time Machine*, by H.G. Wells, he states “…we all have our time machines,” and with this edition, we hope you will take the journey to the past with the authors. The second edition of the *Ohio University Undergraduate Journal of History* explores revolution and its consequences. From revolutions in political thought in 17th century England, to the 20th century Irish Revolution, from a revolution in the Philippines and innovations in the treatment of malaria, to the consequences of the Soviet invasion in Hungary, the authors of the works featured in this edition of the Journal seek to explore the definition of revolution and to emphasize the dramatic consequences of those revolutions.

We would like to take this time to thank the editorial board for all their hard work. Especially, the faculty board, Dr. Mariana Dantas, Dr. Brian Schoen and Dr. Ingo Trauschweizer and the graduate board, Seth Givens and Matthew Jacobs for all of their guidance during this process. Most importantly, the authors of these articles deserve special thanks and acknowledgement. They have put in long hours of research, writing, and editing that show that they truly represent the bright future of historical writing and the profession of history. Finally, we want to reiterate our gratitude to all those involved and extend our congratulations on making it to the finish line. Enjoy!

Senior Editors,
Sara Fisher,
Kaitlin Wilkin,
Mary Wise

Athens, Ohio
10 May 2012
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Contagion and the Colonial Ethos: Changing Attitudes towards Malaria in the U.S. Philippines, 1900-1935

Emily Kern

The United States acquired the Philippines from the decrepit Spanish Empire in May 1898. Although forces within the U.S. government initially favored granting the Philippines independence, strategic naval considerations in the Pacific, as well as popular enthusiasm for overseas expansion, led the United States to establish colonial rule in the islands. While numerous studies explore U.S. interventionism at the turn of the 20th century, this paper will explore changing U.S. attitudes towards malaria control policies in the Philippines from 1900 to 1939. Over the period of time under consideration, the United States fought a three-year war against Philippine nationalists to consolidate control over the islands, with over one million civilian casualties. By 1935, however, the United States had introduced a basic constitution that established the Philippines as a quasi-autonomous state and implemented a staged withdrawal plan meant to establish the Philippines as an independent nation by 1945. In the interim, the new world order, championed by Woodrow Wilson in the aftermath of the First World War, made imperialism for imperialism’s sake unpopular and morally suspect.

At the outset of American rule in the Philippines, fears of tropical diseases like malaria were folded into overarching fears of the tropical climate and the risks posed by the Philippines themselves—land, people, microbes—to the American colonists. Over the first decade and a half of American rule, however, repeated outbreaks of epidemic cholera and plague pushed endemic malaria into the background. During the 1920s, scientific advances—particularly an improved understanding of the particular mosquito vector—and new developments in pesticides made malaria a conquerable threat. Changing malaria policy in the U.S. Philippines was driven in part by new technology, and by shifting patterns in disease outbreaks, as effective quarantine and sanitation regulations gradually defeated recurring epidemics of bubonic plague and cholera. At the same time, however, the

Emily Kern is a graduating senior at the University of Pennsylvania. She is originally from Salt Lake City, Utah. Emily majors in history at Penn, with a focus on global imperialism and American expansion in the Pacific before the First World War. In the fall, she will enter the doctoral program in the history of science at Princeton University.
dominant ideology of empire in the United States played a role in how U.S. public health policy in the Philippines was understood and constructed. In the early years of American involvement in the Philippines, roughly from 1900 until the First World War, the United States talked about its imperial possessions in a tone of benevolent paternalism that presupposed fundamental, almost primordial difference between the “civilized,” modern United States and the “backwards,” disease-ridden Philippines. After the First World War, the United States embraced a much more technology-and infrastructure-driven model of development, with the idea that the Philippines could be self-governing, if they only had sufficient scientific and technical resources.

This paper will rely on a combination of primary source documents, including articles from the archives of The New York Times, scientific and medical journal articles from the period, and the annual reports of the Philippine Commission, published between 1900 and 1916. Although focused on the period materials, the paper will also make use of secondary sources on the relationship between science and imperialism, colonial medical policy, and the history of malaria in the Philippines.

**The United States Acquires an Empire**

“Worst-governed People—The Inhabitants of the Philippine Islands—Priest Rule of the Dark Ages Rampant,” headlined the New York Times on July 18, 1892.1 Some six years before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Islands were largely unknown to the American public. In 1892, the New York Times placed an article on the depraved rule of Spanish priests and governors-general between two shorter articles, one on the low quality of U.S. Sunday school education and the other on the ongoing conflict between proprietors of trolleys and elevated railroads—the Philippines were not prominent in the American consciousness. Despite the strong language of the article, which described Spanish Dominican monks coveting land and displacing three-hundred families by setting their houses on fire, among other similar tales, there was no intimation that the Philippines would be better off under American rule.2

Walter Nugent argues that expansion was a part of the American experience since the 1783 Treaty of Paris both ended the American Revolution and gave the new country command of substantial new territory.3 Even so, this expansion was contiguous, with the exception of the Alaskan Purchase, which was still at least located on the same continental landmass. Even when the white haole settlers in

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2 Ibid.
Hawaii, many of whom were American expatriates, overthrew the Hawaiian queen in the early 1890s, the U.S. government adamantly refused to annex the island chain, resulting instead in the formation of the independent Republic of Hawaii in 1894. However, the steady growth in American trade with China and Japan, after diplomatic and trade relations were established in the 1850s, increased American interest in the Pacific. The desire to expand American commercial penetration into the Chinese market created a pervasive sense that the United States required a stronger commercial base in East Asia. Building from the example of British Hong Kong and later French Indochina, which provided important bases of operations for British and French nationals, respectively, American interest in East and Southeast Asia continued to grow in the latter half of the nineteenth century.4

Although in 1892 news about the Philippines were consigned to the odds-and-ends column, along with transportation disputes and laments on the Biblical illiteracy of American schoolchildren, the depredations of the ailing Spanish Empire—most explicitly the plight of Cuban rebels in the Caribbean—became common fodder for American newspapers during the late 1890s. The “yellow journalism” of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer stoked American antipathy toward the “barbarous” actions of the Spanish imperialists, who were lampooned as massive, hairy apes ravishing delicate maidens with tropical flowers in their hair. Following the sinking of the battleship Maine under suspicious circumstances in the Havana harbor, the Spanish-American War exploded in the Caribbean. Fearing an attack on California and Oregon from the Spanish Pacific fleet, Admiral John Dewey and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were dispatched from Hong Kong.5 Dewey was ordered to proceed to Manila to “capture or destroy the Spanish fleet,” which he accomplished in the span of a few hours on May 1, 1898.6 Initially, it seemed likely that the United States would stay only briefly before handing over power to Emilio Aguinaldo and the other leaders of the long-running Filipino resistance. Following the Spanish surrender, Aguinaldo and his supporters returned to the Philippines from their voluntary exile in Hong Kong and declared the Philippines an independent country on June 12, 1898.7 However, the “Philippines Republic” was short-lived: the Treaty of Paris, signed by the United States in December 1898, ended the war with Spain and authorized the cession of the Philippines to the United States.8 General fighting against Aguinaldo’s forces began in February 1900 and continued, at least officially, through 1902, at which point any outstanding rebel groups were reclassified as bandits.

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6 Ibid.
8 Schirmer, 9.
Although the United States initially backed Aguinaldo, even transporting him to Manila from Hong Kong after hostilities with Spain ceased, a combination of different factors resulted in a change in American policy. Walter Nugent identifies an American interest in Pacific expansion dating back to the American establishment of sovereignty over Oregon and California in the late 1840s. In addition to their own population of seven million inhabitants, who would conceivably buy American goods, the Philippines were only about seven hundred miles from Hong Kong, the gateway to the purportedly enormous China market. Geopolitical considerations and the regional ambitions of other major powers also propelled the American decision to keep control of the archipelago: British, French, Japanese, Austrian, and particularly German ships immediately sailed for Manila after the port was captured by American forces in 1898. According to Juan Torruella, numerous cables were sent between the German Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bülow and Prince Henry of Prussia, the commander of German naval forces in Asia, exploring the possibility of a German take-over of the Philippines.

While geopolitical and economic considerations were emphasized in 1898, a narrative of racial difference and American “benevolent assimilation” also emerged. President McKinley, speaking to a delegation of Methodist church leaders in November 1899, spoke of his long struggle to decide the best path forward. It would be “cowardly and dishonorable,” he said, to return the islands to the Spanish; likewise, the French and Germans, “our commercial rivals in the Orient,” were not a possibility. Furthermore, McKinley felt that the Filipinos were thoroughly unfit for self-rule, and “would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was,” leaving indefinite American control the only option. It would be the work of the United States to “uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them.” McKinley’s remarks clearly negated any possibility of immediate Filipino independence, or even titular sovereignty under American protection. Emilio Aguinaldo, the longstanding leader of the Filipino resistance, was vilified by American leaders as, paraphrasing McKinley’s first Secretary of War Russell Alger, a dirty schemer with delusions of grandeur exploiting American beneficence to create an independent government with himself at the head.
Alger’s criticism of Aguinaldo appears heavily laden with racial discrimination, which played a major role in how American participation in the Philippines was constructed and understood. Paul Kramer argues the Philippine-American War was a “race war,” where the “ends were rationalized in racial terms before domestic publics.” This fundamental ideal of racial difference is apparent in McKinley’s assumption of inherent Filipino inferiority and unsuitability to self-rule. It also appeared in the anti-imperialist rhetoric of many of the critics of American involvement in the Philippines during this time, who worried about the contamination or negative effect the United States would suffer as a result of the incorporation of “millions of inscrutable ‘Asiatics.’” Anti-imperialist critiques, such as fears of Asian immigration resulting from colonial expansion in Asia, forced the pro-imperialist camp in the American government to establish a stronger justification for their continued involvement in the archipelago. The vague assertion of benevolent paternalism and a quasi-divine mandate to “uplift and civilize” did not hold much practical weight for designing a long-term Philippines policy, or, indeed, for justifying the commitment of American resources. Instead, proponents of imperialism began to draw on the rhetoric of the domestic and international Progressive movements to advance a narrative of progressive economic, social, and political development.

David Ekbladh describes how American colonial plans were framed in the language of “benevolent trusteeship” that emphasized the necessity of developing Filipino infrastructure, placing the emphasis on a process of tutelage that made the United States distinct from the other major imperial powers. Within this framework of development, public health and the management of endemic disease began to be viewed as important indicators of relative levels of social development and Filipino preparedness for independence.

**Tropical Perils**

Twenty-two days after Dewey’s warships scuttled the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor, the New York Times carried an article on “White Men in the Tropics: Danger of Disease and Death Much Lessened by Modern Preventative Measures”:

The question of the white man’s ability to conquer the tropics and to make for himself a permanent home in those delightful regions is one that has hitherto been of purely academic interest for physicians in this country, but the fortunes of war and projects of annexation are making it probable that this will soon be changed. Puerto Rico, the Sandwich Islands [Hawaii], and

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19 Mayers, 199.
the Philippines are all tropical islands, and if they, one or all, come under our flag, doubtless the question of acclimatization will at once become a most practical one.\textsuperscript{21}

The Times was relieved to report that recent accounts from the British Medical Journal suggested that there was "no reason whatever why the white man should not be able to adapt himself to the new conditions of life in the tropics."\textsuperscript{22} Although the authors did note the astonishingly high mortality of European colonizers in tropical regions, the blame was laid firmly on the foolhardy individual who refused to "change his habits in respect to eating, drinking, and clothing, and conform his mode of life to the new conditions."\textsuperscript{23} Because the majority of the tropical diseases were, as the Times claimed, "microbic in origin," appropriate sanitary and hygienic measures—the hallmarks of civilization—could be employed against these diseases. The presence of tropical diseases was therefore a signal of inadequate civilization or of misrule by either indigenous powers or another colonial state. "A comparison of the healthfulness of the West India Islands [Jamaica, the Bahamas, etc] under enlightened British rule with that of the two until recently under Spanish misrule shows what can be done by sanitation."\textsuperscript{24} Public health was used as a measure of one's readiness for self-rule, or right to hold power; both the Spanish and the Filipinos had been deemed by McKinley to be unfit.

Hygienic measures could ameliorate microbial fears, but a second and more overwhelming fear related to the enervating impact of the tropical climate. It was one thing to wash all vegetables and boil drinking water; however, the new colonists could do nothing about the heat and humidity of the Philippines. To a certain extent, this fear was imported from Great Britain: warnings about the dangers of the heat pervade British literature about the colonies in the 19th century.\textsuperscript{25}

Climate fears were particularly potent because they expressed anxiety for the vulnerable next generation. Without families and children the colonial project could not survive, and if the colonizers' offspring died or could "not reach the standard of stamina seen in the home-bred," there was little hope for the long-term survival of the colony.\textsuperscript{26} The article, "White Men in the Tropics," swings abruptly from the social Darwinist-inflected fears of long-term racial deterioration and returns to a discussion of the "certain definite diseases" that still blocked colonial expansion—"malaria, dysentery, yellow fever."\textsuperscript{27} "The real question of colonization," continued

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} "White Men in the Tropics."
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
the anonymous New York Times writer, “lies in the finding of means of protecting Europeans against the diseases named.” The water-borne and mosquito-borne diseases were folded into a larger understanding of the climate and the land itself as unhealthy.

Given the climate that most English colonists were used to, these fears made a certain degree of sense. The temperature and climate difference between the cold and foggy island in the North Atlantic and its imperial possessions around the globe, excluding Canada, New Zealand, and certain temperate sections of Australia, was enormous; very few Englishmen had experienced temperatures or humidity comparable to that of Mysore and Mumbai before arriving in India. In the United States, however, the range of climates present in the contiguous states alone covers a substantial range, but much less ink and angst was expended in discussing the damaging impact of the climate of southern Florida or California. However, once the United States took control of the Philippines, these British climate tropes began to appear in discussion, despite the fact that areas of the continental United States could be just as hot and humid as Manila.

In March 1899, readers of the New York Times were treated to an illustrated two-page spread on the islands, complete with photographs of the eponymous “Peoples of the Philippines,” and based in large part on University of Michigan professor Dean C. Worcester’s then-forthcoming book, The Philippine Islands and their People. In discussing disease, the author remarked, “The traveler soon learns to recognize the several types of fever: one recurs the third day, another every second day, and a third daily. If promptly and energetically taken in hand, any of them may be shaken off.”28 The implication of “Peoples of the Philippines” was that persistent fevers of various types were a part of the larger negative impact of the tropical climate on the Anglo-Saxon visitor. Changes in the local terrain, such as the clearing of forests and the draining of swamps, seemed to have some positive effect in areas formerly known as “fever centers,” but no hard-and-fast rules were laid out for avoiding contagion or identifying potential dangers. The implication was that certain towns were more prone to persistent fevers, but that no location was really safe. For “the explorer, the engineer, the man who would fell timber, cultivate new ground, or…develop the latent resources of the country,” there was no way to avoid tropical disease and fever.29 As in earlier articles, the author moved immediately from discussing negative impacts of specific disease to discussing the generalized negative effect of the climate on potential colonial settler society:

The author then adds a statement which is particularly important...Prof. Worcester says: “It is unfortunately true that the climate of the Philippines is especially severe in its effect on white women and children. It is very

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29 Worcester, 65.
doubtful, in my judgment, if many successive generations of European or American children could be reared there.”

Dean Worcester’s The Philippine Islands and their Peoples was based on the author’s experiences on two zoological and ethnographic expeditions in 1887-88 and 1890-92. Worcester’s experiences of ill health during the expeditions were central to his understanding of the Philippines. In the preface he remarks, “The close of our trip found us with health seriously impaired by hardship and exposure. Bourns and I were firmly convinced that we should never again wish to risk such an undertaking.” Worcester’s ill health took many forms, including persistent malaria and dysentery. Because the expeditions moved frequently and throughout the archipelago, there was not a single consistent source of infection; rather, infection was omnipresent. In both The Philippine Islands and their Peoples and in the resulting New York Times article, malarial fevers were presented as a standing risk of traveling to tropical locations; fever was an expected outcome of interaction with foreign climates and populations.

**Malaria in the Colonial Context**

Malaria was initially termed a telluric disease, thought to arise from the conditions of the soil in a backwards salute to miasmic theories of contagion. The newer germ theory, as evidenced by the 1898 and 1899 articles, was sufficiently well-known that the New York Times could reference it in an offhand manner, without any implication of controversy. However, the concept was still new enough that it was presented as an exciting example of modern science and not just as a banal matter of fact. The causative agent of malaria was isolated and identified by Alphonse Laveran, working in Algeria in 1880. It was not until the 1890s, with the work of British physician Patrick Manson, that a clear mechanism was described for malaria transmission. Manson established the basis for human-to-mosquito transmission of lymphatic filariasis, which was caused by a blood-borne parasite, and although he did not make the crucial salivary gland link Manson’s findings paved the way for future work in establishing mosquito-bite infection vectors for both yellow fever and malaria. Dr. Ronald Ross, a surgeon-major in the Indian Medical Service, performed the confirmatory experiments in India in 1898, and established that malaria was spread through mosquito bites which distributed the malaria parasite, and not by unhealthy climates ill-suited to Europeans and North Americans as

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31 Worcester, viii.
33 Ibid., 55.
previously thought.\textsuperscript{34} The respective roles of Manson, Ross, and other European scientists in the discovery of the malaria transmission mechanism remain contested, and have been discussed extensively by historians Douglas Haynes, Gordon Cook, among others, and will not be discussed here. The main point is that while articles in The New York Times were being published with vague allusions to the unhealthy tropical climate, and folding the prevalence of malaria into a larger construct that encompassed fears of contagion, heat stroke, and racial pollution, prominent scientists were establishing a causative agent for malaria that could be strategically targeted and thus controlled.

On February 26, 1900, The New York Times republished an article, originally from the London Times, on Ross’s work on malaria transmission, titling the article “Mosquitoes and Disease: How They Disseminate Malaria and How the Crime Was Proved Against Them.” The article gave a concise and layman-friendly explanation of the pathology of malaria, and then explained the mechanism of malaria transfer, mentioning both Manson and Ross, and including a reference to the recent publication of Ross’s letter claiming priority in the discovery. The female Anopheles mosquito was (correctly) identified as the main culprit, with the ingested parasites “find[ing] their way from her stomach to her salivary glands which secrete the poison with the poison into the blood of the next victim whom she may select.”\textsuperscript{35}

The discovery fundamentally shifted societal conceptions of tropical fever diseases:

All speculations about air, about soil, about “malaria belts,” and the like have been rendered obsolete. There is no reason to believe that the parasite finds access to the human body through any other channel...If this particular insect could be extirpated, there is every justification for the hope that malarious fevers would disappear from the earth; and, fortunately, the extirpation does not seem likely to present any insurmountable difficulty.\textsuperscript{36}

Practical measures, such as draining ponds near houses, or pouring kerosene on the surface of a pond on a regular basis to kill mosquito larvae, offered a clear methodology for conquering and controlling some aspect of tropical colonial life. Malaria could be detached from a generalized environmental threat and rewritten as an ailment resulting from a specific germ, precisely as had been advocated by The New York Times articles from the previous years.

However, discussion of the risks of malaria and other diseases endemic to tropical climates still heavily emphasized the risk to “European” women and children. Acceptance of germ theory meant that disease should be understood as the direct result of infection with a causative agent, one that generally should not discriminate on the basis of either sex or age. Despite the generalized acceptance of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Douglas M. Haynes, \textit{Imperial Medicine: Patrick Manson and the Conquest of Tropical Disease} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 88.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
germ theory, judging by the tones used by The New York Times, the older idiom of “constitutional” disease lingered in the colonial context as an expression of a deep-seated belief in the fundamental, bone-deep difference between colonizer and colonized. The United States had approximately 23,000 troops scattered throughout the country in 1901; it seems patently unlikely that the infection rates for these men were dramatically different from other individuals in the same locations, exposed to the same germs. However, thinking about tropical disease in constitutional terms emphasized the purported risk posed by the Philippines in general to the most vulnerable segments of the American colonial population. Constitutional conceptions of disease experience and environmental risk became a proxy explanation for the larger, nameless fears the colonizers felt for their families in a strange, potentially dangerous environment. The actual causative agent of malaria was less important; combating the threat posed by the entire Philippines experience—land, climate, contact with the “natives”—was the essential part.

Malaria under the Commission Government (1900-1916)

The Annual Report of the U.S. Government’s Philippine Commission for 1903 stated, “Small Number of Deaths from Malaria: Malarial disease is less common and dangerous in the Philippines than in many other tropical countries. The deaths in Manila from malaria during the year have been but 226.” Throughout the annual reports of the Philippine Commission, malaria is consistently described as having a very limited impact in the archipelago. There is no mention of a particularly excessive or even noteworthy mortality rate from malaria, either amongst the Filipino population or the American settler population. U.S. soldiers, who were more likely to be dispatched into regions otherwise avoided because of endemic malaria, were the most prominent non-Filipino demographic infected with the disease, although a casualty report published in The New York Times in January 1899 mentioned no deaths from malaria among the recent war dead in the Philippines.

The Philippine Commission, established in 1900 after the Spanish-American War had more or less ground to an end, functioned as the representative government of the Philippines to the United States, and stood in place of the upper house of the Philippine Legislature. Different levels of territorial government existed in different parts of the Philippines, depending on whether the dominant population was

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40 Elliott, 97.
“Christian, non-Christian, or Moros,” and in the latter two categories, the
Philippines Commission was the “sole legislative body.” The commission was the
sole line of communication between the islands’ government and the U.S. executive
and legislative branches. The Commission’s report for 1900 is addressed to the
President, William McKinley, and thence to the two houses of Congress; the report
for 1915 is addressed to the Secretary of War. After the Philippine Government
Law was enacted in 1916, the Commission was formally disbanded and replaced by
“a government of Filipinos, with the advice and assistance of Americans,” as part of
the gradual steps toward Filipino self-rule. The Reports analyzed every aspect of the
governance of the Philippines, and included reports on education, roads, forestry,
and the Bureau of Health.

An analysis of the Philippines Commission Reports from 1900 to 1915
shows that malaria and generalized “fever” were relatively low-level concerns. As
quoted previously, the 1903 Report felt that malaria was not a substantial problem.
In 1914, no statistics were given for malaria morbidity and mortality, merely that
some 785,000 tablets of quinine had been distributed throughout the provinces. The
Commission did, however, record detailed figures for diseases such as cholera,
plague, and beri-beri, which were felt to be significantly threatening. The exclusion
of the data on malaria suggests that the disease was not a high priority, a conclusion
that seems reasonable in light of the other data from the Commission Reports.

For the officials in the Commission Health Bureau, malaria was not a huge
concern, particularly compared to the massive morbidity and mortality resulting
from diseases like plague and cholera. Massive epidemics of cholera hit the islands in
1902-1904 and 1911, and the disease continued to recur in the intervening years.
The Report for 1903 stated that there were some two hundred malaria deaths in
Manila during the year, whereas approximately 4,386 people died of cholera in
Manila during the same period according to official statistics. The disjuncture
between the perceived disease risk represented by the articles of The New York Times
and the attitudes of the colonial health officials writing the annual Report was the
result of many factors. For the health officials, cholera, plague, and vitamin-deficiency
diseases like beri-beri were numerically more prevalent. Furthermore, malaria was
both preventable and treatable. Even if quinine dosages were frequently sub-
therapeutic, there were no comparable remedies for epidemic cholera. Finally, for
physicians trained in the United States, as the majority of the men of the Health
Bureau had been, malaria was much more familiar. Despite being presented by The
New York Times as a quintessential tropical disease, malaria was widespread in the

41 Ibid.
42 Report of the Philippines Commission to the President, January 31, 1900 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1900); Report of the Philippines Commission to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1913 to
43 Elliott, 96.
45 Rodney Sullivan, “Cholera and Colonialism in the Philippines, 1899-1903,” in Disease, Medicine,
United States and well known to the American medical establishment. Public health reports from 1916 state that some 4% of the total population of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and eastern Texas had experienced “an attack of malarial fever,” adding up to one million cases per year. In contrast, epidemic cholera had not been seen in the United States since 1873, when it remained limited in geographic spread; the last major national epidemic was in 1866. A 1917 public health report on the prevalence of cholera in the United States cited only one locale: the Philippine Islands. Cholera was further outside the experience of the American physicians in the Philippines; malaria was at least somewhat more familiar, and this familiarity on the part of the Reports’ authors may have influenced the degree to which malaria was dismissed and not portrayed as a major threat.

Cholera was a disease of the slums, spread by poor sanitation and overcrowded living conditions. The developing American ideal of progressive imperialism could mobilize resources to solve enormous social problems, and epidemic cholera was a disease whose epidemiology and etiology were well understood and clearly linked to social problems like poverty and sanitation, which were becoming increasingly important in an American progressive framework. Malaria was eclipsed by cholera for a time in part because cholera was just a bigger and more pressing problem: lots of people were dying in recurring epidemics, and the social changes that would need to happen in order to prevent cholera’s spread were both within the power of the United States and relied heavily on infrastructure and sanitation developments. However, it was also eclipsed because the American idea of progressive imperialism focused on infrastructure and social conditions, and fixing these two issues were crucial to defeating cholera. Malaria, since it was spread by mosquitoes and not water contaminated with human waste—was not as clearly connected to poverty and poor sanitation, and hence less receptive to the arsenal of tools of progressive imperialists. Malaria would return as a major health problem in the 1920s, after cholera had been largely defeated, but also only after the United States had effective infrastructure tools for combating malaria as an endemic disease.

Modern Science for Public Health: Malaria Yields to Technology

By the mid-1920s, however, malaria had re-emerged in the available scientific literature as a major public health threat—albeit a former public health threat that was rapidly being conquered. An article published in the Far Eastern Quarterly in February 1945 described the development of the Philippines public health

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bureaucracy in extensive detail, and noted that it was the defeat of the epidemic diseases—plague, cholera, and smallpox—that allowed more attention to be paid to the dangers posed by endemic tuberculosis, malaria, and malnutrition.\(^{49}\) Author and American physician Zygmunt Deutschman estimated the total cases of malaria at one to two million per year.\(^{50}\) From an epidemiological standpoint, the decline in the acute epidemic diseases meant that individuals who might have died of cholera could now be infected multiple times with malaria over a longer lifespan.

A perusal of the articles published in The New York Times between 1920 and 1940 on epidemic disease in the Philippines shows virtually none of the paranoia that permeated the articles from 1898-1902. Rather, the articles focus on fundraisers for victims of leprosy, new measures in leprosy control and treatment, and the growing role of the Rockefeller Foundation in funding and undertaking research into tropical diseases, particularly leprosy and malaria. This interaction brought about a striking change in malaria control and eradication policy. Two U.S. military scientists, Crosby and Whitmore, working at the famously malarial Fort Stotsenburg in 1904, made the discovery that the malarial mosquitoes of the Philippines bred in clear waters at the edge of streams, rather than in the typical swamps, stagnant pools, and marshes. The findings were never published, however, and two other American military scientists, Walker and Barber, made the same discovery ten years later.\(^{51}\) Malaria control seems to have languished until 1925, when the Malaria Division of the Philippine Health Service was created to target the disease.\(^{52}\) The work of the Division was made easier by both the acquisition of a geographical target—streambeds—and a means of effective mosquito annihilation—the hideously toxic, arsenic-based pesticide Paris green. Dr. Paul F. Russell’s 1936 article, “The Epidemiology of Malaria in the Philippines,” summed up contemporary thought on malaria in the Philippines. The disease was confined to atypical regions in the foothills, rather than in marshy lowland rice paddies, and could be effectively controlled through the application of modern pest control methods, which relied on recent chemical and technological developments. The only barrier to malaria eradication in the Philippines was the high cost of the requisite material.\(^{53}\) Overall, the narrative of malaria in the Philippines presented in the scientific journals and reports from the late 1920s and early 1930s is one of triumph: the successful conquering of a formerly dreaded disease with the tools of civilization and modern science.

The late 1920s and early 1930s also saw a shift in American attitudes towards keeping the Philippines. Paul Kramer notes that the 1920s marked a retrenchment of

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\(^{49}\) Zygmunt Deutschman, “Public Health and Medical Services in the Philippines,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (Feb., 1945): 155.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.


\(^{53}\) Russell, 6.
pro-retention policy in the United States.\textsuperscript{54} While the Democrats, and particularly Woodrow Wilson, worked to decrease the American presence in the Philippines and to establish a definite plan for Filipino independence, the Republican presidents of the 1920s—Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover—advanced the argument that the Philippines needed to reach certain standards of political and economic stability to be strong enough to defend themselves against outside forces before the country could become independent.\textsuperscript{55} This idea of independence was in part predicated on the development of strong internal infrastructure, which would be run by the Filipino government without extensive American involvement. Hence, a narrative of successful management of the environment and eradication of malaria can be read as an argument for the strength of Filipino institutions. At the same time, the emphasis on American technological development and the influence of American scientific and medical advisors helped create a narrative of benevolent American influence and successful Filipino tutelage—precisely the narrative advanced by many of the pro-expansionist politicians in 1898 and continued by their successors.\textsuperscript{56}

A final timeline of independence for the Philippine Islands was established with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, although the advent of World War II and the subsequent Japanese invasion delayed actual independence until 1946.\textsuperscript{57} Historians have offered a number of different explanations for the shift in American policy, including the growth of racial exclusionist immigration policies, which particularly targeted immigration from Asia, as well as a strong domestic agricultural lobby, which opposed tariff and import legislation that gave an equal advantage to inexpensive Filipino agricultural products in the mainland market.\textsuperscript{58} However, the shift in the tone of malaria discussion, and the fact that this discussion remained fairly constant around the time of the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, suggests that there was a certain amount of consensus on the fact that malaria had been largely subdued, and the processes by which it had been beaten. This story of malaria’s defeat served both Filipino and American interests, combining narrative elements of strong Filipino leadership and technological implementation of good American science and tutelage.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The different portraits of malaria in the Philippines that emerge from the articles, reports, and journal articles considered here were substantially influenced by outside events and prominent ideologies of empire that dominated before and after the First World War. Although the United States was expanding by various means

\textsuperscript{54} Kramer, \textit{Blood of Government}, 388.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 389.
\textsuperscript{56} Nugent, 268. See also Mayers, 193-194.
\textsuperscript{57} Kramer, \textit{Blood of Government}, 392.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 393-395.
since the creation of the country, the Philippines marked a break from a previously continental expansion policy. Even though Franklin Pierce had considered acquiring Cuba in the 1850s, and even though the Alaska territory was not exactly contiguous with the rest of the country, the Philippines were outside the American sphere established by the Monroe Doctrine, which had established a U.S. sphere of primacy around the Americas. Moving beyond the North American continent represented a new stage in American expansion. The fact that this location of expansion was overseas, was inhabited by non-white peoples who possessed an organized independence struggle (even if it was subsequently dismissed by the American government), and was never presented as a candidate for future inclusion in the United States as an equal state forced the creation of a new national concept of the United States as an imperial nation with “responsibilities” similar to those of Great Britain. This comparison was deeply destabilizing for an American identity based on an exceptionalist narrative that defined itself in opposition to the mediaeval repression of the Old World nations. The Teller Amendment, written by an anti-imperialist senator from Colorado, determined that the United States could not keep Cuba in the event of victory against the Spanish in 1898. The Philippines, however, were acquired without any preparatory legislation about what status the islands would have relative to the United States. The archipelago was ruled by a combination of military command and presidential appointments to a lesser or greater degree until the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. In short, the structures of command were more ad hoc, and not written before the war. The disjoint between the ideas in the Teller Amendment and the ultimate fate of the Philippines vis-à-vis the United States illustrates this uncertainty in the American polity, and the difficulty of reworking the pre-existing American political system and political identity to fit the new circumstance of the tropical overseas possession.

This ambivalence toward imperialism seems to be reflected in the fearful articles of The New York Times, which hinted at dark threats lurking below the gilded tropical surface. Specific bacteriological threats were less relevant; what mattered was the fear of the entire colonial enterprise, including the necessity of holding on to the Philippines for at least another generation. In a way, concerns expressed in the newspaper clippings from 1898-1900 about the long-term impact of the tropical climate on American children raised in the Philippines evoked concerns about the impact of the colonial experience on the national culture and democratic ethos.

Nonetheless, the United States adapted very quickly to its new role as colonial masters. Historian Paul Kramer has written extensively about a growing trend toward an Anglo-Saxon racial identity in the United States over the second half of the nineteenth century, which included feelings of kinship and solidarity with the British as great industrial powers, beacons of progress, and harbingers of civilization.

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to all the dark and savage corners of the world.\textsuperscript{60} By the early years of the twentieth century, the United States was committed to an overseas imperial project; President McKinley’s previously stated views on the “duty” of the United States to the Philippines—“and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them”—can be taken as representative of the prevailing American view.\textsuperscript{61} The comprehensive, regular reports of the Philippine Commission are very much in line with the prevailing trend in British imperial management, with frequent updates and analyses sent back to the home country. In the early years of U.S. rule in the Philippines, a guerilla national resistance movement, coupled with poor infrastructure, a developing but still nascent bureaucracy, and the outbreak of two terrifying epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague pushed malaria down the list of U.S. priorities in the Philippines. Furthermore, the epidemiological distribution of malaria in the archipelago meant that the spread of the disease was not adequately understood. The Bureau of Health reports focused heavily on health in Manila and the surrounding areas, where malaria was not a huge problem. Dr. Paul F. Russell even makes this point in his 1936 analysis of the epidemiology of malaria in the Philippines, stating,

…the largest cities, such as Manila and Cebu, have always been free of malaria. The fact that officials have resided largely in such non-malarious communities, where in the past cholera, dysentery, and smallpox were destroying their thousands annually, led to a belief that malaria was neither widespread nor important.\textsuperscript{62}

The descriptions of malaria in the reports of the Philippine Commission reflect the priorities and perspectives of the American health officers working in the nascent colonial government; the picture of malaria in the Commission era that emerges is largely shaped by the form and limitations of the Commission government itself.

At the end of the First World War, the new international order, which was based to a great extent in the personal ideology of Woodrow Wilson, made possessing colonies somewhat morally suspect. This gave extra strength to the by then declining ideology of Progressivism; while the domestic impact of Progressivism was largely gone by the end of the First World War, the movement’s ideology lived on in American overseas policy. The new colonial ethos emphasized sharing the bounties of advanced civilization, particularly in medicine and technology, with the less advanced, with the aim to move the less-advanced peoples to a greater level of civilization, eventual independence, and full participation in the global order. Now arguably the dominant world power after the devastating fallout of the First World War, the United States was not afraid to exert itself in the colonial realm; the nation was young and confident, and correspondingly expounded a narrative of malaria control where progress was being made, and a formerly fearsome disease was being successfully controlled and, perhaps, mastered. Tropical disease was de-racialized; it was not a disease of the “native,” or the expression of a dangerous foreign climate,
but instead an indicator of a lower level of development and civilization that could be easily corrected through education and the careful application of pesticides and the latest modern techniques.

Today, malaria is present in rural areas on the islands of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, and Palawan at elevations below six hundred meters; it has been completely eradicated in urban zones. The past history of malaria in the archipelago remains, however, as a reminder that understandings of a disease on the societal level can be profoundly impacted by the fears, ideologies, and structures of a society. The existential neo-imperialist fears of the 1890s folded malaria fear into a more generalized fear of the polluting effects of a tropical climate—and the more spiritual pollution of engaging in European-style imperialism for fun and profit. While the Philippine Commission relied more heavily on actual statistical measures, their data was skewed by a mistaken understanding of the epidemiology of the disease in the Philippines, and limited by the forms of the bureaucratic structures created for the purpose of understanding, measuring, and managing this new tropical possession. Societal stability also impacted the recorded perceptions of malarial spread: during the worst periods of the war against the Philippine resistance, the American forces barely controlled more than the functionally non-malarial territory immediately surrounding Manila. In the two decades between the world wars, the international climate interacted with the new technocratic and scientific tendencies of the ascendant United States to support a narrative of malaria’s control and defeat that celebrated infrastructure and scientific progress, focusing on the tools more than the people who were using them. The story of malaria in the Philippines under the United States is thus one of confluence: of imperialist rhetoric and progressive models of modernity with disease etiology and the development of new scientific tools and infrastructure practices to create a narrative of the victory of American modernity against backwards practices and protozoa alike.

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From the Ashes: The Success of Failure in Ireland 1916

Alec Holland

On Easter Monday, April 23, 1916 detachments of the Irish Volunteers, the military organization of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, marched through Dublin and took control of several areas of the city including the General Post Office (GPO) on the city’s main thoroughfare. On the steps of the GPO, Patrick Pearse renounced British rule and proclaimed the formation of an independent provisional government of Ireland. Over seven hundred years had passed since the English first occupied Ireland in 1169 and in that time countless rebellions and smaller risings had occurred. During the later half of the nineteenth century the Irish had turned to parliamentary negotiations for a Home Rule Bill, but the House of Lords continuously voted it down. Irish militant nationalism waned, and with the coming of the First World War in 1914, many Irishmen who used to be part of the nationalist movement instead served under the British in France. The Easter Rising of 1916 broke the lethargy of all those nationalists in Ireland who still desired freedom from the British state.

The Rising in Dublin lasted only a week as the British authorities brought in soldiers from their bases around the island and even shelled the city from a gunboat anchored in the River Liffey. On Saturday April 28, 1916, surrounded by soldiers and cut off by raging fires, Pearse ordered the unconditional surrender due to the hopelessness of the Volunteers’ positions. General Sir John Maxwell took control as military governor of Ireland and swiftly began carrying out the courts-martial of the Volunteers, which resulted in the executions of Pearse and fourteen other leaders of the Rising.

The martyrs of the Easter Rising, not only the fifteen leaders who were executed in Kilmainham Gaol, but those who died in prisons and those reportedly murdered by British soldiers during the Rising, came to embody the idea of the fight for Irish independence and the cruelty and ineptitude of British rule toward the Irish people. From the ashes of the Rising also arose leaders, such as Michael Collins, who

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Alec Holland is currently a senior undergraduate student at Ohio University. He will be graduating with a B.A. in History with a minor in German in June 2012. Alec plans to pursue a career in the United States Army after graduation while continuing his studies in History. He hopes to pursue an M.A. in History.
took control of the Irish Volunteers after being released from prison for his part in the Rising. Collins and his compatriots, who fought in the GPO, realized the hopelessness of the Irish cause in open battle against the British. They formed a plan to cut off England’s most valuable asset in Ireland, their intelligence network. These strategies lead to the most successful campaign the Irish ever waged against the British.1

In the years following the Easter Rising many poems, essays, and biographies praised its leaders to such a degree that they “underwent a steady process of secular sanctification.”2 This first interpretation was led by renowned literary men of the time including Bernard Shaw and W.B. Yeats. F.X. Martin described this as the “faith and fatherland” interpretation, which invoked the romantic ideals that existed in Irish Nationalism. These writers describe the Rising as a much-needed wake up call to the Irish people and portrayed the executed leaders as saints and martyrs. Most of their works read like monuments to those who died in the Rising.3

However, there were a few dissenters such as W. Alison Phillips, an Englishman who was a professor at Trinity College in Dublin, who wrote the first history of the events before and after the Rising in 1923 that claimed to be unbiased. His book reflected the official British view and that presented in the newspapers of the period, which claimed the Rising was a plot by the Germans to distract British forces. The British Prime Minister’s visit to Ireland to discuss the enactment of the Home Rule Bill, Phillips believed, bolstered Irish nationalism after the Rising.4

In 1919 Michael Collins began to pursue his strategy of targeted attacks by guerilla forces to do the most damage possible to the British government in Ireland. Historians of the Irish Revolution agree that he played a pivotal role in the war against the British. Arthur Griffith, head of the first Irish Parliament, called Collins, “the man who won the war.”5 Collins has undergone apotheosis in dozens of biographies throughout the twentieth century.

However, some viewed his activities as pure terrorism, while others believed he did not do enough to gain a unified and totally independent Ireland. His role in the negotiation of a treaty with Britain in 1921, giving Ireland dominion status and the right to self-rule but keeping Northern Ireland under the Union, made him the target of hatred by those who wanted nothing less than a unified Ireland free from all ties to Britain. These actions sadly led to the bloody Irish Civil War immediately on the heels of Irish Independence. There are also those who questioned his importance to the Revolution, among them, Cathal Brugha, the first Irish Defense Minister.6

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During the 1960s a new school of thought developed, called the “revisionist” school, which began to look at the Rising in a more critical manner. Around this time violence between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Northern Ireland increased. The partition of Ireland, when the northern counties remained in the Union with Britain under the Anglo-Irish Peace Treaty, was blamed on the Easter Rising. Within this school, authors argued that the Rising was either unnecessary, or that it was ill-timed. They asserted that had the Rising been launched a few years later, in particular when conscription came to Ireland resulting in the British government’s unpopularity, Ireland could have been united in its rebellion and the partition could have been avoided. Another revisionist argument was that the Parliamentary negotiations for a Home Rule Bill would have been successful. After the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Rising in 1991 and the IRA ceasefire in 1994, the scholarship of the Rising took on a more muted and analytical tone.\(^7\)

The events of the Rising began to be explored with a less biased tone to the scholarship and the arguments whether it was right or wrong became muted. In 2005 Charles Townshend attributed the success of the Rising and the subsequent revolution to many small processes of patriotic fervor, such as the emerging popularity of “A Soldier’s Song.” This hymn, written in 1907 and heard for the first time in public during the Easter Rising, became the Irish National anthem. Adrian Hardiman, writing his analysis of the legality of the courts-martial after the Rising, admits the importance of the deaths in terms of public opinion, as do Michael Foy and Brian Barton in their book written in 1999.\(^8\)

Throughout the twentieth century, historians have debated the effects and the necessity of the Easter Rising. The general consensus of those who study the Rising is that it was an important part of a greater picture, which led to the successes in the revolution of 1919, and it was key in creating the Irish Republic that exists today. Despite the revisionist historians’ views, the Rising and especially Britain’s reaction to it directly affected the radicalization of the Irish people and their support of the guerilla warfare that broke out in 1919. As such, the Rising was the key factor that caused the Irish people to back the Irish Revolution. The British reaction to the Easter Rising and hasty execution of the leaders galvanized those in Ireland who were up until then sitting on the fence, swinging the popular sentiment in favor of radical action. From this wave of popular support new leaders emerged, such as Collins, who had learned their lessons in the fires of the GPO during Easter Week. They were able to radicalize the movement with a wider support base and build a strategy which was indispensible in bringing the British Government in Ireland to its knees and forced it to come to terms with the Irish Free State.

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It is necessary to understand the impact the executions had on Irish public opinion in particular: events leading up to the Rising, the immediate reaction, the emotional effects of the executions along with their tactics and the subsequent change that resulted from the actions. Ireland’s nationalist cause had always contained a romantic flare, which inspired Irish patriots to stand up and die for their country. After the executions Ireland’s great literary men seized upon the opportunity given to them by the British and transformed the executed leaders of the Easter Rising into heroes. Finally, the weakness of Ireland in relation to British power affirmed the necessity and the importance of Michael Collins’ personal practicality and tireless efforts on behalf of the Irish nationalist cause, as well as the radicalization of the strategy he developed in order to gain Irish Independence through forceful means.

On Saturday, April 29, 1916, one of the Volunteers described how, “louder than all the noise was the silence that descended on the city.” The Easter Rising was crushed beneath the might of the British military, pummeling the rebels into submission, and those in the rebel positions felt the weight of failure press hard upon their spirits. The leaders addressed their comrades and urged them to carry on the fight in their hearts and live that Ireland might one day be free.⁹

As the guns fell silent on Saturday of Easter Week and the order to surrender circulated through the separated outposts of the Irish Volunteers in Dublin, the streets thronged with people. In some places, the surrendering Volunteers were begged to hide and offered shelter. Citizens crowded other streets to cheer the Volunteers as they marched past.¹⁰ While some took to the streets to offer comfort to the surrendered rebels, most came out to revile them. In parts of the city the crowds were so hostile that the British officers in charge of the prisoners ordered their soldiers to keep the mobs at bay with their bayonets. The Easter Rising had failed not only as a military engagement, but it seemed to have failed in winning the hearts and minds of the majority of the Irish nation as well.¹¹

In the years leading up to the Easter Rising Irish Nationalism steadily grew in the southern twenty-six counties where a Catholic majority felt it had been oppressed by the Protestant British government. The support for the nationalist Irish Party in the British Parliament had steadily grown and the extent of Irish Nationalism was clearly displayed after the 1884 Representation of the People Act. This legislation gave the vote to a majority of citizens in the United Kingdom, and significantly increased the visible support for the Irish Party outside of the Ulster Unionist stronghold in the north. This surge in popular nationalism led to the introduction of a Home Rule Bill in 1886, which would grant Ireland its own national government. This was greeted with mixed sentiments in both Britain and Ireland. The British had

¹⁰ Foy and Barton, 205.
¹¹ Ibid., 203; Joseph Sweeney interview, 79.
experienced several outbreaks of rebellion in their overseas empire during this period and many politicians thought that if Britain let go of Ireland, then other colonies would see it as a further weakening of British rule and sue for their own independence. In the north of Ireland, the Unionist cause remained strong. Unionist delegates thought they would become a minority in a Home Rule Ireland.\(^\text{12}\)

The Home Rule debates lasted until the beginning of the World War I, when a preliminary bill was passed; but its enactment was postponed until after the war. This development temporarily dampened the prospects of radical nationalists who mistrusted the British government and sought to forcibly take Irish Independence. The radicals were left in a minority as the majority of nationalists sided with the Parliamentary cause. This passage of the Home Rule Bill also created an upswing in Irish support for the British cause in the war and many Irishmen volunteered for service in the British Army.\(^\text{13}\)

Irish support quickly dropped however and a growing majority was unhappy with the war and the postponement of Home Rule. Distrust of the British slowly grew once again. Some became cynical about whether or not the British would follow through with the Home Rule Bill after the war, many saw no advantage for Ireland in supporting the war, and the fear of conscription grew after it was introduced in March 1916, although not yet applied to Ireland.\(^\text{14}\) The radical minority saw a chance to act in the fall of support for the war and the growing mistrust of the British government. They acted too rashly, however, and their bid for freedom failed during Easter Week of 1916.

In Britain the Rising was proclaimed a German plot to distract British attention from France. This view turned the Rising from a nationalist grasp at freedom into a treasonous act by enemy agents and made it repulsive even to the Irish Nationalist Parliamentarians, who sought freedom for Ireland through diplomatic means. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, publicly denounced the Rising, and newspapers throughout Britain wrote of the Rising as a heinous German act of sabotage.\(^\text{15}\)

Depicting the Rising as an entirely German plot caused unexpected problems for the British when they began punishing the leaders of the rebellion. The “German Plot” made the actual participants in Ireland seem to be only the surrogates of the Germans and thus not entirely responsible for their actions. Therefore, as soon as the first men were executed many Irish Members of Parliament (MP), including Redmond, spoke out against the treatment of the prisoners. Redmond warned the Prime Minister that the party could not condone the executions. John Dillon, another Irish MP, gave a vehement oration, in which he complained that the Irish


\(^{13}\) Ibid., 199-200.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

Party was not consulted before, “the bloody course of executions was entered upon.”

Dillon, an extremely outspoken MP, gave speeches against the handling of the Rising which caused great controversy in the British Government. He accused the British of, “letting loose a river of blood,” which had destroyed the efforts of the Irish Party to bring the Irish and British closer together. He also praised the rebels for their, “superb bravery and skill,” and declared, “It is not murderers who are being executed; it is insurgents who have fought a clean fight, a brave fight.” He made his opinion of the rebels absolutely clear on the floor of the British House of Commons and criticized the British government for its hasty actions, which exposed the cruelty and incompetence that lurked behind the mighty façade of the British Empire.

Even those who fought against Irish independence were rattled by the executions. Warre B. Wells, a journalist who belonged to the Unionist party opposed to the Irish Nationalist Party, wrote a public plea to the British people, “to understand [the executions'] effect on that Irish public which read of them.” He described the Irish position as a, “feeling of helpless rage,” that one feels when watching, “a stream of blood dripping from under a closed door.” He also believed the British policy of understating the Rising from the beginning, “inevitably threw into disproportionately high relief,” the executions which followed. Therefore public opinion swung completely against the British and their regime in Ireland.

In the days following the Rising, the courts-martial and executions of participants were carried out in an unorganized and hurried manner. William G. Wylie, the man who was given the task of prosecuting and defending the rebels in their courts-martial, received notice of his position only a few hours before the trials started on May 2 only two days after the end of the Rising itself. Wylie’s memoirs reveal his sympathy for the accused and his own disgust for the proceedings. He continually asked for the secrecy of the trials to be lifted and lobbied for the defendants to be allowed access to proper defense counsel. Wylie succeeded in persuading the court to allow prisoners to call witnesses for their defense after the first day of trials. The speed of the trials took many by surprise, from Wylie to the Prime Minister of Britain. Additionally it gave Maxwell complete power over the courts-martial for the first week of the trials. This speedy prosecution left Maxwell with the power of life and death from May 2 to May 9, as he was the only person to sign off on the sentences of execution. Maxwell’s reign stopped only after Prime Minister Asquith finally stepped in on May 9 to prevent further executions that he felt would destroy what little reputation the British government had left in Ireland.

Ostensibly, General Maxwell loosely grouped the men condemned to death into three categories: those who signed the independence proclamation and were

16 Ibid., 58-59.
19 Barton, From Behind a Closed Door, 34-35; Townshend, Easter 1916, 287.
20 Hardiman, 230.
“ringleaders,” those who commanded rebel detachments, and, “those whose offense was murder.” The problems with these charges were that no solid definition of “ringleader” was stated and much of the evidence against the accused was weak at best and would never have held up in open court. Wylie speculated that the refusal to hold the courts-martial in public was precisely because the evidence by which the defendants were convicted was so weak. 21

The secrecy and speed in which the trials were conducted greatly damaged the British cause to suppress rebellion in Ireland. The secret trials gave rise to rumors, which damaged the reputation of the British administration and of Maxwell himself. Many believed that all the rebels had been shot immediately and rumors circulated of a mass grave, dug to hide the bodies of hundreds of rebels. 22

Just as the wild rumors flew through Ireland, so too did the news of the real executions and the public’s reaction was no less horrified by the actual deeds than it had been by the rumors. One Dublin resident remembered feeling, “terrible sore,” at the news of the executions and reacted with, “a feeling of revulsion.” Another exclaimed, “whatever bitterness was in your heart just swelled up and made you more and more determined to carry on.” 23

From the beginning of the executions the martyrs of the Easter Rising were a type of patriots different from martyrs and figures of Ireland’s past. The men of the 1916 Rising had been well known in Ireland before their participation in it. Therefore their deaths struck an intense emotional chord with the Irish people. One man remembered them as, “men of intellect and vision… of education, ability and courage that faced their deaths in a noble manner.” 24

James Connolly, one of the executed leaders, had started his public career defending Unions in Dublin and became popular to the working class of Ireland even before he participated in the Rising. He was so badly wounded during the Rising he had to be carried around on a stretcher and in order to execute him the soldiers tied him to a chair because he could not stand. The story of his execution exemplified the merciless nature of the executions in Irish eyes. As the news of his execution spread, a banner was hung outside Liberty Hall, his headquarters in Dublin from his Union days, that read, “James Connolly Murdered May 12th 1916.” His popularity and the manner of his death further fueled the sympathy for the rebels and the rising anti-British sentiment. 25

Also fueling anti-British sentiment were the executions of men whose guilt was so dubious that many questioned the reasons behind their deaths. Sean Harling

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21 Townshend, 283-287.
22 Hardiman, 232.
remembered, “there were some people you’d never think [the British] would execute which they did.” The single most objectionable death was that of William Pearse, the brother of Patrick Pearse, who was singled out for what appeared to be no other reason than the connection to his brother. The official records of the court-martial show that William pleaded guilty but the trial itself was a, “travesty of justice.”26

The hasty and haphazard manner in which the trials and executions took place and the popularity of the men being executed set popular opinion in Ireland against the British. Subsequently, the great literary men of Ireland cast their images in the eternal memorials of poem and song that had long affected Ireland’s national politics and set them among the pantheon of Irish patriots from ages past. With the horror and revulsion of the Irish people came the inevitable romanticized remembrance of the men who died for freedom’s noble cause. Nicholas Mansergh observed in his book The Irish Question, “National sentiment in Ireland had long found a romantic refuge.” Thousands of songs, poems, and other works existed in Ireland celebrating patriots from the past who had risen against British rule and failed similarly to those who took part in the Easter Rising. The Irish had long memorialized their dead patriots and given them the status of tragic heroes. In the same way, those executed by the British after the Easter Rising became heroes nobly facing their deaths for the sake of their country.27

They were immortalized in the poems of W.B. Yeats, one of the most popular poets in Ireland during this period, and celebrated in dozens of songs written and sung about their brave and tragic stand. Bernard Shaw, another prominent Irish literary figure, proclaimed, “Nothing will stop these people being named as martyrs for the Irish people.”28 In his poem, “Sixteen Dead Men,” Yeats equates Pearse and MacDonagh with Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Wolfe Tone, both Irish patriots from centuries before who had led uprisings in Ireland and were executed when they failed. These were men whom all Irishmen knew from song and story passed down through the generations and celebrated as Irish heroes.29 Those fifteen men executed after the Rising became the pillar at the center of the growing popular support for Irish Independence in the years between the Easter Rising and the Revolution in 1921. However, other men also became martyrs for the cause of freedom following the Rising, some more willingly than others.

Francis Sheehy-Skeffington held a prominent role in Dublin politics before the Rising as a well-known and liked supporter of many causes such as pacifism and women’s suffrage. He was in the city during the Rising, trying to stop people from looting when he was arrested by a British officer and shot for no apparent reason. When an attempt to cover up the event failed and the story of his murder leaked out,
it greatly angered the Dublin citizenry against the British and Sheehy-Skeffington became an unwitting martyr for freedom in the years after his death.\textsuperscript{30}

Many involved in the Rising who were not executed were deported to prison camps in Wales and other locations in mainland Britain. Some of these men protested their treatment by going on hunger strikes. These men were subjected to force-feeding by the British guards and some died in the process. One of the victims of this British treatment, Terence MacSwiney, even wrote a moving poem before he died, “Before the Last Battle,” in which he entreats God to, “teach us how to die... Before our flag can fly.” He poignantly sums up the situation in Ireland in the years after the Rising by saying, “All the agony of years, all the horrors, all the fears, Martyrs’ blood, survivors tears, Now we offer Thee... for the freedom we have lost. God, restore it, tho’ the cost greater still must be.” This poem revealed a mentality that existed among the Irish people following the Rising. They took the harshness of the British response to the Rising and used it to bolster their own courage and fortitude for the fight to come. The stories of these men and their “care” in British hands further enflamed the Irish public opinion against the British, whose rule they were coming to view as cruel, heavy-handed, and incompetent.\textsuperscript{31}

The events of 1916 led to a distrust of Irish soldiers by some of the British commanders who blamed several heavy defeats on the disloyalty of the Irish battalions. This fostered resentment among the soldiers, and many returned to Ireland after the war only to join the nationalist movements developing at the time that would later form the backbone of the IRA in the Irish Revolution. The growth in popularity of the more radical nationalist movements was so pronounced that when conscription was finally introduced in Ireland in 1918, it was not enforced because the Royal Irish Constabulary reported that anti-British sentiment had been growing and it was unable to restrict the drills and parades of the nationalists.\textsuperscript{32}

The growing popular support for the nationalist party, Sinn Fein, culminated in the 1919 election. Those Sinn Fein candidates who were elected in the majority of the Irish counties refused to sit in London and formed their own Parliament in Dublin. This was the true start of the Revolution that would win Ireland its independence. The electorate spoke up and supported the break from Britain in public elections. This was the true legacy for which the men of the Easter Rising had laid down their lives.

From the romantic flame, which the executions stirred, grew a wildfire of national support for Ireland’s freedom and now that fire had to be controlled and directed by practical hands so it would continue to thrive. The right men had to take the task at hand and see it through. The new leaders of the Irish independence movement were forced to carefully consider their strategy and the limits inherent with their situation. Instead of performing tragically heroic stands against the full might of the British, they radicalized the nationalist strategy into a combination of

\textsuperscript{30} Foy and Barton, 189-191.
\textsuperscript{31} Townshend, 1.
\textsuperscript{32} McMahon, “Ireland, the Empire, and the Commonwealth,” 203-05.
guerilla operations and terrorist attacks in order to inflict the most damage against the British presence in Ireland while evading capture. Michael Collins was one of the most important figures in the development of this new radical strategy.

Collins had fought in the GPO during the Easter Rising and experienced the disparity of the fight against the superior British forces that hit the rebels with artillery and machine gun fire. It was during the Rising that he realized the hopelessness of Ireland’s cause in open battle against the British. He desired nothing less than a victory over the British. Collins was convinced that no amount of hopeless stands would gain Irish independence. After the Rising one of his companions remarked that the Rising had been a good fight to which Collins replied, “What do you mean… We lost, didn’t we?” His only goal was to overcome the British and he would not accept anything less. This was the notion that would pervade the Nationalist strategy during the Irish Revolution in 1919.33

Collins admired the leaders of the Rising for facing their deaths nobly, but he had serious reservations about the entire adventure. In a letter he described how, “looking at [the Rising] from the inside (I was in the GPO) it had the air of a Greek Tragedy about it.” He also stated that, of all the leaders, he admired Connolly the most for the “air of directness” he exuded. Collins admired Connolly because he saw a fellow realist whose patriotism was mixed with practicality. Collins’ own sense of practicality would later influence his work to bring about Irish Freedom by any means he saw necessary.34 Once the British released most of the rebels from prison in 1917, many quickly rejoined the Irish Republican Brotherhood and its operations to further the cause of Irish freedom. As one of those released, Collins also rejoined the Brotherhood and rose swiftly through the ranks until he sat on the Supreme Council and wielded great power in the Brotherhood’s networks.

When, in 1919, almost half of the Irish Parliamentarians who refused to sit in London were arrested, Collins escaped capture along with other key lieutenants of the proclaimed Irish government, including Richard Mulcahy and Dick McKee who were his closest collaborators. Together they pursued a new strategy to destroy Britain’s intelligence networks in Ireland and thereby cut off British power to confound every action of Irish resistance against them. His plans mixed guerilla operations against military units with assassinations of known collaborators, Royal Irish Constabulary, and British officials. Collins built on the popular support base to gather a large group of tightly organized guerilla fighters whose goal was to attack the British and retreat back into the hills and alleys so as to prevent the British any means of retaliation. These men became the first incarnation of the IRA. The aid of the Irish people was key to Collins’ strategy and without the popular support of the

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Nicholas Mansergh asserted that the IRA’s strategy was a sad necessity as the Irish were presented with the, “task of carrying on by any means in their power an unequal conflict against modern weapons of war.” He agreed with Collins’ assessment that there was no way for the Irish to win an open war against the might of the British war machine. Collins knew that before the Irish could win their freedom, they would have to pay a horrible price in blood to convince the British to release their hold on Ireland.\footnote{Mansergh, 266.}

The brutality of attacks and reprisals escalated throughout 1919 and into 1920. Guerilla bands struck military convoys and disappeared into the hills. Individual gunmen shot policemen and detectives in the street and then vanished in the crowds. In retaliation Britain sent unemployed World War I veterans to Ireland, known as the Black and Tans because of their mismatched uniforms. This group of paramilitaries unleashed a reign of terror in Ireland. When the IRA attacked a convoy or assassinated an officer, the Black and Tans retaliated by shooting the first likely suspects they could find. Under their authority, suspicion was proof. The most infamous event occurred on “Bloody Sunday” in November 1920, when, after an IRA raid on a military convoy, the Black and Tans as a reprisal opened fire on a crowd of Irish civilians enjoying a football game, killing fourteen innocent spectators. Three IRA prisoners, including Dick McKee, were also killed that day.

The trading of atrocities continued as the British government of David Lloyd George sought to come to a decision on how best to end the conflict in Ireland. Concern that the emergence of a free Ireland would prompt similar rebellions in other British territories, such as Egypt and India where nationalist factions had also been gaining popularity, occupied government debate. However, the continuation of the conflict raised concerns about reactions in countries with significant Irish expatriate communities such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Lloyd George needed to find a balance that was acceptable for both the British Empire and the British state.\footnote{McMahon, “Ireland, the Empire, and the Commonwealth,” 206-208.}

In July 1921 the British had finally had enough. They called a truce and entered into a peace treaty in which they recognized the Irish Free State. The British, although they were brought to the table, were not cowed and their demands were backed up with the threat of an overwhelming all out war.\footnote{Ibid., 209.} The willingness of Michael Collins to develop a practical strategy extended to the negotiations of a treaty and as the lead negotiator for Ireland he accepted a truce that, while not all they had hoped for, accomplished more than what so many generations of risings...
had failed to achieve in the past. Most of Ireland was free from British rule after over seven hundred years of occupation.

The Easter Rising, though a military failure, was thus the cornerstone that transformed centuries-old struggles into a realized dream. It radicalized the Irish people into taking bold and decisive action against the British. The sacrifices of the leaders of Easter Week at the hands of the British revitalized the romantic ideals of traditional nationalism in Ireland and produced leaders with the practicality to see what was necessary to break the British hold in Ireland. The Irish Free State and the Republic which grew from that state, and still exists today, would not have emerged the way it did if not for the men who stood up for the rights of their country during Easter Week 1916.

Quite rightly did Thomas Clarke, one of the executed leaders, claim to his wife just before his death, “We have struck the first successful blow for freedom. The next... will win through. In this belief we die happy.” His prediction came true, the next blow did win, and the Irish nation those brave men fought and died for became a reality.39 Patrick Pearse prophesied Ireland’s future best when he proclaimed just a year before his own death, “Life springs from death; and from the graves of Patriot Men and Women spring living nations... They [the British] think they have pacified Ireland... but the fools, the fools, the fools! – they have left us our Fenian dead and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree [sic] shall never be at peace.”40

39 Barton, 40.
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Hungary’s Soviet Shock: *The Day the Revolution Died*

Rebecca McKeown

It is said that when a man is fatally sick, he frequently experiences a day of euphoria a little before his death, when the functioning of his organs seems almost normal, giving him the illusion that recovery is possible. In the history of the Hungarian Revolution, that day was November 3 - Tibor Meray

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was as fascinating and dramatic an uprising as any other. As in many popular uprisings, Hungarians appeared sure of their imminent success. They protested, fought, and died for their cause. Civilians celebrated their collective triumph as a near certainty.

The sacrifices made by ordinary Hungarians that year should not be diminished. Their stories have been immortalized in countless records and through national and international commemorations of their struggle. But there is more to the story of Hungary’s stand against the Soviet Union than the first heady days of protest and combat. The revolution bore an almost totally unforeseen twist, a downfall so great it threatened to extinguish the flame that only a day earlier had burned so brightly. That force was the Hungarian spirit, and the twist was November 4.

This article intends to argue that the Soviet intervention of November 4 came as a considerable shock to much of Hungary’s population. Drawing from first-hand accounts by civilian fighters, local and foreign witnesses, and other historical.

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Rebecca McKeown is a third year student of International Relations and Development Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand. After completing her Honors year in 2013 she hopes to undertake a two-year International Masters in Economy, State, and Society at University College London, with a research year at Corvinus University in Budapest. Rebecca is particularly interested in the diverse histories and cultures of Eastern European states; especially Romania, where she worked as a journalist in 2007. On completion of her studies she hopes to work in a diplomatic role for New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2 The event has been described by various scholars as both an uprising and a revolution, both terms being employed equally in historic accounts. This paper follows that same convention, utilizing both descriptions.
sources, it will present a thorough narrative and analysis of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Subsequent sections will examine Soviet decision making leading up to the counter-attack, as well as the shock of November 4 itself. Though this article’s primary focus is Hungarian reaction to the Soviet re-occupation of Hungary, it is imperative to acknowledge the foundations upon which this “Soviet shock” was constructed. The aforementioned sections will follow a brief account of the events of the uprising itself.

The Hungarian Revolution: “Russians, Go Home!”

Arise, Hungarians,
The fatherland summons you,
Now is the time, or never.
By God we swear
Never again to be slaves.
- Sándor Petőfi, 1848

On October 22, 1956, a group of Hungarian writers and university students in Budapest organized a demonstration against Soviet imperialism. Tensions had been mounting in Hungary throughout the year, magnified in June by Polish protests in Poznań. The air of excitement and rebellion on the night of October 22 was, however, a new development. The 5,000-strong crowd of students and writers meeting at the Technical University in Budapest were unanimous in their motivation. “All we want is a silent, calm, peaceful demonstration,” wrote engineering student Mihaly Samson in his diary that evening, “That is the only thing that can make it possible for us to attain our goal.”

But the next day brought little in the way of calm or peaceful protest. The students and writers were joined in their demonstrations by thousands of fellow Budapestians. When Ernő Gerő, the General Secretary of Hungary’s Communist

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3 Sándor Petőfi, ‘Nemzeti dal/National song’, 1848, quoted in Tibor Meray, That Day in Budapest (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 145. The Nemzeti dal (or National song) written by Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi is said to have inspired the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, which sought independence for the Kingdom of Hungary from the Austrian Empire. In 1956, the nationalist spirit of the song was rekindled by the freedom fighters and used to motivate the masses against the Hungarians’ contemporary oppressor: the Soviets.


Party, refused to acknowledge the demonstrators’ demands, they became incensed. Ropes were wrapped around the neck of the statue of Joseph Stalin in Városliget, the city park, in an attempt to drag it to the ground. When the crowd realized Stalin would not fall so easily, blowtorches were employed to melt the knees of the great “man of steel.” His bronze replica toppled to the ground as the people cried out with a newfound courage: “Ruszkik Haza!” (Russians go home).

When the crowd realized Stalin would not fall so easily, blowtorches were employed to melt the knees of the great “man of steel.” His bronze replica toppled to the ground as the people cried out with a newfound courage: “Ruszkik Haza!” (Russians go home).

Intense fighting grew from the demonstration and persisted until October 28 when a cease-fire was arranged. Two days later, Soviet armed forces began to withdraw from Budapest. The Hungarian freedom fighters, full of bravado and nationalist fervor, believed they had triumphed. By all accounts the atmosphere was one of ecstasy and certainty. One schoolboy-turned-fighter wrote later that “even the most skeptical were beginning to believe what had happened…. The sacrifices had been great, but Hungary was now an independent country, free and neutral.”

Foreigners rejoiced under the same illusion. British correspondent Sefton Delmer recalls the celebratory air of conviction in his account of the first day of

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10 Ibid. Joseph Stalin was born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili in Georgia in 1878, but changed his surname to “Stalin” as a pen name for his written works. Stalin literally means ‘steel’ in Russian.

11 Ibid.


13 Ibid.

14 Noel Barber, Seven Days of Freedom (New York: Stein & Day, 1974), 21. Barber (1909-1988) was a British journalist and novelist who travelled to Budapest to report on the Hungarian Uprising. On October 28, 1956 he survived being shot in the head by a Russian soldier who fired upon the car he was driving.

15 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary – 1957, 23. The cease-fire was ordered by the new government of Imre Nagy, political leader of the revolution. The report by the UN Special Committee on “the problem of Hungary” suggests a few isolated skirmishes continued until October 30, when Soviet armed forces began their withdrawal from Budapest. The report also maintains that at this point the cease-fire did become fully effective, and that a sense of normality gradually spread across the state.

16 Ibid.

17 Meray, Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin, 137.

18 See Mikes, The Hungarian Revolution, 105, and Zoltán Tildy, Radio Kossuth Broadcast, quoted in Lasky, ed., The Hungarian Revolution, 139-140.

19 Thomas Szabo, Boy on the Rooftop (Surrey: Heinemann, 1958), 63.
revolution. “I marched with them and I wept with joy like them when the Russian emblems were ripped out of the flags by an exalted crowd … but what was most important was the fact that this revolt seems destined to be victorious.”

On November 1 the political leader of the revolution, Imre Nagy, announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and in the streets Hungarians chanted their support: “Nagy Imrében bizalmunk!” (We have faith in Imre Nagy!).

The Day It Turned Sour: Hungary Reclaimed

This is Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, speaking. Today at dawn, Soviet forces launched an attack against the capital…. Our troops are fighting.

Nagy’s radio broadcast cut through the airwaves just before 5:20 on the morning of November 4. Just one hour earlier, fifteen Soviet armored divisions began their attack on the unsuspecting nation. Budapest residents woke to a distant rumbling that many initially attributed to an unseasonable thunderstorm. Soon, however, the reality became clear. Budapest was being bombarded.

The number of tanks reportedly involved in the Soviet invasion varies considerably between sources. George Mikes puts the number at 6,000, Victor Sebestyen at 2,500, and a special United Nations report estimates there were between 1,600 and 4,000. The disparity can be attributed in part to the chaos that surrounded the counter-attack. Yet any one of the estimates demonstrates the power wielded by the Soviet Union over the Hungarian fighters. The use of tanks in the struggle for Hungary is significant, as in many ways the machines represented Soviet ruthlessness and violence. Their arrival heralded the beginning of five long days of Russian onslaught, of cold-blooded arbitrary retribution, and the eventual defeat of the Hungarian freedom fighters.

Understanding the actions of the Russian soldiers is an important step toward

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20 Sefton Delmer, quoted in Meray, _That Day in Budapest_, 151.
21 Meray, _That Day in Budapest_, 149. Imre Nagy was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary for two years between 1953 and 1955. He was forced to step down in 1955 by the Soviet Presidium, after pushing for a “new course” for Socialism. Many actors in the 1956 Revolution, including both anti-Soviet demonstrators and Soviet loyalists, considered Nagy the ringleader of the October unrest. Months before the uprising, in June, the Hungarian Working People’s Party adopted a resolution denouncing the perceived attempts of Nagy to rally “anti-party elements” around his leadership.
22 Meray, _Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin_, 237.
23 Ibid.
24 Mikes, _The Hungarian Revolution_, 148.
appreciating the traumatic disbelief that November 4 heaped upon the Hungarian people. But the orders and actions of the soldiers’ commanders are also significant factors to consider. How is it that only four days after promising to withdraw troops from Hungary, Soviet Russia was back on the offensive?

Historians have offered a range of answers to this very question. Karl Benziger argues that far from being the driving force behind the Hungarian freedom fighters, Imre Nagy only gradually embraced the goals of the uprising. When he began urging Hungarians to “safeguard the achievements of the Revolution,” claims Benziger, the Soviets reacted, fearful of the political change Nagy now seemed to be advancing. But Benziger’s assertions fail to give Imre Nagy sufficient credit. An argument closer to the truth is perhaps that of analyst Terry Cox, who maintains that despite Nagy’s reform ideas being somewhat tamer than those demanded by the demonstrators, the Soviet Presidium had been nervous of Nagy’s intentions all along. The version expounded by Tibor Meray, Hungarian writer and good friend of Imre Nagy, aligns with Cox’s explanation, though Meray goes further to describe the point when the Presidium decided that such events in Hungary could not be tolerated. That moment came as First Secretary of the Soviet Presidium Anastas Mikoyan returned to Moscow from negotiating the extraction of Soviet troops with Nagy and former Hungarian Prime Minister Zoltán Tildy. On his return, Mikoyan was informed that the Soviet Union “would no longer tolerate Hungary’s departure from the socialist camp and her reorientation towards the right through renunciation of the Warsaw Pact.” These few words encapsulate the catalyst of the Soviet intervention. When the Soviets became conscious that Nagy’s demands would not be so easily abated as those of Polish reformist Władysław Gomułka during the Poznań protests months earlier, their patience snapped. Nagy not only wanted reform, but he had grown to want what the Hungarian people were demanding: complete independence from the Soviet Union. This was clearly unacceptable to Moscow.

The thought of letting Hungary slip through the net of the mighty Soviet Union was too much to bear for the Presidium. They sought to punish Nagy and the Hungarian people for their dissidence, their fury reflected by the callousness of the

28 Ibid., 65.
30 Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, 197.
31 Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland”, 174. Władysław Gomułka was the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from 1956-1970. He was a popular reformist who oversaw a smooth conclusion to the 1956 Polish protests by pandering somewhat to Soviet interests.
33 Ibid., 197.
invading Russian soldiers. This sudden and merciless attack added to the Hungarians’ shock that their cause was swiftly being trampled. And both their cause and resistance were indeed quite easily crushed. The Hungarians fought with only light machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades. Defense was disorganized, and crumpled under the power and number of the Russian tanks. Those tanks, recalls Ede Pfeiffer, “seemed to fire indiscriminately, shells poured into chosen targets at close range until buildings collapsed like sand castles.”

It was not only the thousands of Soviet tanks that wrought havoc on the Hungarian people. Tens of thousands of Russian troops were set upon the country, very few with any trace of compassion on their minds. According to Mikes, their brutality boiled down to anger that the uprising had postponed their demobilization. Whatever the reason, many of their actions were nothing short of atrocities. One eye-witness describes the random attacks on bread lines in Budapest, the dead lying in the streets with newly purchased loaves still clutched in their hands. Other accounts tell of soldiers looting homes and stores and raping countless young girls and women.

The Soviet Shock: Doubt, Disbelief, Disaster

The shock experienced by everyday Hungarian people following the Russian invasion has been recounted by many scholars, but few have actually analyzed that disbelief. The depth of dismay is made obvious by reports of the event, but unpacking the cause of this devastation takes a more comprehensive examination. Why did failure in such a precarious situation come as such a surprise to Hungarians?

The Soviet shock resulted from a combination of three key causes: a sense of normality and victory preceding the invasion, a false belief in support from the international community, and an underlying fear of Soviet retribution. Historiographically, there is a conflicting stance held by a handful of scholars. There are those who no doubt disagree with this concept of shock; their opinion being that most Hungarians saw the counter-attack coming. Victor Sebestyen, for example, contends that the Soviets were “tightening their noose” around the country, and the population knew it. But Sebestyen’s argument goes against the majority of other accounts from the chaotic period. To most Hungarians, snippets of news about an imminent Soviet threat were merely rumors, brushed aside by most as fear

34 Mikes, *The Hungarian Revolution*, 151-152.
35 Pfeiffer, *Child of Communism*, 231.
40 Ibid., 254.
mongering or idle gossip.\(^{41}\) In fact the truth was deliberately concealed from the general population by Nagy, who imposed a strict ban on the publication of “all news of an alarming nature.”\(^{42}\) Nagy and his government were relatively informed and considerably concerned, but most Hungarians remained blissfully unaware. On November 2 there was a major public outcry when the government cancelled the following day’s football match between Hungary and Sweden.\(^{43}\) The objection demonstrated Hungarians’ renewed sense of safety, and their readiness to return to everyday life.

Friday November 2 was indeed a happy day in Hungary. The previous morning Nagy had announced the country’s neutrality and withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact.\(^{44}\) Budapestians began to get on with their lives in a state of “nervous calm.”\(^{45}\) The following day appeared even brighter. People started back at their places of work, taking the trams that were now up and running again after a week of inaction. “To many,” recalls Meray, “it was a pleasure to be able to climb once again the steps of one of those yellow cars.”\(^{46}\) The people “paid their fares almost cheerfully.” Mikes’ account of November 3 depicts the same triumphant atmosphere. He even goes so far as to describe an “unsuspecting and hilariously happy Budapest.”\(^{47}\) Life really did seem to be returning to some semblance of normality for residents of the city. Local producers even began to compile a documentary about the events of the uprising, their enthusiasm demonstrating confidence that the situation was rapidly improving.\(^{48}\)

Underpinning this sense of nervous calm was the belief that the eyes of the world were fixed on Hungary’s plight; the international community was considered poised for action should Hungarians need their help.\(^{49}\) Yet the reality was very different. During the Polish protests, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made his country’s position very clear. The U.S. was completely in support of Poland’s struggle for democratization, but to have “outsiders” hurrying the process by military means would, he insinuated, be insulting.\(^{50}\) Dulles’s take on the wants and needs of the Polish freedom fighters was mirrored in international attitudes to

\(^{41}\) Barber, *Seven Days of Freedom*, 167.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 148.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 166.


\(^{46}\) Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, 218.


\(^{48}\) Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, 219.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 221; Council of Free Trade Unions, *Nepakarat*, November 2, 1956, in Melvin Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution*, 204.

the Hungarian uprising.\textsuperscript{51} In a State Department circular, Dulles brushes aside Hungarians’ ongoing fight for sovereignty, maintaining that “regardless [of the] military outcome, events have unquestionably strengthened [the] position [of the] people…and unsettled [the] status [of] Soviet occupation troops.”\textsuperscript{52} But the truth behind America’s position on the Eastern European unrest was far more about fear than any kind of moral high ground. President Eisenhower made this very clear in a speech to the National Security Council on the morning of October 26:

With the deterioration of the Soviet Union’s hold over its satellites, might not the Soviet Union be tempted to resort to extreme measures, even to start a world war? This is a possibility we must watch with extreme care.\textsuperscript{53}

The international community’s strategies and policies on the Hungarian Revolution may have been clear to those in the West, but little of this information trickled down to the Hungarian people. Rumors ran rife about the imminent arrival of Western troops. One such tale told of a young freedom fighter who had spoken to United Nations troops stationed along the Austro-Hungarian border. The soldiers had supposedly assured him that they were on alert, ready to cross into Hungary should Nagy extend an invitation for their assistance.\textsuperscript{54} Such reports boosted the morale and confidence of the populace, but also led to even greater shock when no assistance came and Soviet forces crushed the revolution. There were of course no troops stationed at Hungary’s border. Now, not even Imre Nagy could be counted on. By the end of the day on November 4, Nagy had sought political asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy.\textsuperscript{55}

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\item[51] Ibid., 783-784.
\item[54] Meray, \textit{Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin}, 220-221.
\item[55] Ibid., 239.
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On November 4, when Soviet troops invaded Budapest, the Hungarian people began to realize their dire situation was not about to be remedied by any international force. Desperate radio appeals flooded the airwaves, many of which were particularly poignant:

Civilized peoples of the world! We implore you in the name of justice, freedom, and the binding moral principle of active solidarity to help us. Our ship is sinking. Light is failing. The shadows grow darker every hour over the soil of Hungary. Listen to our cry, civilized peoples of the world, and act. Extend us your fraternal aid.

The fact that no such aid came was shock enough for most Hungarians, but adding to their dismay was a growing unease at what might come with the Soviet invasion. Their disbelief at the intervention did not stop with the events of November 4, but carried into the immediate future, a time when the Russians might...
seek retribution for the dissidence of the preceding weeks. Everyone had a son, daughter, neighbor, or friend who had been involved in action against the Soviets. The Hungarian people were all too aware that the failure of the uprising would have serious consequences. There would be a thorough investigation undertaken as to exactly who had taken part in the revolution, and punishment would most certainly be carried out. As Michael Korda acknowledges, “There is always a terrible price to be paid for a revolution that has failed, and the Hungarians were about to pay it.”

**Aftermath: Legacy of a Revolution Lost**

In the days following the Soviet intervention, Hungary lost a significant proportion of its population. The Russians used mass deportation as a means of both punishing those involved in the uprising, as well as frightening friends, families, and neighbors into submission. Hungarians, young ones in particular, were rounded up in the streets and packed onto trains headed for the Soviet Union. Though some trainloads were freed by Hungarian railway men, many others were unable to be saved. The number of exiled persons remains a mystery because of the cloud of refutation and shock under which the deportations occurred. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, a General Grebennik, argued that “No deportations have taken place, but individual units have arrested and deported people on their own initiative.” According to Mikes, the General never attempted to explain his contradiction.

Despite the large scale of the deportations, more Hungarians left by choice than were forced out by the Soviets. Both Benziger and Korda describe the grim procession of refugees across Hungary’s borders as people “voting with their feet” against communism. Korda puts the number of Hungarian refugees crossing into Germany and Austria in 1956 at more than 100,000. Again, the numbers are disputed. Benziger and Pryce-Jones maintain the number was double that. Regardless of the final figure, four to seven thousand refugees were crossing the frontier every night, and for some time the Soviet forces barely lifted a finger to stop them. Mikes gives a simple and credible explanation for the refugees’ relative ease of escape: mass exodus saved Russian soldiers the hassle of forced deportations, and

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58 Korda, *Journey to a Revolution*, 188.
63 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 202.
focused the eyes of the West on the plight of Hungarians abroad above those at home.  

Lessons Learned? A Conclusion

The aftermath of Hungary’s 1956 Revolution was undoubtedly tumultuous and distressing for those involved. The pain and shock of a national cause lost was perhaps the biggest blow to most Hungarians. Analyzing exactly why this shock was so great can go some way to understanding the mechanisms of the revolution, the reasons for its failure, and possibly even warning signs for similar events in the future.

In Hungary, the shock of the Soviet intervention was devastating. It led to widespread fear of retribution, demonstrated by the number of Hungarians fleeing their homeland in the days immediately following the Soviet invasion. This article has recounted the Soviet shock, analyzing the events leading up to the very fateful day of November 4. Ultimately, it has established three key causes of Hungarian disbelief: the sense of normality in the days leading up to the invasion, a false conviction in the international community’s readiness to react, and an undercurrent of fear at the prospect of Russian retribution.

The depth of the people’s anguish is summed up by two lines of a poem, written by a Hungarian student in December of 1956. The student paints a solemn picture of the ruthlessness of Soviet expansionism in Hungary. “We are cut and fallen” he writes poignantly, “like wheat in the reaper....”

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68 Ibid., 173.
69 Hungarian Student (anon.), “Too Late,” in Melvin Lasky, ed., The Hungarian Revolution, 250.
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Divine Right and Human Consent: Renovations of English Political Thought, 1603-1689

Emily Hawley

The Randolph Stone Award for Historical Writing is given in honor of the first teacher of English history at Ohio University to promote and reward excellence in the writing of history. These awards are made annually for the best undergraduate term papers on historical topics. There are two categories: research papers and short essays. The following paper is the 2011 second-place winner of the historical research category.

In the time between the ascension of James I to the English throne in 1603 and the appointment of William and Mary to the same position in 1689, a revolution occurred in political thought. This revolution was characterized by a change in conceptions of monarchs’ power as they related to the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. While—after enduring a traumatic “un-kingship”—the English upheld the belief that the presence of a monarch was necessary and good, the prevailing view of the origins and bounds of the crown’s power was profoundly altered. Whereas before the experience of the civil wars and interregnum the English had fundamentally agreed with the proposition that God alone ordained and restricted the monarchs’ power, by 1689 the mainstream of political thought clearly articulated that the crown was answerable to Parliament and the people—and was rightly limited by the contractual relationship from whence their power originated.

In 1603, practically all of English society accepted the notion of a Great Chain of Being, with a divinely sanctioned monarch at the top. James I was a staunch proponent of divine right, and argued adamantly that God alone could judge kings, who—even if wicked—were “preferred by God above all other ranks and

Emily Hawley is a senior at Ohio University. She will graduate in June 2012 with a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in history and economics and a European Studies Certificate. After graduation, Emily will pursue a Ph. D in history at Princeton University. Her graduate studies will focus on the economic history of twentieth-century Italy and European integration.
degrees of men.” In agreement with widespread opinion of the day, James wrote, “I grant indeed that a wicked king is sent by God for a curse to his people, and a plague for their sins. But that it is lawful for them to shake off that curse at their own hand, which God has laid on them, that I deny, and may do so justly.”

He specifically denied the existence of any contract made between the king and his people at his coronation in 1603, and discounted the legitimacy of any attempt to hold the sovereign to his willing promise to “discharge honourably and truly the office given him by God over them.”

James I was not alone in touting the primacy of the crown. Persons across the political spectrum adhered to these same beliefs and sought to accomplish their agendas in accordance with the divine right of their monarch to hold unlimited authority over matters political, religious, and otherwise. Puritans seeking relief from religious persecution in 1603 delivered the Millenary Petition to James, and prefaced their requests:

Seeing it has pleased the Divine majesty, to the great comfort of all good Christians, to advance your highness, according to your just title, to the peaceable government of this Church and Commonwealth of England… [we] could do no less in our obedience to God, service to your majesty, love to His Church, than to acquaint your princely majesty with our particular griefs.

Likewise, even the Form of Apology and Satisfaction—a shocking document that was never formally approved by the Commons nor actually delivered to James—referred constantly to the majesty and sovereignty of the king, while never offering harsher condemnation of the new monarch than the assertion that he had been misinformed about the rights of the estates.

Even as financial problems plagued the royal court and debates about religious innovation grew more heated, decisions such as that in Bate’s Case in 1606—regarding extraordinary taxation of exports to generate revenue for the crown—reinforced James’s power. In a 1610 address to Parliament, James again asserted—without rebuttal—that “the state of the monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth. For kings are not only God’s lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God’s throne, but even by God himself they are called gods.” Nonetheless, the increasing frustration of at least a sizeable minority of political elites over what they perceived as inappropriate exercise of royal prerogative. The Protestation of 1621 reveals an

2 Ibid., 102.
3 Ibid., 103.
6 James VI and I, A Speech to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-hall (1610), in Divine Right and Democracy, 107.
increasing tendency by the House of Commons to characterize their rights as protected by the Ancient Constitution, although they were not explicitly enumerated, and to perceive the king’s actions as arbitrary and popish. Still, no attempt was made to call into question the divine ordinance of the office of king, or to otherwise undertake innovation of the fundamental premises upon which the hierarchy of English social and political life was established.\footnote{House of Commons, “The Protestation of 1621,” in Constitutional Documents of the reign of James I, Parts 1603–1625, edited by Joseph Robson Tanner (London: Cambridge University, 1930), 288.}

Rather, clergyman Roger Maynwaring and Robert Sibthorpe offered strong expressions of the doctrine of divine right and divine limitation of monarchical power declaring in 1627:

All powers created are of God; no power, unless it be given from above...Among all the powers that be ordained of God the regal is most high, strong and large: kings [are] above all, inferior to none, to no multitudes of men, to no Angels, to no order of Angels... No power in the world or in the hierarchy of the Church can lay restraint upon these supreme; therefore theirs [is] the strongest...[As for Parliament], though such assemblies as are of the highest and greatest representatives of a kingdom be most sacred and honourable, and necessary also for those ends to which they were first instituted, yet know we must that ordained they were not to this end, to contribute any right to kings.\footnote{Robert Maynwaring, “Religion and Allegiance,” in The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary, edited by J.P. Kenyon (London: Cambridge University, 1986), 14-16.}

Admittedly, this affirmation comes from a sermon preached before Charles I in the early stages of his campaign to promote Arminianism among a disconcerted populace. Arminianism stood in contrast to orthodox Calvinism, and was considered heretical by the Church of England. The intensity of such assertions represented the defense of the crown against equally polar—and far more innovative—puritan claims regarding the nature of monarchical power.

The Petition of Right marked an important assertion of subjects’ rights, which later proponents of the restoration of the crown would harken back to as an appropriate model for balancing the constraints and sovereignty of a monarch. This document, in a sense, represented a more articulate version of the claims made in 1621. In examining the evolving claims of the Commons, it is crucial to note the basis for their assertions. In 1628, far from being grounded in innovative claims about the nature of the monarch’s power, the basis for the Commons’ contentions remained founded in historical precedents.\footnote{See The Petition of Right (1628), in Divine Right and Democracy, 166-171.} In that same year, Charles issued The King’s Declaration Prefixed to the Articles of Religion, a reassertion of the traditional view:

That we are supreme Governor of the Church of England: and that if any difference arise about the external policy, concerning the injunctions, canons, and other constitutions whatsoever thereto belonging, the Clergy in their
Convocation is to order and settle them, having first obtained leave under our broad seal to do so: and we approving their said ordinances and constitutions; providing that none be made contrary to the laws and customs of the land.\textsuperscript{10}

Clearly, the king’s tone is more moderate than James’s discourses or the sermons of Maynwaring—particularly in respect to the mention of the “laws and customs of the land” as distinct from the king’s own will. While the storm to come was still far from inevitable at the close of the 1620s, the building tension was at this point becoming evident.

Still, in 1641, the Protestation issued by Parliament insisted that the threat of papism and arbitrary government was “to the hazard of his majesty’s royal person,” and affirmed that the protestors swore to defend “true reformed Protestant religion…according to the duty of my allegiance to his majesty’s royal person, honour, and estate.” The fundamental difference between this document and earlier declarations, though, is the additional pledge of loyalty to “the power and privilege of Parliament, [and] the lawful rights of the subjects.”\textsuperscript{11} While the Protestation of 1621 and The Petition of Right asserted privileges belonging to Parliament and the people, the Protestation of 1641 exemplified a much more forceful repudiation of unrestrained monarchical power.\textsuperscript{12} To be clear, it did not present a rejection of the divine ordinance or necessity of monarchs as such; rather, it represented innovation in the conception of the specific powers an individual ruler is entitled to by virtue of the royal office.

Writing shortly after the outbreak of the First Civil War in 1642, Philip Hunton propounded mainstream sentiment on the nature of monarchical power and the questions surrounding Charles I in particular. On the subject of the origins of a monarch’s power, Hunton wrote, “let no man think that it is any lessening or weakening of God, yet, when by the disposing hand of God’s providence a right is conveyed to a person, or family, by the means of a public fundamental oath, contract and agreement of a state, it is equivalent then to a divine word.”\textsuperscript{13} Hunton’s treatise sought to find a middle ground between the most extreme defenses of royal power and those that asserted early theories of parliamentary sovereignty. He elaborated on

\textsuperscript{10} The King’s Declaration Prefixed to the Articles of Religion, in Documents Illustrative of English Church History, edited by Henry Gee (London: Macmillan, 1914), 418-420.


\textsuperscript{12} The growing desperation of the crown to provide a popularly acceptable response to such claims comes through in His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament, in Divine Right and Democracy, 171-74. In it, Charles I attempts to convince his legislature that the present arrangement of English politics offers all the benefits of absolute monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, without the short-comings of any of these. The tone of the piece seems almost pathetic, and the civil war that broke out shortly after lends proof enough to the conclusion that all was not well in England, as Charles I self-interestedly insisted.

\textsuperscript{13} Philip Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, in Divine Right and Democracy, edited by David Wooton (Indianapolis, Hackett 2003), 175-211.
the view that there are three degrees of absoluteness in a monarch. Clearly, Hunton favored the third and most moderate degree, in which a sovereign “not only sets down an express rule and law to govern by, but also promises and engages himself, in many cases, not to alter that rule.” Hunton insisted that this monarch was absolute in his power, as the people still owed absolute subjection.\footnote{Hunton, in \textit{Divine Right}, 179.}

Nonetheless, Hunton’s view represented a departure from the older divine right tradition, which would have never (as Hunton did) recognized the possibility of a monarch giving “illegal commands,” nor of a transgression by the monarch for which “prevention by resistance ought to be.”\footnote{Ibid., 185, 188.} It was upon these grounds that the Parliamentarians raised civil war in order to restrain Charles I—though certainly not to depose him, let alone commit regicide.

Civil war only served to radicalize both sides and forced people who did not feel strongly either way to align themselves. To some extent, the persistent view of the king’s power—if not his legitimacy—among even the most rebellious of Calvinists (whose theology permitted them to consider deposing their king) raised the stakes of the civil wars, consequently pushing some to accept more extreme views on the extent of Charles’s transgression and the appropriate means of dealing with him. This was reflected in an exchange between Richard Montagu, Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell in 1644. Said Manchester, “if we beat the King ninety and nine times yet he is King still, and so will his posterity be after him, but if the King beats us once we shall all be hanged, and our posterity made slaves.” To this, Cromwell responded, “My lord, if this be so, why did we take up arms at first? This is against fighting ever hereafter; if so, let us make peace, be it never so base.”\footnote{Quoted in \textit{Oliver Cromwell: Politics and Religion in the English Revolution, 1640-1658}, edited by D.L. Smith (London: Cambridge University, 1991), 17-18.}

Revealed herein are the increasingly divergent views held by those within the Parliamentary forces. On one hand were those who still believed in rightness of the monarchical office, albeit with some limitation; on the other was an active and increasingly hostile minority that would be seduced by the idea of regicide.

In late 1647, “agitators” within the New Model Army presented An Agreement of the People. The document proposed the first written constitution in English history—the contents of which reflected Leveller ideas about democratic procedure. The only mention of the king found anywhere in this important document on governmental authority is the closing reference to “him that intended our bondage, and brought a cruel war upon us.”\footnote{An Agreement of the People, in \textit{Divine Right}, 285.} Instead, all concern is given to the proper selection of representatives whose “power…is inferior only to theirs who choose them, and does extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or persons” (i.e. the monarch).\footnote{An Agreement of the People, in \textit{Divine Right}, 284.}
out in An Agreement of the People were debated by the General Council of the Army in the October 1647 Putney Debates. Transcripts of the second day’s debate reveal still further divisions within the Army, between Levellers and Grandees. Within the New Model Army, these two opposing movements represented, respectively, a demand for popular sovereignty and the senior officers who disagreed with such a radical proposition. Both groups, however, clearly rejected the primacy of the monarch as the source of rights or maker of policy. These texts exemplify what could almost be characterized as a slow degeneration in respect for the authority of the king among those who held political sway (particularly the army). Even as 1647 came to a close, though, talk of regicide and a republic was far from public discussion, and most of the English population still saw the monarch as the rightful head of the body politic. It was the extent of his power, however, which the civil wars called into question.

With Pride’s Purge and the formation of the Rump Parliament on December 5, 1648, the group which held the most extreme views on limitation of the monarchy seized control of the political apparatus. A prayer meeting at Windsor Castle in early 1648 had galvanized opinion among this group’s leadership against what they saw as Charles’s challenge to a providential victory in the Second Civil War, ultimately pushing them to settle on a course from which there was no return. After this meeting, the king was no longer referred to by his title, but simply as “Charles Stuart.” The most powerful military officers accepted that England must be freed from the tyranny of monarchy entirely. Even the Rump had trouble accepting regicide. Many members either were not present on the day Parliament met to pass Charles’s death warrant or were physically forced to sign the document. Charles was executed on January 30, 1649, and on March 17 Parliament passed An Act for the Abolishing the Kingly Office.

The act declared that Charles was found guilty of treason and executed “by authority derived from Parliament,” and that it had been determined “unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to the liberty, safety and public interest of the people” to have power invested in a monarch. The implication was clearly that those penning the document believed the monarchy an entirely man-made construct that could be disposed of entirely when deemed necessary. This was nearly the polar opposite of the view espoused by prominent writers just a decade or two earlier. It is important to consider, though, that most people in England had doubts about taking the degradation of divine right this far.

People of all political inclinations soon realized that the Commonwealth and then Protectorate would not be the Calvinist utopia for which they (at least some) had hoped. William Allen’s sardonic pamphlet, Killing Noe Murder, which advocated Cromwell’s assassination, conveys the frustration and fear felt under the Lord Protector’s hand, even by those who had sided with the Parliamentarians.

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20 An Act for the Abolishing of the Kingly Office, in Divine Right and Democracy, 355-356.
21 William Allen, Killing Noe Murder, in Divine Right and Democracy, 360-388.
Despite the fact that the very office of king had been dissolved, the legacy of monarchical power provided some striking reminders of the stability it afforded. The fact that the Commonwealth and Protectorate levied far higher and equally arbitrary taxes as those during Charles I’s rule only made people remember the kingship all the more fondly. As the 1650s wore on, the English were increasingly aware that it would perhaps be easier to limit a monarch than to limit Cromwell. As Lord Protector, Cromwell had all of the powers of a king—and perhaps greater control over the army—without the restraint prescribed by tradition.

By 1657, even many of those closest to Cromwell wished for the return of the monarchy and attempted to engineer the crowning of Cromwell as king. The Humble Petition and Advice sought to bestow upon Cromwell the crown of England, in essence giving the traditional title to the prerogatives he already held. While Cromwell did not accept the kingly office, he did accept the rest of the requests laid out in The Humble Petition and Advice. This document called for the reinstatement of the House of Lords, implementation of hereditary succession (via Cromwell’s right to appoint a successor), and, effectively, the reinstatement of the Triennial Act of 1641 to insure that Parliament met for at least one session every three years.²² Although it was unsuccessful, this marked the first time Parliament would endeavor to semi-contractually create a king.

Following Cromwell’s death on September 3, 1658, his eldest—though not most competent—surviving son assumed his place as Lord Protector. Richard Cromwell had little of his father’s personality, and soon lost control of politics to the portion of the New Model Army stationed in Britain. Much of the summer and fall of 1659 consisted of a veritable tug-of-war between General Charles Fleetwood’s army and the restored Rump. By February 1660, though, General George Monck had completed a measured march from Scotland to London, bringing with him the only fully-paid troops in the New Model Army. None knew what to expect from him, but his decision to force the Rump (which first reassembled itself into the entirety of the old Long Parliament) to immediately hold elections and dissolve itself ultimately opened the door to the return of the monarchy. The elections resulted in the incredibly moderate Convention Parliament, full of Royalists and sympathetic Presbyterians. The first open voting in decades confirmed the notion of the rightness of a monarchy in the English conscience.

This also reinforced what Roger L’Estrange had written to General Monck just months before, seeking to convince him of “the manifest inclination of the whole people, now to Monarchy,” based in part upon the feeling that the laws and institutions of England were “habituated to that air and diet” of monarchy.²³ The subscript “Optima Libertas, ubi Rex, cum Lege, Gubernat,” (The Best Liberty, where

the King, with Law, Governs) served well to sum up L’Estrange’s—and most Englishmen’s—conception of right government at the Restoration. There were, admittedly, defenders of republicanism, including John Milton, whose The Readie & Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth served as the opposite appeal to L’Estrange’s at the crucial moment when all awaited Monck’s next move. Not even Milton ventured so far as to proclaim the Commonwealth blameless, and in his attempt to explain its failing he ended up raising some of the most logical points in favor of the Restoration. In his words, these shortcomings “may be ascribed with most reason to the frequent disturbances, interruptions and dissolutions which the Parliament hath had partly from the impatient or disaffected people, partly from some ambitious leaders in the armie.”

The freely elected, moderate Convention Parliament seemed to agree. In April 1660, Parliament invited Charles Stuart to assume his murdered father’s post as king of England. On May 29, 1660, King Charles II arrived in London, greeted by a much-rejoicing populace.

The Declaration of Breda—issued by Charles II prior to his restoration as king of England—shows, however, that it was a somewhat different sort of monarch who assumed that ancient office. Though Charles’s advisors doubtless composed the declaration in consideration of what they believed the Parliament in England wanted, the overall tone—not to mention the specific concessions—within the document revealed the fundamental shift in conceptions of the monarch’s power that had taken place as a result of the “un-kingship experience.” The very fact that Charles and those in exile with him gave so much thought to granting certain indulgences while remaining strategically vague in their plans for his return demonstrated a newly built-in understanding that the king’s power had to be tempered by concern for Parliament and the people’s demands.

Not only did Charles “grant a free and general pardon” to all but those excepted by Parliament, he also declared “that no man should be disquieted or called in question for differences of matters of opinion in matter of religion, which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom.” Furthermore, he agreed to recognize all “grants and purchases of estates” undertaken during the interregnum. This was not all, though: in the declaration, Charles had also agreed to consent to any act of Parliament undertaken “for the just satisfaction of all men who are concerned,” as well as to pay all of Monck’s troops.

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24 L’Estrange, in Struggle for Sovereignty, 493.
from the continent sounded nothing like the firm dispensations of his grandfather or even his father.28

The first part of Charles II’s rule—up to around 1670—consisted of successful cooperation between the king and Parliament, due in large part to the entwined pathologies of a monarch eager not to be forced back into exile (or worse, suffer his father’s fate) and a parliament with an equally fresh memory of the past two decades.29 As financial troubles again began to plague the crown, though, Charles II exercised the royal prerogative more extensively. At the same time, hysteria over the alleged Popish Plot to assassinate Charles, worked alongside tension resulting from the subsequent Exclusion Crisis to prevent the Catholic James II from being named heir to his brother’s throne and solidification of the first political parties to prompt the composition of some of the most enduring works of political philosophy.

While these works sprang from the specific conditions of the 1670s, they built upon ideas that had emerged in the more immediate aftermath of the civil wars. On the side of the Tories, Sir Robert Filmer penned Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings Asserted—though written during the 1650s, its application to the issues of the early 1680s is revealing of the strength of Tory feeling toward Charles II and the office of king generally. In a return to the comparative—and confident—language of The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, or of Maynwaring’s sermon, Filmer declared:

I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man else, can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself; it follows that civil power not only in general is by divine institution, but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents, which quite takes away that new and common distinction which refers only power universal and absolute to God, but power respective in regard of the special form of government to the choice of the people.30

Not only did Filmer defend the origin of monarchy as proper, he also enumerated three basic powers that he saw as “the chiefest marks of ‘sovereignty’ that are found in any monarch:” the privilege and exercise of judgment in capital crimes, the power to make war, and the complimentary authority and legitimacy to arrange peace.31

28 For example, the Declaration of Breda opens: “If the general distraction and confusion which is spread over the whole kingdom doth not awaken all men to a desire and longing that those wounds…may be bound up, all we can say is to no purpose.” Gardiner, in Constitutional Documents, 465.

29 This led the Cavalier Parliament to explicitly associate religious conformity with loyalty to the government, and to begin to take measures to (they believed) stabilize the political scene in England. Charles responded by making a number of concessions from his own preference for religious toleration. These concessions included the Corporation Act (1661), Quaker Act (1662), Uniformity Act (1662), Five Mile Act (1665), and first and Second Conventicle Acts (1664 and 1670). These acts can be found in Documents Illustrative of English Church History, edited by Henry Gee (London: Macmillan, 1914). All enforced conformity with the liturgy of the Church of England.


31 Ibid.
Additionally, harkening back to Tudor and previous precedents, Filmer wrote, “What is hitherto affirmed of the dependency and subjection of the common law to the sovereign prince, the same may be said as well of all statute laws; for the king is the sole immediate author, corrector, and moderator of them also.”32 Of this claim, even some supporters of the monarchy might have been skeptical. Nonetheless, this is the sort of polarized political theory that came to the center of public discourse in the late 1670s and early 1680s, and to which John Locke responded with an oppositely extreme view.

In his famous Two Treatises of Government, Locke propounded a perspective that would come to have an unimaginable impact on the development of Western political thought and governmental practice, even into the modern era. One reason that the texts’ contributions to democratic theory are so extraordinary, though, is precisely because they ended up on the losing side of the Exclusion era philosophical fight. After accusing Filmer of intending to “persuade all men that they are slaves and ought to be so”—and spending, in fact, the whole First Treatise of Government specifically berating the late royalist author—Locke developed an alternate explanation for the origins of government. The idea that all men are naturally in “a state of perfect freedom” and “a state also of equality”—in which the subjection of a child to their parent “is but a temporary one” (a direct rebuttal of Filmer’s logic)—amounted to a philosophical innovation of epic proportions.33 In part because of its unprecedented rationale, and even more as a consequence of the massive effort exerted by Charles and the Tories to bolster the crown’s power, Locke’s treatises were not widely accepted when first circulated.

An important piece of the royal propaganda aimed at silencing Locke and other Whigs was John Dryden’s skillfully crafted Absalom and Achitophel. In this document, Dryden argued that:

To change foundations, cast the frame anew, / Is work for rebels, who base ends pursue,” and queries, “What prudent men a settled throne would shake? / For whatsoe’er their sufferings were before, / That change they covet makes them suffer more. / All other errors but disturb the state, / But innovation is the blow of fate.34

Absalom and Achitophel—with its heroic structure, and likening of Charles II to the biblical King David and the wayward Monmouth to Absalom—effectively conveyed the sentiment that, if not necessarily wildly popular, would at least remain officially acceptable for the duration of Charles II’s rule. Between printed argument and the convincingly anti-Whig purges in all levels of English government, when Charles died (passing the throne to James II) in 1685, it certainly seemed that

32 Ibid., 297.
Dryden’s conclusion, “Once more the godlike David was restored, / And willing
nations knew their lawful lord” applied to England. It is important to recognize
that the work of authors like Filmer was disseminated as part of a wave of Tory
extremism and popular anti-papist hysteria. Although few people at the time of
James II’s ascension would have subscribed to Locke’s views on monarchy, neither
would they have taken kindly to the idea that the monarch was unconstrained by the
Common Law or any other part of the Ancient Constitution. Dryden’s view—that,
in fact, monarchy was based both on divine sanction and a sort of contract between
the ruler and the people (or the wise ones, at least)—resonated more with the
majority of Englishmen. Having seen that he could exercise royal prerogative in such
a way as to sufficiently maintain their nation’s stability, by the time of Charles II’s
death most people were willing to at least give James II a chance to make his own
mistakes.

Political mistakes were something James would make plenty of in his three
years as king of England—not least among these being his perceived attempt to
return England to Catholicism through a policy of relatively extensive religious
freedom. Whether or not he personally believed the principle he was proclaiming,
James’s statement of intent in The Declaration of Indulgence—to unite the people of
England under him “by no means so effectually as by granting them the free exercise
of religion”—represented a disastrous miscalculation of the temperament of the
English people. This, and numerous similar misperceptions regarding just how
much obedience he could leverage from the populace by virtue of his post, eventually
led political elites to take matters into their own hands for the second time in only a
few decades. This time, though, they were more patient: not until a Catholic heir was
produced, and the succession moved away from James’s protestant daughters, did the
Immortal Seven beseech William of Orange (husband of their king’s eldest daughter
Mary, the former heir) to invade the country. By 1689, when this happened, the
“rebels” had a remarkably well-articulated theory of government—reinforced by the
lingering memory of the interregnum—to direct actions that they hoped would lead
to a less traumatic foreseeable (though admittedly still uncertain) end.

In fact, the conceptions of monarchical power fostered by those who sought
James II’s overthrow did not lead them to intentionally set England down the path it
would ultimately take. Their request for William and Mary to share the throne did
not presuppose the hands-off rule the two would conduct. Rather, English political
elites—and, by all indications, the vast majority of the population—fundamentally
believed in 1689 that the office of the monarch was installed by God and ought to be
preserved for the sake of the people as well as out of pious deference to divinely
ordained hierarchy. Although it does not follow from this that the English monarch
would end up a mere figurehead for a parliamentary democracy, the popular view of
royal power in 1689 was fundamentally different from that espoused by mainstream

35 Ibid., 1815.
36 The Declaration of Indulgence, in Documents Illustrative of English Church History, edited by Henry
divine right advocates in the early 1600s. Indeed, in the wake of the civil wars, the “unkingship,” and Exclusion Crisis, English political philosophy seemed almost to have struck a compromise between divine right and constitutional monarchy. In 1689, the widely ascribed-to view of a legitimate monarch was of a leader who held both divine sanction and popular consent. This demonstrated, as much as anything else, the English people’s ability and desire to formulate an elegant but amorphous basis from which to pursue their various religious innovations in an environment made stable by a traditional political authority.
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