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Tag Archives: Law
University of California of San Diego
May 9th, 2002, 4:00 to 5:30 pm
Anderson Auditorium (Scripps Hall)
Sentencing, Science, & Philosophy: Philosophical Issues in the Use of Expert Testimony During Federal Sentencing
October 25th, 2002, 4:00 to 5:00 pm
Ellis Hall 024
Mr. Allenbaugh is an Associate at Montedonico, Belcuore & Tazzara, P.C. in Washington, D.C., and is an Adjunct Professor in the Philosophy Department at the George Washington University where he has taught courses in the Philosophy of Law, and Ethics in Business and the Professions. Prior to entering private practice, he served as a Staff Attorney for the United States Sentencing Commission where he was assigned to the Economic Crimes Policy Team and the Terrorism Team. Mr. Allenbaugh has published numerous articles on sentencing and criminal justice, and is a co-editor of Sentencing, Sanctions, and Corrections: Law, Policy, and Practice (2d ed., Foundation Press, 2002). He holds a B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Southern California (1993), an M.A. in Philosophy from Ohio University (1995), and a J.D. from American University’s Washington College of Law (2000). He can be reached at Mark.Allenbaugh@mbt-legal.com.
November 1st, 2002, 4:00 to 5:00 pm
Ellis Hall 024
Jim Sallah is a Senior Counsel with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement in Miami, Florida. His responsibilities include investigating and, when warranted, prosecuting violations of the federal securities laws. Prior to joining the SEC he was Assistant General Counsel for Raymond James Financial, Inc., the largest brokerage institution in the Southeastern United States. While at Raymond James, Mr. Sallah represented the firm and its associates in both federal and state courts, as well as in arbitrations before the NASD. Mr. Sallah is an active member of the Florida Bar Association, and has served on the executive committee of its Business Law Section. He is licensed to practice in both Florida and Colorado.
Mr. Sallah holds a B.S.C. (1991) and M.A. (1993) from Ohio University, and a J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law (1996). While in law school, Mr. Sallah was a member of the University of Miami Law Review and was elected to the Order of the Coif.
James Dreier, Brown University
January 15th, 2004, 8:00 to 9:30 pm
In legal reasoning, and especially when judges and juries reason their way to verdicts, we long for absolutely certain, deductive proofs. But the world does not, by and large, cooperate with our ideals, and legal reasoning like almost all practical reasoning involves and often turns on claims and inferences about which we can have only partial, uncertain confidence: probable reasoning, that is to say. Sometimes reasons for thinking a defendant guilty are merely probable in a special way: they are statistical reasons, and the reasoning that judges and juries engage is statistical reasoning. Intuitively there seems to be something wrong with “merely statistical reasoning” when it results in a verdict, especially when it results in a verdict against a defendant. I survey some examples and some accounts of what is wrong with “mere statistical reasoning” in the law. Analysis of the examples and accounts should, I argue, leave us puzzled. I conclude with a radical suggestion.